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INTRODUCTION
One of the most significant lessons that this planet has learned from
its twentieth-century venture into globalization is the importance of not
leaving any nation or population behind in the frantic race toward progress,
prosperity, and plenty. Globalization must benefit everyone or the entire
world will suffer the consequences when any exploited and neglected group
of people insists on its right to a decent economic lifestyle. The world is
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now so inter-connected by its communication networks and air, road, and
sea travel routes that information is disseminated instantaneously across
the planet. The result is that there are very few really remote areas left
and populations have now acquired a universal consensus in terms of their
rising expectations about a better life. Go to any part of the world today
and people’s goals are similar—sufficient food, a decent wage, a comfort-
able home, education for their children, and good health care are on almost
everyone’s wish list. The problem is that while globalization has undoubt-
edly made human beings across the planet more aware of each other and
therefore more attuned to diverse cultures and to what constitutes a desir-
able way of life, it has also raised expectations to the point where lack of
achievement breeds an acute sense of alienation and resentment. This
resentment grows more acute when it becomes apparent that there are
some fortunate souls who enjoy a comfortable, even luxurious life—virtual
islands of prosperity surrounded by a sea of poverty, hunger, and misery.
These disparities in the division of the global economic pie are now not as
easily tolerated by those whose share is minuscule. Unfortunately, as the
first decade of this new millennium comes to a close, we have not yet been
able to close sufficiently the gap between the haves and have-nots, nor
to alleviate the misery of those for whom getting something–anything–
to eat is the main challenge of each day. In short, globalization has not
yet reached the entire globe and therein lies the potential for all the
political and economic threats of our time. The world today faces a
dichotomy wherein there is a globalization of human expectations and
aspirations but only local, insular pockets of affluence and political influ-
ence. Those disparities pose our biggest challenge and constitute the grav-
est threat for the so-called “First World”, which, until the recent recession,
has enjoyed the highest standard of living ever achieved in human history.
One of the most significant cases to demonstrate the truth of the
maxim that no people should be left behind is Somalia—an ancient land,
now deprived for decades of any effective government; a failed state, prey
to violent and oppressive marauders; a country where the one growth
industry happens to be piracy and where environmental degradation has
added to the misery and tragedy that mark everyday life. As Bruce
Hickling, of the International Rescue Committee stated, “[t]he piracy
epidemic is just one symptom of the appalling humanitarian conditions
and chronic instability in Somalia.”1 Somalia’s long-simmering political
1 Int’l Rescue Comm., Focus on Piracy Must Not Divert Attention from Massive
Humanitarian Needs of Somalis, Apr. 22, 2009, http://www.theirc.org/news/focus-piracy
-must-not-divert-attention-massive-humanitarian-needs-somalia-irc-media-release-4468.
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and economic crisis resulted in anarchy, social breakdown, and acute
misery for its civilian population.2 The meltdown of law and order insti-
tutions in that state gave the green light for infamous bands of Somali
pirates to hijack and loot foreign ships, supertankers, yachts, container
vessels, and sailboats traversing the very popular ocean trade route be-
tween Europe and the West that goes past Somalia’s very long coastline in
the Horn of Africa.3 Most significantly, the pirates have attacked American
shipping, an action guaranteed to bring their story to the forefront of world
news.4 Where piracy is concerned, “anyone can be a target.”5
By hunting international prey, the pirates brought the political
crisis prevailing in their homeland back into the consciousness of the
world.6 Ironically, by globalizing their own predatory crimes, the pirates of
Somalia may have indirectly publicized internationally the terrible com-
bination of misrule, oppression, environmental pollution, and economic col-
lapse with attendant poverty and hunger that afflicts the lives of millions
of Somalis.
By most accounts, the Somali pirates have been, by and large, very
successful at their infamous venture.7 As Jeffrey Gettleman commented:
“In Somalia, it seems, crime does pay. Actually, it is one of the few indus-
tries that does.”8 International piracy, by one estimate, costs the global
economy approximately $10 billion in losses per year.9 The International
Maritime Bureau, which set up a Piracy Reporting Centre in 1992,10 esti-
mated that there were approximately 111 recorded attacks in the waters
off the Horn of Africa in 2008, a figure that doubled the number of attacks
2 See infra Part I.B–D.
3 See infra Part I.B–D.
4 See, e.g., Pirates Threaten Americans; France Fights Back, MSNBC.COM, Apr. 16, 2009,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30204891.
5 Posting of David Bezmozgis to The Afterword, An Interview With Daniel Sekulich,
Author of Terror on the Seas, http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/afterword/
archive/2009/ 05/16/david-bezmozgis-an-interview-with-daniel-sekulich-author-of-terror-
on-the-seas .aspx (May 16, 2009, 10:00 EST) [hereinafter Bezmozgis].
6 See Roger Middleton, Piracy Symptom of Bigger Problem, BBC NEWS, Apr. 15, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8001183.stm.
7 See, e.g., Douglas A. McIntyre, Somali Pirates are Getting Rich: A Look at the Profit
Margins, TIME.COM, Apr. 15, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,189
1386,00.html.
8 Jeffrey Gettleman, Somalia’s Pirates Flourish in a Lawless Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30,
2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/31/world/africa/31pirates.html.
9 Bezmozgis, supra note 5.
10 Donald R. Rothwell, Maritime Piracy and International Law, CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT,
Feb. 24, 2009, http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-piracy.html.
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in 2007.11 Because many ships do not bother to record or document minor
incidents, the actual number of attempted attacks and thefts may be con-
siderably higher.12 Estimates vary, depending on how one defines a pirate
attack, but between January and September of 2009, an estimated 156
attacks had occurred.13 The Piracy Reporting Centre reported a total of
306 piracy attacks worldwide in the first nine months of 2009; during
these attacks, ships were boarded in 114 instances, 661 crew members
were taken hostage, 12 were kidnapped, and 6 were killed.14
Extensive research into this subject makes it amply clear that this
world has to either share the benefits of globalization more equitably or
suffer each time a band of marauders decides to help itself to the spoils.
The people on this planet are becoming less inclined to passively accept
and tolerate huge economic inequity and obvious injustice. Those who live
in poverty see no particular reason why their lives should be doomed to
endless misery. It is no longer possible, as it was in the past, for estab-
lished political and religious institutions to convince them that God willed
it thus or that certain aristocratic sectors are just naturally destined for
economic benefit while they are destined for lifelong poverty. Neither
religion, nor birth, nor Fate are widely acceptable as justification for such
serious economic inequity. The economically deprived are more than ever
inclined to seize any opportunity to enrich themselves. The ethics or
morality of their actions to seize what wealth they can appear to give
way to the expedient joy of having the wherewithal to live as they have
dreamed of living. Where we allow egregious poverty to exist, we imperil
not just the lives of those who live through that bleak existence but ulti-
mately ourselves as well. Somalia has been frequently termed a ‘failed
state.’15 Perhaps, we should look inward—we in the far wealthier Western
nations—and ask ourselves whether, in allowing the Somalias of the world
11 LAUREN PLOCH ET AL., PIRACY OFF THE HORN OF AFRICA Summary (Congressional
Research Service, Sep. 28, 2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40528.pdf
[hereinafter PLOCH].
12 See Christopher Torchia, Pirate Attacks Go Unreported, NEWS24.COM, Aug. 7, 2009,
http://www.news24.com/Content/World/News/1073/a770b67c2166425f8e2945057160e3ff/
08-07-2009-11-51/Pirate_attacks_go_unreported.
13 PLOCH, supra note 11, Summary.
14 Int’l Chamber of Commerce [ICC], Unprecedented Increase in Somali Pirate Activity,
ICC COM. CRIME SERV., Oct. 21, 2009, http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option=
com_content&view=article&id=376:unprecedented-increase-in-somali-pirate-
activity&catid=60:news &Itemid=51.
15 See, e.g., The Failed State Index 2009, FOREIGNPOLICY.COM, http://www.foreignpolicy
.com/articles/2009/06/22/the_2009_failed_states_index (last visited Feb. 08, 2010).
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to continue in their cycle of poverty and misery, we are not making this
a ‘failed world.’
It is clearly and essentially in our own self-interest to find a work-
able solution for the long-suffering Somali people.16 The prevalence of very
successful piracy along a major world oceanic route has a direct impact
upon every consumer in the West.17 Ninety percent of the world’s trade
by volume travels through the Gulf of Aden and the Suez Canal.18 By one
estimate, approximately 20,000 ships traverse Somali waters annually.19
These vessels of all sizes carry oil, gas, and huge containers filled with
every type of consumer product through this route.20 As the wealthy world
has dedicated itself to the development and enhancement of globalization,
at the very least, the transformation of a key trade route into a pirate alley
is self-defeating to that aim. By April 2009, the scope of the pirate alley ex-
tended over one million square miles in the Gulf of Aden and the Western
parts of the vast Indian Ocean.21 Most serious of all was the danger posed
by pirates to humanitarian food shipments destined for people in East
Africa who are in dire need of these supplies.22
There are few stories as compelling and as tragic as that of modern-
day Somalia. A country once rich in resources, history and culture, today,
Somalia struggles for bare survival.23 Its lands and waters have fallen
prey to extreme environmental degradation caused by internal and foreign
polluters.24 Its infrastructure is in ruins.25 Violence afflicts its cities and
villages.26 Somalis who could, have fled, forming a significant diaspora
scattered around the globe.27 The majority of those who are stranded at
16 See PLOCH, supra note 11, at 17, 24.
17 See id. at 12.
18 Hopewell Radebe, Africa: Economic, Political Aid ‘Needed to End Piracy,’ BUS. DAY,
Apr. 24, 2009, http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200904240054.html.
19 Nigeria: Piracy in Somali Waters, DAILY TRUST, Apr. 24, 2009, http://allafrica.com/
stories/printable/200904240371.html.
20 See Radebe, supra note 18.
21 PLOCH, supra note 11, at 11.
22 See id. at 14.
23 See SOMALIA: A COUNTRY STUDY 3, 45–53 (Helen Chapin Metz ed., Library of Congress,
Federal Research Division 4th ed., 1993), available at http://rs6.loc.gov/frd/cs/sotoc.html
[hereinafter SOMALIA COUNTRY STUDY].
24 See infra Part II.
25 See SOMALIA COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 23, at 117–18; see also infra Part I.B–D (for
a discussion on the general collapse of Somalia).
26 See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
27 See SOMALIA COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 23, at 112–17; see also PLOCH, supra note 11,
at 8 n.20.
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home, particularly agrarian villagers, can only eke out a miserable living
unless their young men take to piracy, which appears to be the most lucra-
tive make-work project in that part of the world.28 As Chris Albin-Lackey,
Senior Africa Researcher at Human Rights Watch, commented, piracy is
“a symptom of state collapse.”29
Somalia provides an important case study of the nexus between
environmental devastation and consequent criminal actions against inter-
national targets.30 Although the piracy is entirely criminal and totally
unjustifiable, it is understandable, given the political and economic back-
ground. Somalia also provides a case study of brazen violations of in-
ternational law, both by the Somalis and by foreigners, who have taken
advantage of the absence of effective government, to wreak environmental
havoc on the weakened nation.31 Although the Somali pirates can be
termed ‘predators,’ it must be appreciated that their country has suffered
at the hands of predators from many nations who have polluted their
waters with toxic and even nuclear waste and looted their oceans of fish.32
The research establishes the need for international adherence to
maritime and environmental law by all parties with respect to Somalia.33
It also demonstrates the necessity for the world to assist Somalia to acquire
political stability so that piracy and its attendant crimes can be brought
under control.34 In a world that is increasingly globalized, it is in every
nation’s interest to ensure that there are no areas left behind or left out
of the benefits of international trade and market economics. Given the
severity of the world-wide economic recession that has tarnished the image
of globalization, it is all the more important that we not neglect the poorest
and least developed of nations, for their people are the most vulnerable.
Roger Middleton, of the think tank Chatham House, aptly commented
that “Somalia is one of the poorest, most violent, least stable countries
anywhere on Earth.”35 While such countries, including Somalia, may not
be very significant in terms of generating vast global income, they can
and have generated enormous mayhem by attacking the very symbols of
28 See infra Part III.
29 Ken Dilanian, Chaos Onshore in Somalia is Driving Piracy Epidemic, USA TODAY, Apr.
9, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2009-04-08-pirateinside_N.htm.
30 See infra part II.
31 See infra part II.
32 See infra part II.
33 See PLOCH, supra note 11, at 8, 17, 18.
34 See id. at 35.
35 Middleton, supra note 6.
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globalization, the huge ships and tankers that sail past that coast.36 World
trade, without international safety and security on the oceans, poses too
many unacceptable risks for the lives of sailors.37 Arguably, by address-
ing the basic problems that plague Somalia, by providing alternate forms
of ensuring a decent economic lifestyle, and by cleaning up the terrible
environmental oceanic devastation caused by the dumping of toxic waste
by foreigners, the world may ensure safe and secure shipping in those
waters.38 The old adage about “the butterfly that flaps its wings and ends
up causing a hurricane on the other side of the world,” is apt in providing
us with a realization that local actions can have global consequences.39
I. THE SCENE
A. International Law Definition of Piracy
An old Greek proverb somewhat cynically states that “[w]here
there is a sea, there are pirates.”40 The proliferation of piracy in this new
millennium threatens the entire interwoven network of global trade and
ultimately imperils the world economy.41 In its present recessionary state,
the world can hardly afford the added burden of the human and financial
costs of piracy.42 Nor can the world ignore this problem or neglect those
countries, like Somalia, where anarchy, two decades of conflict, and eco-
logical damage on a massive scale have given rise to piracy as the ultimate
‘make-work’ program.43 There can be no doubt that the major trading
nations of the world have not equipped themselves to deal with this
36 See id.
37 See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text.
38 See, e.g., PLOCH, supra note 11, at 35–36.
39 Alex Perry, Analysis: To Beat Somalia’s Pirates, Fix Their Country, TIME, Dec. 15, 2008,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1866361,00.html.
40 John C.K. Daly, Somalia Pirates of the Gulf, INT’L RELATIONS AND SEC. NETWORK—SEC.
WATCH, Mar. 12, 2009, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/
?id=97585&lng=en.
41 See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. MAR. ADMIN., ECONOMIC IMPACT OF PIRACY IN THE GULF OF
ADEN ON GLOBAL TRADE (Dec. 2008), http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/HOA_Economic
%20Impact%20of%20Piracy.pdf; see also PLOCH, supra note 11, at 12; see also James G.
Stavridis, Sailing Across the Bridge, 135 PROCEEDINGS MAGAZINE 1280 (2009), available
at http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/story.asp?STORY_ID=2050.
42 See PLOCH, supra note 11, at 24; Editorial, Horn of Africa Piracy Wars Mask Wider
Struggle, BUS. MONITOR INT’L., Nov. 19, 2008, http://www.riskwatchdog.com/2008/11/19/
horn-of-africa-piracy-wars-mask-wider-struggle.
43 See PLOCH, supra note 11, at 8–9.
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phenomenon with sufficient vigor or with any long-term solutions in
mind.44 Thus far, the initiative has been taken by the pirates, while the
ship owners, their governments, and the United Nations have been largely
reactive in approach.45
Until the entire global mindset changes to some rational and all-
encompassing solutions that address piracy, poverty, environmental deg-
radation, and human rights violations in tandem, piracy will continue to
plague the ships sailing the oceans on this planet.46 “Piracy is going to
get worse, because it’s so easy,” predicted Eric Ellen, Executive Director
of the Commercial Crime Services of the International Maritime Bureau
(“I.M.B.”).47 That forecast, made in 1997, has unfortunately turned out
to be accurate.48 Now, twelve years later, the world’s approaches are still
ambivalent and hesitant, and the countries where piracy originates are
in worse economic shape.
International law does provide the world with an effective basic
formula for understanding the problem of piracy.49 The comprehensive
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) provides
the following definition of piracy in Article 101:
(a) Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act
of depredation, committed for private ends by the
crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private
aircraft, and directed:
(i) On the high seas, against another ship or
aircraft, or against persons or property on
board such ship or aircraft,
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property
in a place outside the jurisdiction of any
State;
44 See, e.g., Posting of Galrahn to Information Dissemination, Observing the Obama
Administration Somali Piracy Policy, http://www.informationdissemination.net/2009/04/
observing-obama-administration-somali.html (Apr. 10, 2009, 01:00).
45 See PLOCH, supra note 11, at 18–24.
46 See, e.g., Middleton, supra note 6.
47 Helen Gibson, High Seas: A Plague of Pirates, Modern Buccaneers with Machine Guns
Instead of Cutlasses Are Once Again the Scourge of the Oceans, TIME, Aug. 18, 1997,
http://home.wanadoo.nl/m.bruyneel/archive/modern/plague.htm.
48 See PLOCH, supra note 11, at 4.
49 See generally United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS], Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
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(b) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation
of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts
making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating
an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).50
The extensive research undertaken for this article explores piracy
committed by Somalis against the global trading community as well as
predatory activities committed by individuals from many nations against
Somalia. If the word “depredation,” as used in Article 101(a) above, is
taken in its usual sense to refer to pillage and plunder, then this tragic
saga about Somalia concerns two types of piracy. First, there is the well-
known, highly publicized, and terrifying piracy committed by Somalis
against foreign ships.51 Second, there is an equally threatening form of
piracy—over-fishing without licenses or compensation and, worse, dump-
ing of nuclear and other forms of toxic waste into Somali waters—being
perpetrated by ships from a significant number of foreign nations.52 Any
balanced assessment must examine both forms of piracy and also ponder
why the United Nations has neglected the second type, which has so many
perpetrators, while energetically galvanizing the world to fight the first
type, that is carried out by criminal interests in Somalia.
The number of pirate attacks has galvanized the world community
into some measures of preventative action.53 At present, naval forces from
many countries now patrol the waters off Somalia in an effort to protect
their own national vessels.54 The scale of Somali piracy has prompted such
action. In 2008 there were, by one estimate, over 100 attacks, 42 successful
hijackings, and 815 crew members taken hostage.55
The universal application of international law and adherence to
fairness for both Somalia and peaceful international shipping are not
beyond the reach of globalized institutions, provided the will exists to
implement an international consensus acknowledging that all forms of
piracy must cease. If hijacking a ship is piracy, then looting fish must
also be deemed piracy. Additionally and realistically, in a world that has
50 Id. at 436.
51 See infra Parts III–IV.
52 See infra Part II.
53 See PLOCH, supra note 11, at 16–24.
54 Id. at 16, 36.
55 Oliver Hawkins, What to Do With a Captured Pirate, BBC NEWS, Mar. 10, 2009, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7932205.stm.
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outlawed dumping of nuclear and toxic waste in the oceans, is it not an
egregious form of environmental depredation or piracy for nations to
despoil Somali waters?
B. Demography
The pirates of Somalia were quick to seize the opportunity created
by the geographic location of their country and its importance to world
shipping.56 Their country, which is somewhat smaller than Texas, is located
in East Africa, with the Gulf of Aden to the North and the vast Indian
Ocean to the East.57 Ships traveling between the Middle East, Europe,
Africa, and both South and Eastern Asia frequent the Indian Ocean sea
routes that effectively make globalized trade a reality for millions of people
worldwide.58 Approximately 20,000 ships traverse the Gulf of Aden every
year.59 By one estimate, over thirty percent of the world’s oil is moved
through the Gulf of Aden.60 Fortuitous location along these vital commer-
cial routes provides ample opportunity for pirate attacks on international
ships that ply those waters, carrying huge cargo containers and oil
through the Gulf of Aden to the Suez Canal and the West or to Asia.61
Of even more benefit to pirates is the fact that Somalia has the
longest national coastline in Africa, 3,025 km.62 Such a coast provides
numerous hiding places for hijacked ships.63 The resemblance of that part
of Eastern Africa to a rhino’s horn has given this strategic location an
international nomenclature as the Horn of Africa, an area that includes
56 See PLOCH, supra note 11, at 11–12.
57 U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, Somalia (2009), available
at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html [hereinafter
CIA WORLD FACTBOOK].
58 See id. at Indian Ocean, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/xo.html.
59 World Pirate Attacks Soar in First Quarter, THE STRAITS TIMES, April 21, 2009, http://
www.straitstimes.com/Breaking%2BNews/World/Story/STIStory_366502.html.
60 Helen Kennedy, Piracy Big Boon to Somalia Economy; Hotels, Restaurants Sprout in
Port of Eyl in Pirates’ Presence, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 9, 2009, http://www.nydailynews
.com/news/national/2009/04/10/2009-04-10_piracy_boon_to_somalia_economy.html.
61 See Turkey Pledges to Help Train Somali Armed Forces, REUTERS.COM, Apr. 18. 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE53H0TN20090418.
62 Federico Carbone & Giovanni Accordi, The Indian Ocean Coast of Somalia, 41 MARINE
POLLUTION BULL. 141, 141 (2000).
63 See, e.g., Jeffrey Gettleman, Hijacked Arms Ship Limps into Port, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12,
2009, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/13/world/africa/13pirate.html.
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Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Kenya.64 Yemen lies just across
the Gulf of Aden.65 Eritrea and Ethiopia have been extensively involved in
Somali internal politics in recent years and have been accused of extending
their conflict with each other to Somalia.66
Having claimed sovereignty over territorial waters, reaching 200
nautical miles, the Somalis attempted to utilize the rich fishing areas just
off their shore and on the continental shelf.67 Unfortunately for the local
fishermen, foreigners in much larger ships also wanted to take advantage
of the food resource that was so easily available.68 According to the Somalis,
the outsiders plundered the fish, taking full advantage of the absence of
effective government in the country.69 The foreign ships had no worries
about being accosted by the Somali coastguard, who generally did not re-
quire any licenses or permits.70 According to Shohreh Naji and colleagues
from Carleton University, “Somalia’s marine resources are being quickly
depleted, primarily by foreign trawlers, due to a lack of coastal security.”71
As a land of limited physiographical contrast,72 Somalia’s terrain
has encouraged both a nomadic and semi-nomadic, or partly rooted agrar-
ian lifestyle, a fact that makes population enumeration extremely prob-
lematic.73 By one estimate, approximately sixty to seventy percent of the
population is nomadic or has nomadic affiliations.74
The results of Somalia’s first census, conducted in 1975, are highly
questionable for a variety of political and clan-related reasons.75 In 1991,
the United Nations estimated the size of the Somali population at 7.7
64 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, PLACES IN THE NEWS, SOMALIA, http://www.loc.gov/today/
placesinthenews/archive/2008arch/20081118_somalia.html (last visited Feb. 08, 2010).
65 See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, MAPS, SOMALIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/cia-maps-publications/maps/802851.jpg (last visited Feb. 08, 2010).
66 See, e.g., Bernard Gwertzman, Lyons: Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict Fueling Somali Crisis,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Aug. 22, 2007, http://www.cfr.org/publication/14074/
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million,76 a figure that increased to approximately 10.7 million by 2005.77
Somali life expectancy ranges from forty-seven years for men to fifty-one
years for women.78
Socially, the Somalis are divided into various clans, subclans, and
sub-subclans79 who have fought each other ferociously for years, particu-
larly over water rights and grazing land.80 Somali “[c]lan membership is
genealogical, and some of the smaller subclans may be little more than
large extended families,” explained Stephanie Hanson and Eben Kaplan
of the Council on Foreign Relations.81 “Somali clan organization is an un-
stable, fragile system, characterized at all levels by shifting allegiances.”82
Any analysis of Somalia has to consider the clan issue, but it must be
realized that the “clan system is a fundamental but deeply controversial
factor in Somali society, which can both divide and unite, depending on
[the] context.”83
Ethnically, the majority of the population is Somali and the over-
whelming majority religion is Sunni Muslim.84 According to Ioan Lewis, the
“Somalis are firmly attached to Islam.”85 Like most Africans and Asians,
Somalis are frequently multi-lingual, although Somali is the national lan-
guage.86 It is almost impossible to estimate the size of the Somali diaspora,
possibly now numbering in the millions and potentially one of largest from
any part of Africa.87 The diaspora is critical in terms of its dispatch of
76 Id. at 67.
77 Somalia Int’l Finance Centre, About Somalia, http://www.somaliainternational
financialcentre.com/about.aspx (last visited Feb. 08, 2010).
78 CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 57.
79 WORLD BANK, CONFLICT IN SOMALIA: DRIVERS AND DYNAMICS 7 (2005), http://siteresources
.worldbank.org/INTSOMALIA/Resources/conflictinsomalia.pdf.
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remittances, estimated by the U.N. to be worth about one billion dollars
annually,88 to family members in Somalia, an economic action that staves
off abject hunger for thousands of Somalis,89 whose per capita gross
national income was estimated in 2007 at only $140 USD.90 Although
raw data is not precise, specialists estimate a 2009 urban unemployment
rate in Somalia at 66% and the rural equivalent at 41%.91 The World Bank
estimated that 43.2% of the Somali population exists below the interna-
tional poverty line of $1 per day, with poverty afflicting 53% of the rural
population and 24% of urban dwellers.92 The Food and Agriculture
Organization (“FAO”) estimated that between 2000 and 2002 approxi-
mately 71% of Somalis were undernourished.93 In August 2008, the same
organization reported that 3.2 million people in Somalia required hu-
manitarian assistance.94 This large number represented a 77% increase
since January 2008.95 Given such dire economic conditions afflicting so
many Somalis, the lure and attraction of quick and easy money through
piracy is explainable if not morally justifiable. As one pirate commented:
“It is the only way to make money now.”96
As is the case in many other developing countries, Somalis are
particularly at the mercy of their own climate. “Climate is the primary
factor in much of Somali life. For the large nomadic population, the timing
and amount of rainfall are crucial determinants of the adequacy of graz-
ing and the prospects of relative prosperity.”97 Drought in 2006 wrought
88 Lucas Barasa, Piracy Cash Not Funding Kenya Projects, Says MP, DAILY NATION,
Apr. 30, 2009, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/592568/-/u65mnt/-/index.html.
89 SOMALI SUPPORT SECRETARIAT, FOOD SECURITY & ECON. DEV. COMM.,http://www.reliefweb
.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/JBRN-7P6GW3?OpenDocument(last visited Nov. 30, 2009).
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94 U.S. AGENCY INT’L DEV. (“USAID”), BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT AND
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (“DCHA”), OFFICE OF U.S. FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE
(“OFDA”), SOMALIA: COMPLEX EMERGENCY, SITUATION REPORT #4 (2009), http://www
.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/countries/somalia/
template/fs_sr/fy2009/somalia_ce_sr04_01-15-2009.pdf.
95 Id.
96 Steve Bloomfield, The Pirate Hunters, HERALD SCOTLAND, May 2, 2009, http://www
.heraldscotland.com/the-pirate-hunters-1.829627.
97 SOMALIA COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 23, at 59.
390 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 34:377
havoc for the people of Somalia.98 When the absence of effective govern-
ment and personal safety and security are factored into so precarious a
situation as climate, the perils facing thousands of Somalis become very
serious indeed. The land is prey to recurring drought that can cause
famine and floods resulting in both disease and food shortages.99 Jean-
Francois Leon and Michel Legrand, in their interesting environmental
study of mineral dust sources in the North Indian Ocean, commented
that the “climate of Somalia is well known to have a high inter-annual
variability leading to severe droughts or devastating floods.”100 It has
been estimated that since 2006 over two million Somalis have suffered
the effects of severe drought.101 As of 2009, some parts of Somalia have
endured a Spring season of severe water shortages and drought, “exacer-
bating the humanitarian crisis in the country.”102
Given its ancient history, rich culture, and unique traditions, it is
indeed tragic that this country is now deemed one of the most dangerous
places in the world,103 and is “one of the world’s poorest and least developed
countries.”104 In 1996, Somalia rated 172 out of 174 countries on the United
Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Index.105 Sub-
sequently, lack of reliable data, likely due to increased violence, has pre-
cluded any ranking of Somalia.106 It is evident, however, that Somalia’s
health standards “are some of the worst in the world.”107
The absence of any effective governing structure has had a drastic
impact on the people, particularly on those most vulnerable—the poor,
the elderly, and the children. By one estimate, less than twenty percent
98 See Denise Shepard-Johnson, Somalia Afflicted By Worst Drought in Decade, UNICEF,
Feb. 8, 2006, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/somalia_30967.html.
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1, available at http://ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&docId=1109454.
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of Somalis have access to safe drinking water; cholera, tuberculosis,
malaria, and diarrhea prevail.108
Somalia’s capital city, Mogadishu, has been the scene of terrible
violence against civilians for a number of years as the country has struggled
to establish an effective government for decades.109 According to Oxfam,
over one million Somalis have been forced to flee from their homes between
2007 and early 2009.110 Somalia is the prototype of a ‘failed state,’111 and,
hence, neither the extent of environmental degradation nor the resort to
piracy by a portion of its population should cause any great surprise.
Regionally, in comparison with Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya,
and Sudan, Somalia has been deemed by the United Nations to have the
lowest GNP per capita, the lowest adult literacy level, the highest rate of
infant mortality,112 and the second lowest life expectancy.113
What has been termed a “strong informal economy,”114 focusing on
remittance funds, livestock sales, and telecommunications, has shown
some growth, but Somalia’s GDP “is one of the lowest in the world.”115 The
United Nations has determined Somalia to be “the most pressing humani-
tarian emergency, even worse than the crisis in Darfur, Sudan.”116 The Food
Security Analysis, conducted by the United Nations, estimated that as of
September 2008, approximately 41% of Somalia’s population needed hu-
manitarian assistance, an alarming growth of 77% from January 2008.117
This nation—ravaged by decades of war, its infrastructure looted
and vandalized, its land and waters polluted, and its civilian population at
the mercy of warring militias—is now one of the most frightening places on
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earth.118 By one estimate, nearly two million Somalis have been displaced
from their homes as of April 2009, and half a million eke out a miserable
existence in refugee camps in neighboring countries.119 “The same lawless-
ness that makes big ships in high seas vulnerable to the scourge of piracy
affects the common Somali man or woman inland, who unfortunately can-
not count on the protection provided by mighty international forces.”120
Somalia’s internal conflicts and problems have now spilled over into
the global arena with desperation and opportunity, as well as enormous
profit-motivating criminal activity that targets shipping and the citizens
of numerous countries. Although the world may act decisively to police
the oceans near Somalia, or to kill pirates whenever necessary, such
actions will do little to provide any lasting solution to the problem. Until
the various governments of the world act multilaterally to address the
humanitarian issues that plague Somalia, there is little likelihood that
the piracy threat will permanently cease.
C. Brief Historical Background I
The scope of this paper precludes any detailed examination and
analysis of the history of Somalia. Rather, the aim is to provide some
indication of the reasons why this area has succumbed to years of law-
lessness and economic and environmental degradation. The focus of this
article is the present series of crises related to piracy and environmental
degradation in Somalia. The examination of the past is accordingly neces-
sarily selective and exclusively intended to provide some insight into the
current situation. Additionally, the background could provide the reader
with a glimpse of the atmosphere of a collapsing anarchistic society. An
inclusive history of modern Somalia would require volumes to recount
and would be far beyond the length constraints of this article.
If the problem of piracy—now so much on the minds of world
leaders—is to be successfully addressed, it is imperative that we attempt
to understand how this culturally rich country reached such a nadir of
poverty and deprivation. It should then come as no surprise that a lawless
land should generate lawless criminals like the present-day pirates.
Interestingly, Somalia was not always deemed a synonym for
violence, poverty, hunger, misrule, and all the negatives that dominate
118 See Greenburg, supra note 103.
119 Guillermo Bettocchi, Piracy: A Symptom of Somalia’s Disease, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, Apr. 16,
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current foreign perceptions of that land.121 In ancient times, the region
now referred to as constituting the Horn of Africa was said to be rich in
gold, exotic fragrance oils, rare species of wood, ivory, objects prized in
ancient Egypt, and much sought after by Egyptian pharaohs who sent
expeditions to trade with the exotic Land of Punt, which may have been
modern Somalia, Ethiopia, or Djibouti.122 An abundance of fish and wildlife
made for a region rich enough to be deemed fabled, even by the luxurious
standards of ancient Egypt.123
Politically and socially, the very homogeneity of the present-day
Somali people should preclude rather than encourage animosity. Unlike
many other nations that work each day to reconcile diverse cultures, re-
ligions, and traditions into one national unit, Somalis “are a culturally,
linguistically, and religiously homogeneous people, who are divided along
clan lines and sparsely scattered over a harsh dry land.”124 Ironically, the
unifying factor of homogeneity has been overtaken by clan loyalties that
appear, according to scholars, to be at the root of the internecine conflicts
that have plagued that land for decades.125 As the United Nations has
commented: “[c]lan, territorial and economic identities stratify Somali
society.”126 The challenges of forming and adhering to modern concepts
of nationalism and loyalty within the geographic boundaries of the nation
state pose problems for a people whose political identity has been shaped
for centuries on family genealogies, tracing descent from male ancestors.127
“Membership in clans and lineages shaped the allocation of individual
rights and obligations.”128 The volatile combination of familial ties of loy-
alty, scarce resources for grazing cattle and water,129 easy access to weap-
ons, and a tradition of local militia culture has contributed to an incessant
pattern of conflict as the clans have fought for domination and control of
the country. It has aptly been suggested that “[n]early all armed conflicts
in contemporary Somalia break out along clan lines.”130
121 See generally SOMALIA COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 23, at ch.1 (discussing Somalia’s
rich history).
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In the past, this pattern of clan conflict leading to a “segmented
social order”131 made the entire region easy prey for Western colonial
ambitions.132 After Britain had developed its economic strangle-hold on
India, which became the ‘jewel in the crown’ for England, it was deemed
imperative to secure all oceanic routes to and from that rich imperial
colony.133 The Red Sea was critical for this imperial aim as was the Suez
Canal which opened in 1869.134 By 1884, Britain and other European
countries were feverishly engaged in their presumptuous ‘scramble for
Africa’ which was ‘validated’ via an international conference held in
Berlin that year.135 The various disunited Somali clans fared badly as tar-
gets of European imperialism. They fell, not into the hands of one imperial
power, that could have unified them, but four: Great Britain, France, Italy,
and Ethiopia.136 Ethiopia occupied the Ogaden region; Britain established
the protectorate of British Somaliland; Italy colonized the south, estab-
lishing Italian Somaliland; and France took over an area, now located in
Djibouti.137 According to Ioan Lewis, “divisions within the otherwise
generally homogeneous Somali national culture facilitated the imperial
partition of this region during the scramble for Africa.”138 This African
version of the proverbial imperial ‘carving of the melon,’ a phrase also
aptly applied to China, led to serious long-term consequences for the en-
tire Horn of Africa.139 It ensured disunity and division, and the Africans,
after independence, inherited a mishmash of imperial structures and insti-
tutions that ignored their indigenous social systems.140 This resulted in
an era of endless war.
While this region was under the European powers, the easiest way
to ensure the longevity of imperial control, was the tried and true system
of keeping the local population at war with itself.141 The maxim ‘divide and
rule’ became the methodology for dealing with local populations in Somalia,
131 SOMALIA COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 23, at 58.
132 LEWIS, supra note 74, at 28.
133 See SOMALIA COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 23, at 10–11.
134 Somalia History, supra note 126.
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140 See id.
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Somali Crisis, AFRICA UPDATE, Winter 1994–95, http://web.ccsu.edu/afstudy/upd2-1.html.
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exactly as it was used in India, Egypt, Ireland, Kenya, and a number of
other colonies.142 According to Julius O. Ihonvbere, “[a]s part of the poli-
tics of divide-and-rule, the colonial powers did everything possible to play
one clan against the other sowing seeds of discord and conflicts.”143
During the Second World War, Britain and Italy fought for control
of the Horn of Africa, with Britain emerging the victor.144 After the War,
Italian Somaliland became a United Nations trust territory under the
control of Italy.145 The fledgling Somali nationalist movement champi-
oned the twin causes of independence and unity of Somali peoples.146 Both
British and Italian territories of Somalia gained independence and united
in 1960 as the new Republic of Somalia.147
Unfortunately, political independence did not prove to be the pan-
acea that was so widely anticipated. It brought neither peace nor plenty
to the Somali people.148 There were numerous reasons for this, including
the fact that the “segmented social order, with relatively minor modifica-
tions, was carried into the independence period.”149 The pan-Somali move-
ment was further complicated by the nomadic traditions of some of the
clans, which made for rather vague geographic boundaries in terms of
defining precise national territories.150 The fact that Western imperial
powers delineated African national boundaries with little thought to the
actual location of particular tribes and clans may well be considered the
primary cause of inter-African wars that have so plagued the latter half
of the twentieth century and extended into the new millennium.151
In the Horn of Africa, this imprecise situation geographically led
to competing political claims and conflict between Somalia and its neigh-
bors Kenya and Ethiopia.152 In effect, as they departed, European imperial
powers inflicted an artificial Western centralized nation state structure
on ancient decentralized African social systems, that were grounded in
clans, “leading eventually to a zero-sum struggle between clans for control
of the state apparatus and its resources, including land.”153
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African political aspirations, seeking to adjust to the discordant
realities of imperial geographic boundaries, found outlet in grandiose and
bellicose assertions of sovereignty and supremacy that led to conflict and
enduring misery for civilians caught in the cross-fire.154
Although Somalia was a seriously under-developed state, it paid
primary attention to the development of its military which grew from 5,000
in 1960 to 65,000 in 1990.155 The enormous sums expended on the military
were inevitably at the expense of the social needs of the people who lagged
behind in the fundamentals of civilized society: a clean environment, effec-
tive health care, and efficient education systems.156
The intrusion of Cold War rivalries further entangled the complex
skein of Somali politics as the superpowers vied for influence in Africa,
by providing a liberal supply of arms to a region that desperately needed
industries, agrarian development, infrastructure, and education.157 The
Cold War game of patron-client politics was played out with deadly con-
sequences for many states in the Horn of Africa. The superpowers armed
their clients to the teeth and fought each other vicariously as thousands
of Africans died.158
The deadly combination of pan-Somali aspirations, economic under-
development, clan-to-clan rivalries, corruption,159 and external interference
was a recipe for political meltdown. On October 15, 1969, Somali President
Abdi Rashid Ali Shermarke was assassinated by a bodyguard, who was
subsequently executed.160 The resulting political uncertainty provided an
opportunity for military control of the government under Major General
Mohamed Siad Barre.161 Barre was initially welcomed by the people, who
hoped desperately for greater efficiency and less corruption.162 The “vibrant
but corrupt and eventually dysfunctional multiparty democracy”163 had
unfortunately failed and was now replaced by a personality-cult style dic-
tatorship. As is the practice of most dictators, there were some positive
154 See SOMALIA COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 23, at 28–30.
155 Id. at 181.
156 See id. at 204.
157 See id. at 30.
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_programmes_and_projects2/the_cold_war_in_africa_a_history (last visited Feb. 08, 2010).
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attempts at social improvement.164 In 1973, the Somali language acquired
standardized written form, using the Latin script, and extensive literacy
campaigns targeted urban and rural areas.165 The result was an increase
in literacy from 5% in 1972 to a United Nations estimate of 24% by 1990.166
However, the approximately two decades of Barre’s dictatorship sowed
the seeds for long-term state meltdown. As Julius Ihonvbere commented,
“corruption reached unprecedented proportions, clannishness became the
fundamental basis of politics, infrastructures were run down, the legiti-
macy of the state, its institutions and agents were clearly eroded, and
[Barre] carried out several bloody persecutions of opposition elements.”167
Like many dictators in other countries, Barre contributed gener-
ously to the upkeep and enhancement of the Somali military and continued
the tradition of lavish spending on the armed forces.168 Although precise
figures are not available, by one estimate, between 1961 and 1979 the mili-
tary imported a staggering $660 million in armaments and its annual ex-
penditures during the 1980s amounted to approximately $44.5 million.169
Barre considered himself a Scientific Socialist and became an ally of
the Soviet Union, concluding a treaty of friendship and cooperation in 1974,
until the Soviet Union decided to support its client state in Ethiopia.170
Barre, quite pragmatically, switched sides in 1977, expelled the Soviet
advisors and became a client of the United States of America.171 American
development aid brought some assistance to Barre’s plans for improving
the Somali infrastructure and modernizing the country through elaborate
education programs.172 However, Barre’s hold on power was decimated by
the factor that has caused the downfall of dictators throughout history: war.
Between 1977 and 1991 the Somalis fought three wars.173 The first was
the Ogaden War with Ethiopia between 1977–78, which Somalia initiated
and lost at a cost of 25,000 lives.174 The second war was internal, between
the Government and the Somali National Movement, a conflict that was
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clan-generated and resulted in the death of approximately 50,000–60,000
people, including civilians.175 This internal conflict eventually led to the
secession and proclamation of the state of Somaliland in 1991.176 How-
ever, as of 2009, no state has recognized the Somaliland Republic.177 The
punitive nature of Barre’s regime, “generally directed at clans,”178 re-
sulted in violent resistance against the government. A bloody, free-for-all
third war erupted in the late 1980s and early 1990s, with the govern-
ment fighting numerous groups simultaneously until the collapse of the
Barre government on January 26, 1991.179 Barre was exiled, eventually
moving to Nigeria, where he died in 1995.180 The main suffering of his
long and bloodthirsty dictatorship was borne by untold thousands of
Somali civilians because “military policy was devastating much of the area
and driving it into famine.”181
Tragically, it is possible to formulate a clear connection between
the policies of Siad Barre—policies that resulted in an oppressive govern-
ment which exploited its people, extorted their resources and massacred
thousands—and the present lawless situation in Somalia, where internal
crime has now become an international problem because of the activities
of the pirates.
However, it is important as well to direct responsibility for some of
this prevailing crisis to the superpowers who perceived the Horn of Africa
as strategically important at the height of the Cold War and then sidelined
the area once the Soviet Union had imploded.182 “As the Cold War waned
in the late 1980s, Somalia’s strategic importance to the West diminished.”183
The unique twist whereby Somalia was initially a Soviet client and then
came under American patronage, seriously weakened any hope for the
effective development of a viable functioning Somali unified state. Barre’s
crucial mistake was to align himself with the most grandiose of Somali
175 See id. at 10.
176 Id.
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imperial ambitions, and then attempt, with external patronage, to imple-
ment his dreams. In the process, he destroyed his own regime and any
hope for long-lasting stability for his country. This collapse was, accord-
ing to Hussein Adam, a “consequence of the policies and practices of dic-
tator Barre and his ruling elite.”184 The Barre regime has been called a
“kleptocracy in which those who had political pull stole from those who
did not.”185
The Somali political crisis affected neighboring states as well;186
some of them were undergoing their own political upheavals. Ethiopia,
long the target of Somali territorial frustrations, continued to foster and
assist dissident elements within Somalia.187 In this rather tragic saga, we
witness at once, internecine clan conflict, civil war, rebellion, national war,
and international interference and intervention.188 The fact that so many
Somalis have turned to international crime should come as no surprise.
The absence of feasible economic options and a state awash in firearms
can be a deadly combination.
This unfortunate truism was validated in the years following the
fall of Siad Barre. Somalia disintegrated and virtually imploded into a
lawless land where gangsterism, random violence, cut-throat criminality,
and clan-based militia attacks prevailed, taking a physical and psycho-
logical toll on civilians.189 A Report written in 2005 for the World Bank
explains that the “ouster of the Barre regime was followed not by a re-
placement government but by a prolonged period of violent anarchy and
warfare.”190 Thousands fled, wherever they could, and neighboring states
found desperate Somali civilians begging for entry and safety.191 The infra-
structure, much of it constructed as part of Barre’s public-works projects,
was systematically looted or fell into disrepair.192 The economy virtually col-
lapsed, although for a price, certain goods, particularly weapons, enjoyed
a brisk trade.193 Neighboring nations made frantic attempts to bring the
184 HUSSEIN ADAM, TYRANNY TO ANARCHY: THE SOMALI EXPERIENCE 2 (2008).
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many Somali factions together at external meetings, hoping to broker a
peace. Ethiopia, most accused of interfering in Somali politics, hosted sev-
eral peace initiatives, while Egypt, Yemen, Kenya, and Italy attempted to
find solutions.194 What was formulated lasted briefly before disintegrating
once again in the reality of long-festering resentments and political ambi-
tions that would not be assuaged with anything less than total victory.
A Report prepared for the World Bank, although specific to 1991
and 1992, eloquently articulates the nightmare of life in a lawless state:
The wars, which began as struggle for control of the govern-
ment, quickly degenerated into predatory looting, banditry,
and occupation of valuable real estate by conquering clan
militias. Young gunmen fought principally to secure war
booty, and were under only the loosest control of militia
commanders. Powerful merchants and warlords were impli-
cated in this war economy too. The principal victims of this
violence were weak agricultural communities and coastal
minority groups caught in the middle of the fighting. . . .
Warlords’ power base depended on a chronic state of inse-
curity, so that their clan constituencies needed them for
protection. Illiterate gunmen saw war, plunder, and extor-
tion as their only livelihood. Some businessmen were en-
riched by war-related criminal activities such as weapons
sales, diversion of food aid, drug production, and exportation
of scrap metal. And whole clans found themselves in pos-
session of valuable urban and riverine real estate won by
conquest, which they stood to lose in a peace settlement.195
Desperate people demolished their environment to provide them-
selves with some kind of a living. Trees were cut down by the thousands
for firewood and the land became degraded.196 Absent any effective govern-
ment, the lack of basic services like garbage collection and disposal further
endangered both the environment and the health of people, particularly
the most vulnerable—the elderly and children.197 Food was so scarce that
194 See globalEDGE, Somalia History, supra note 170.
195 WORLD BANK, supra note 79, at 11.
196 UN—HABITAT, supra note 83, at 90.
197 See UNICEF, SOMALIA, WATER, ENVIRONMENT AND SANITATION, http://www.unicef.org/
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most people were seriously malnourished.198 By one estimate, approxi-
mately 350,000 Somalis died between 1991 and 1992 from a lethal combi-
nation of disease, war, and starvation.199 Cities like Mogadishu, the capital,
swelled in numbers as starving refugees from the countryside wandered
there, hoping to find work and food for their families.200 To all the world
watching Somalia implode, there appeared to be only one possible solution,
humanitarian intervention, particularly by the United Nations.
D. Brief Historical Background II—The Role of the United Nations
in Somalia
It became quickly evident that while the rest of the world might
have perceived Somalia as being in desperate need of outside help and
involvement, many in Somalia felt quite differently.201 The years of in-
ternational intervention in Somalia highlight both the good intentions
and the failings of humanitarian attempts to assist civilians living in a
state of anarchy.202 Ray Murphy has explored the problems of peace-keep-
ing in Somalia, commenting that “it was a mixture of peacekeeping, peace-
making, peace enforcement and nation-building.”203 The United Nations
was actively involved in Somalia between April 1992 and March 1993 in
United Nations Operation in Somalia (“UNOSOM”) I and between March
1993 and March 1995 in UNOSOM II.204 The failure of the United Nations
to deal with this crisis on land does not presage well for any efforts by that
international organization to cope with the instant piracy crisis emanating
from Somalia.
If words alone could have resolved the internal and international
problems of Somalia, the United Nations would have earned kudos for its
efforts. A veritable flood of verbiage poured forth at U.N. headquarters
198 See Red Cross: Somalia Facing Severe Famine, CNN.COM, Jun. 4, 2008, http://www
.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/06/04/somalia.food.crisis/index.html.
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in New York and in the international community in a universal litany of
distress and dismay about Somalia. All this concern resulted in a plethora
of well-meaning, albeit wordy Security Council resolutions, only a few of
which can be considered within the length constraints and scope of this
article. The dilemma facing the United Nations was clearly explained by
Ken Rutherford, who stated that the “key factor in the lack of major inter-
national action was how the U.N. could resolve the chaos and whether it
should intervene without consent.”205
On March 17, 1992, the United Nations Security Council passed
Resolution 746 expressing its concern about the “magnitude of the human
suffering caused by the conflict,” and calling on the Secretary General to
“pursue his humanitarian efforts in Somalia.”206 By April 1992, UNOSOM I
had been established to assist and continue earlier international efforts
to aid the vast numbers of Somalis who were facing famine, disease, and
physical danger.207 Just fifty unarmed208 United Nations observers were
tasked with monitoring a cease-fire in Mogadishu, and they commenced
their activities on site by July 1992.209 In an effort to curb the unlimited
violence prevailing in Somalia, the Security Council, on January 23, 1992,
had instituted an embargo on all weapons deliveries to that nation.210 As
the country was already awash with weapons from the Barre years,211 such
U.N. efforts were doomed. The ineffectiveness of the embargo was appar-
ent when the Security Council passed Resolution 751 on April 24, 1992,
seeking “recommendations to the Council on ways of increasing the effec-
tiveness of the embargo,” and for measures to deal with violations of the
weapons embargo.212 The success of this embargo can be gauged by the
reality that today, nearly two decades later, the pirates of Somalia have no
trouble getting hold of the most sophisticated weaponry for their attacks
against commercial shipping.213
205 KENNETH R. RUTHERFORD, HUMANITARIANISM UNDER FIRE: THE US AND UN
INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA xv (2008).
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The best that can be said of UNOSOM is that at least the interna-
tional community tried. Having only brokered a tentative cease-fire, and
being in Somalia with the consent of the main warring factions,214 there
was just not that much the United Nations could achieve. There was so
much anarchy that humanitarian food convoys and relief supplies had to
be guarded by troops.215 That became the quagmire that sucked in the
United Nations.216 For civilians the situation became intolerable. The
Secretary General explained that the “desperate and complex situation
in Somalia will require energetic and sustained efforts on the part of the
international community to break the circle of violence and hunger.”217
Ironically, while the member States of the United Nations believed they
had a moral obligation to create a meaningful presence in Somalia, it was
obvious that the Somalis were largely opposed to the foreign presence.218
It was a veritable free-for-all with the Somali factions, headed by ambitious
warlords, fighting not just each other but the United Nations as well.219 A
deadly kaleidoscope of factions that united and parted in quick succession
ensured a maximum of anarchy as warlords competed for the spoils, any
spoils, including humanitarian aid convoys for starving Somali civilians.220
Predatory looting was such a marked feature of Somali political life that
the present resort to piracy on the high seas should come as no surprise.
The United Nations encountered a formidable enemy in the Somali militant
General Mohamed Farrah Aidid, who was determined to expel the peace
keepers, observers, and everyone else representing the United Nations
in his country.221
By July 27, 1992, the Security Council engaged in its recurrent
activity of passing resolutions, this time expressing deep concern “about
the availability of arms and ammunition in the hands of civilians and the
proliferation of armed banditry throughout Somalia.”222 The Security
Council authorized an airlift of humanitarian aid and repeated its earlier
calls for cooperation by all Somali parties with the international efforts.223
By August 1992, the United States agreed to participate in the airlift, but
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soon thereafter, it became obvious that American troops would be required
to protect the food cargo from predatory looting inside Somalia.224 Wel-
coming the logistical support of member states for this difficult mission,
the United Nations drew attention to the threats and violence from Somali
factions against relief personnel, and agreed with the Secretary General
that the situation in Somalia was intolerable.225
The United States military mercy mission to bring humanitarian
aid to Somali citizens was termed Operation Restore Hope, and it com-
menced in December 1992 with a famous televised marine landing in the
ravaged country.226 The Unified Task Force (“UNITAF”), as it was also
called, was tasked to protect relief efforts in Somalia.227 Twenty-four coun-
tries contributed troops to UNITAF,228 which was under the operational
command of the United States of America.229 Instead of a grateful popula-
tion, eager for aid, the United Nations and the United States encountered
ferocious opposition and extensive violence that resulted in many deaths
of international personnel and Somalis, including many civilians.230 The
vortex of clan conflicts, prevailing through much of the country, pulled
in the external forces, and the escalating casualty rates were deemed un-
acceptable for what was envisaged as a mission of mercy.231 International
forces found themselves fighting the very people they were supposedly help-
ing. Aid distribution became more a task of running a gauntlet of rioters
and looters.232 The foreign compounds were also infiltrated by thieves look-
ing for booty. Television screens across America displayed cheering Somalis
dragging the body of an American soldier, a dead Ranger, through the
streets of Mogadishu on October 4, 1993.233 It was a pivotal and searing
moment for America, haunting the nation for years to come. The American
people had had enough of Somalia and its unstoppable anarchy.234 On
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October 7, 1993, United States President Bill Clinton announced that
American forces would be withdrawn from Somalia by March 1994.235
Earlier, in March 1993, the United Nations Secretary General
admitted that security had not been achieved in Somalia.236 The failed
UNITAF mission eventually transitioned in 1993 to a new UNOSOM II
intervention, with ambitious goals of restoring peace and stability, rebuild-
ing the economy, and achieving both national reconciliation and a demo-
cratic government.237 With a strength of 28,000 personnel, UNOSOM II
drew support from a variety of U.N. member States, including the United
States of America, and thirty-two other nations.238 However, the anti-U.N.
rhetoric of warlord leader General Aidid and the failure of the United
Nations to curb or catch him, despite a $25,000 bounty on his head,239
seriously hampered UNOSOM II in its operations.240 “Hunting a single
individual in a foreign and unforgiving land can be demoralizing for
troops.”241 Aidid, with significant Somali support, continued to defy the
United Nations and its forces and caused the death of large numbers of
international troops. Aidid played the political game to enhance his own
power base, exacerbating divisions and manipulating the clans to serve
his own aim to secure power in Somalia.242 Aidid managed to undo the
noble aims of UNOSOM II, denigrate international efforts at intervention,
and in the process, seriously brutalized his own people, thousands of whom
fled abroad to escape the violence. He was accused of having his militias
rob trucks carrying food aid to sell it and fund his continuing war.243 Aidid
died in 1996, never having been captured by his United Nations foes.244
He was succeeded by his son Hussein, ironically, a former United States
marine who had served in Somalia in 1993.245
On November 4, 1994, the United Nations in effect admitted defeat
in its peacemaking efforts for Somalia, deeming the cost in human life too
high for the tolerance level of the countries that had contributed troops
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for the worthwhile cause of establishing peace and stability in Somalia.246
Admitting that its objectives had been undermined in Somalia, the Security
Council authorized withdrawal of the international force.247 The United
Nations had earlier acknowledged that “the people of Somalia bear the
ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation and reconstruction of
their own country.”248 The Security Council also reminded “all parties in
Somalia, including movements and factions, that continued United Nations
involvement in Somalia depended on their active cooperation and tangible
progress towards a political settlement,”249 a conclusion that is as valid
today as it was in 1993.
The years since the demise of UNOSOM II have seen a succession
of peace initiatives, changes in leadership, and the inevitable kaleido-
scopic coming together and dispersal of clans and families.250 Any detailed
examination of those actions is beyond the scope or objectives of this
article.251 The essential brutal reality is that since the expulsion of dic-
tator Siad Barre, the Somalis have lacked any effective unified govern-
ment.252 Additionally, two regions, Somaliland and Puntland, have
separated, the former declaring independence in 1991 and the latter
declaring its autonomy in 1998.253
The grim reality was that Somalia in the early 1990s was already
a land given over to brigands, with little hope for the civilian victims caught
in the middle. The Somali situation is both tragic and unusual because
in “Somalia, a single ethnic group sharing the same religion, history, and
language split into heavily armed clans.”254 With a developing tradition
of lawless banditry, the emergence of piracy from the region was only a
signal that there was nothing left to loot internally and so external prey
was now sought.
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The extent of anarchy in Somalia can be gauged by the fact that the
creation of a governmental structure for the country had to be undertaken
in neighboring Kenya.255 In 2004 with the encouragement of a number of
countries, Somalis formed a Transitional Federal Parliament as part of
a new state, conveniently termed the Transitional Federal Government
(“TFG”) which included: a Charter; adoption of Islamic Sharia law as the
foundation for its legislative system; and a proportional system of clan rep-
resentation in Parliament that was immediately condemned.256 Because
of the volatile situation in Somalia, the transitional team governed from
Kenya and only convened in Baidoa, Somalia in February 2006.257 The
Somali President, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed finally arrived in Mogadishu
in January 2007.258
Ethiopian intervention into Somalia seriously imperiled the sur-
vival of the transitional government.259 After Ethiopia finally withdrew,
a more inclusive transitional government—“TFG version 2.0”—emerged
in January 2009 with much hope for its success.260 At a conference held in
Brussels in April 2009, the international community pledged over $200
million to support the transitional government and effective nation build-
ing support structures for Somalia.261
However, Mogadishu remains prey to increasing violence that
occurs daily between Islamic militants, warlord militias, criminal gangs,
and anyone else who has a mind inclined toward mayhem and murder.262
One consequence of eighteen years of non-government is that a number
of individuals, specifically some of the warlords, have acquired a “vested
interest in maintaining instability within Somalia.”263 That rather unfor-
tunate agenda poses a serious challenge for any future peace that might
be contemplated.
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Politicized Islamic fundamentalism has added a new wrinkle to
the already tangled situation in Somalia. The years-long absence of polit-
ical stability provides an opportunity for terrorists. Somalia’s location on
the Horn of Africa makes it an expedient gateway to other Arab states
and Europe. Somalia could thus become a convenient stopover for terrorists
planning to attack European and North American targets. Additionally,
the prevailing lawlessness in the country could enable terrorists to acquire
weapons easily and to use Somalia as a base from which to launch attacks
against the West. The threat of piracy morphing into terrorism is a very
real concern.264 In an article criticizing the United Nations and Western
powers, Moign Khawaja asked the world whether it was “ready to let the
pirates transform into terrorists.”265
Mark Mazzetti of The New York Times reported that according to
experts there is “no evidence . . . of any links between the pirates and
Islamic militants in Somalia.”266 Although there is little reliable open
source information about connections between pirates and Islamic mili-
tants, there are indications that the latter have sought to woo the former
to the over-arching anti-American, anti-Western jihadist agenda.267 Mili-
tant Islamic fundamentalists “appropriated” the hijackers of the Maersk
Alabama, calling them “religious fighters because they are at war with
Christian countries that have exploited Somali waters for decades.”268
However, the pirates thus far appear by and large to have eschewed polit-
ical orientation—except insofar as Somalia’s environmental problems are
concerned—and seem dedicated only to the acquisition of money through
ransom.269 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton correctly called them “nothing
more than criminals,”270 and, hopefully, they will continue to be greedy and
avoid becoming political or religious zealots. The religious radicalization
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of the Somali pirates would be the greatest threat to the West. That would
take piracy to the far more threatening plane of international terrorism
and make decisive military action a vital necessity. American experiences
in Iraq and Afghanistan should serve as a potent reminder of the chal-
lenges of fighting a war against terrorism in a foreign country. There is
no reason to suppose that such an operation in Somalia would fare any
better for the West.
There appears to be some support for fundamentalist Islam in the
Horn of Africa countries.271 Religion, especially militant religion, can easily
take hold and gain popularity in an economically desperate society.272
Where the population has seething resentments against Western interfer-
ence or involvement, the situation can quickly become volatile. It is im-
perative that Somalia not become the next Iraq or the next Afghanistan.
We in the West can hardly afford to engage in endless wars all over the
world. Some more rational solution has to be found.
It is frustrating, futile, and self-defeating for us in the secular
West to seek to pigeon-hole the many varieties of Islamic thought and the
diversity of political opinion into neat categories termed “moderate,” or
“militant,” or “fundamentalist,” or “radical,” or “jihadist,” in an effort to
sort out friend from foe.273 There is a huge diversity of reaction to the West
among Islamic populations. Every human being is after all, the product
of his life experiences played on the mindset of his political and cultural
values. It is impossible to categorize people and either laud or condemn
them simply on the basis of our priorities for them. Categorization may be
a comfortable exercise from our perspective but it can be counter-productive
if we make mistakes. This has occurred time and again. The war against
terrorism has to be fought, and very vigorously, against those who would
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able at http://www.iss.co.za/dynamic/administration/file_manager/file_links/CONCEXTREM
.PDF?link_id=5391&slink_id=7742&link_type=12&slink_type=13&tmpl_id=3 (explaining
the growth of fundamentalism in North Africa arising from economic conditions).
272 See RAND CORP., U.S. STRATEGY IN THE MUSLIM WORLD AFTER 9/11, RESEARCH BRIEF
1, 2–3 (2004), http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB151/index.html (follow “Full
Document” hyperlink).
273 See, e.g., Chip Berlet, Terms & Concepts: Use with Caution, PUBLICEYE.ORG, http://www
.publiceye.org/frontpage/911/clerical-911.html (last visited Feb. 08, 2010) (clarifying the
various labels used indiscriminately by commentators).
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threaten the secular democratic way of life that we in the West have
worked centuries to create and which we cherish, particularly for the
human rights that we enjoy.274 However, all Muslims need to be perceived
and interacted with not as extensions of our political agendas but within
their own context and on the basis of their own national and social pri-
orities.275 If the West can achieve that, it may well find that there are
more Muslims willing to be equal partners with the West than terrorists
determined to destroy our way of life. If we refrain from over-simplifying
our interactions with the Islamic populations and approach them with an
emphasis on mutual respect, mutual “live and let live,” and mutual benefit,
they will, on their own, by their reactions, demonstrate whether they are
friend or foe. By putting the onus on them, we allow them to categorize
themselves rather than doing it ourselves and making the mistakes which
have cost so many lives on all sides in the past few years. Where they are
inclined to violence, whether or not they quote religious verses to justify
their attacks against us, we fight them in the way a secular democracy
would fight any political enemy, with the utmost determination to succeed.
By refusing to categorize them or to prejudge them, we allow those who
would engage with us peacefully the opportunity to do so, diminishing in
no way our own values while appreciating theirs as well.
The implementation of such an approach for Somalia could result
in the West seeking to curb piracy but insisting that it is entirely up to the
Somalis to determine and create their own government. The West could
assist the process by ensuring that more arms do not reach that embattled
country; that humanitarian assistance is offered, provided Somalis guar-
antee its protection and distribution to those who need it; that technical
assistance of all types is made available, should they ask for it; and that
their oceans are protected from international predators.
The Somali political debate has focused on the effectiveness or
otherwise of the various Islamic groups which united under the Islamic
274 See President George W. Bush, President’s Address Before a Joint Session of the
Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11 (Sep. 20,
2001), in 1 PUB. PAPERS 1140. “They hate what they see right here in this chamber: a demo-
cratically elected government. . . . They hate our freedoms: our freedom of religion, our
freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.” Id.
at 1141–42.
275 See Fawaz A. Gerges, Commentary: Obama Must Speak to Young Muslims, CNN.COM,
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/02/gerges.obama.speech/index.html (last
visited Feb. 08, 2010) (suggesting in advance of his speech in Cairo that “[t]o be effective,
the president must simultaneously address not only thorny regional conflicts but also the
fears, hopes, and aspirations of young Muslims for a better life.”).
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Courts Union, also known as the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts.276
Bitter fighting erupted between this religious group and some more secular
clans as well as those who supported the Transitional Government.277 It
was the usual violent free-for-all with civilians being the main targets and
suffering the most.278 The Youth Wing of the Islamic Council, Al-Shabaab,
undertook much of the actual fighting and gained notoriety for its attacks
against civilians.279 The group made news in 2007 when it allegedly threat-
ened prospective peacekeepers from African Union countries, warning them
that “Somalia is not a place where you will earn a salary—it is a place
where you will die.”280 Al-Shabaab is on the United States terrorist list.281
By June 2006, the Somalia Islamic Courts Council had, for a time,
seized Mogadishu and the port of Kismayu, Somalia’s third largest city,
and had declared a jihad against Ethiopia.282 Ethiopia and its regional
rival Eritrea got involved on different sides in the Somali crisis, Ethiopia
invading Somalia in July 2006, purportedly to sustain the Transitional
Government.283 The two rivals, Ethiopia and Eritrea have been accused
of resuming their long historical conflict, this time via a proxy war in
Somalia.284 The U.N. Security Council has accused Eritrea of arming
Islamic militants, an action that violates the U.N. arms embargo imposed
on Somalia.285 Eritrea has denied the charge.286
276 See BBC News, Africa, Profile: Somalia’s Islamic Courts, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
5051588.stm (last visited Feb. 08, 2010).
277 See BBC News, Africa, Country Profiles, Timeline: Somalia, supra note 253.
278 See, e.g., Posting of Daniel Graeber to War Crimes: The World Affairs Blog Network, Hun-
dreds of Civilian Casualties in Somalia Fighting, http://warcrimes.foreignpolicyblogs.com/
2007/04/23/hundreds-of-civilian-casualties-in-somalia-fighting (Apr. 23, 2007, 08:37 EST).
279 See NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, TERRORIST GROUPS, AL-SHABAAB, http://
www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2009).
280 Somali Militants Post Video Warning to African Peacekeepers, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(“AP”), Jan. 30, 2007, http://www.aparchive.com/Search.aspx?remem=x&st=k&kw=Somali
+Militants+Post+Video+Warning#preview.
281 See NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, TERRORIST GROUPS, AL-SHABAAB, supra
note 279.
282 See BBC News, Africa, Country Profiles, Timeline: Somalia, supra note 253.
283 See id.; see also BBC News, Africa, Somalia: Who Supports Who, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/africa/5092586.stm (last visited Feb. 08, 2010).
284 See, e.g., Garoweonline.com, Editorial: Ethiopia-Eritrea Rivalry Should Not Dictate
Somalia Politics, May 17, 2009, http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Editorial
_29/Ethiopia-Eritrea_rivalry_should_not_dictate_Somalia_politics.shtml.
285 Megan Davies, UN Cites Reports Eritrea Aiding Somali Militants, REUTERS.COM,
May 15, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN15313368.
286 See Abdurrahman Warsameh, Somalia: Al-Shabaab Defiant, Determined, INT’L
RELATIONS AND SEC. NETWORK—SEC. WATCH, Jun. 4, 2009, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/
Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?id=101131&lng=en.
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To further complicate the Somali anarchic mess of competing mili-
tias, armies, mercenaries, brigands, home-grown terrorists, and garden-
variety criminals, there were also allegations of Al Qaeda involvement in
Somalia.287 This situation brought direct American intervention in 2007
with air strikes and special forces deployments against suspected Al Qaeda
allies of the Islamic groups.288 By one estimate, “[i]nitial intervention to
eliminate Islamic militancy supported by the US has ultimately led to . . .
a drastic increase in Islamist extremists.”289 The United States Government
of President George Bush, determined to prevent Islamic fundamentalism
from turning a vital strategic state into a terrorist haven, is said to have
assisted and funded the Somali Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and
Counter-Terrorism, an action that allegedly had the unexpected conse-
quence of popularizing the Islamic cause in Somalia.290 Somali government
troops defected to the insurgency.291 The Islamic Courts Union was mili-
tarily defeated in December 2006 by a combination of Ethiopian and Somali
government troops.292 However, now in insurgent “mode,” the Islamic mili-
tants continue the war and in Mogadishu, in particular, the random and
violent free-for-all prevails.293
With respect to the subject of piracy, it is worth noting that while
it held power, the Islamic Courts Union took steps to curb the pirates and
launched military campaigns against pirate strongholds.294 Piracy was
declared a capital offense and beheading was the punishment.295 It is also
worth noting that no other Somali authority appears to have exercised any
effective control over the pirates.296
287 See, e.g., World, Timeline: Chaos in Somalia, REUTERS.COM (U.K.), June 3, 2007,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKL0367271320070603.
288 See, e.g., Lloyd de Vries, U.S. Strikes In Somalia Reportedly Kill 31, CBSNEWS.COM,
Jan. 9, 2007, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/01/08/world/main2335451.shtml.
289 SOMALIA RISK ASSESSMENT BRIEF, supra note 71.
290 See Emily Wax & Karen DeYoung, U.S. Secretly Backing Warlords in Somalia, WASH.
POST, May 17, 2006, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2006/05/16/AR2006051601625_pf.html.
291 See BBC News, Africa, Q&A: Somalia’s Conflict, May 13, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/africa/4760775.stm.
292 BBC News, Africa, Country Profiles, Timeline: Somalia, supra note 253.
293 See id.
294 See Tony Karon, Battling the Somali Pirates: The Return of the Islamists, TIME, Nov. 25,
2008, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1861698,00.html (noting that while
they were in power, the Islamists “had some success in stamping out piracy”).
295 John S. Burnett, Opinion, Grand Theft Nautical, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2008, at A39,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/05/opinion/05burnett.html.
296 See id.
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Somali history of the past few years makes it painfully clear that
any international peace-keeping force is likely to receive short shrift at
the hands of the Somalis. Ironically, while Somali groups, clans, tribes,
and even families fight apparently never-ending wars against each other,
the one factor that seems to provoke a common voice from many of them
is the prospect of international intervention in their country. Many Somalis
are fiercely opposed to the presence of outside military forces in their
country and have apparently yet to appreciate that in that insular (us vs.
them) but patriotic view may lie the seeds of nationalism, that could some
day unite them.
The international support provided to the Transitional Government
may have caused it more harm than good. By May 2009, the likelihood
of a radical Islamic regime being established in Somalia was already being
articulated as a possibly “devastating blow to U.S. counter-terrorism and
anti-piracy efforts in East Africa.”297
Meanwhile, having failed so miserably to cope with the byzantine
politics of Somali warlords and their gun-toting followers, the United
Nations turned to the African Union in 2007 to create a regional force of
peacekeepers with the mandate of supporting the fledgling and faltering
transitional government of Somalia.298 This force was titled the African
Union Mission to Somalia (“AMISOM”) and its mandate has been extended
several times, most recently until January 31, 2010.299 African nations that
have contributed troops for these attempts to keep the peace in Somalia
have met considerable resistance from some Somali factions and a number
of their soldiers have been killed and wounded.300 Some Somalis resent
this African force “as yet another foreign occupier.”301 The loss of life and
the cost of this mission have to be assessed very carefully in order that its
aims and agenda are made very clear to all parties. Kalundi Serumaga,
writing for The Independent, asked about the African Union’s objective:
“[I]s it to prop up a state that clearly does not want to be propped up? Is it
to prevent the growing emergence of home-grown states according to the
297 Shashank Bengali, Somalia Government Close to Collapse, BARTAMAHA.COM, May 16,
2009, http://www.bartamaha.com/?p=2513.
298 See EUROPEAN COMM’N, EXTERNAL COOPERATION PROGRAMMES, AMISOM, http://ec
.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/peace/peace-support-operations/
amisom_en.htm (last visited Feb. 08, 2010).
299 Id.
300 See BBC News, Africa, Country Profiles, Timeline: Somalia, supra note 253.
301 Bruce Crumley, Ridding Somalia of Pirates: Hard Choices for the West, TIME, Apr. 30,
2009, available at http://www.time.com/world/article/0,8599,1894395,00.html.
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needs of the locals . . . ? Is it part of the former war on terror?”302 Accord-
ing to Jennifer Cooke, Director of the Africa Program at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, the African Union’s peacekeepers are
ineffective.303 Islamic leader, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys referred to these
African peacekeepers as “bacteria” and vowed to fight them.304 Another
commentator declared that “every AMISOM soldier is an enemy of the
Somali nation.”305 Instability and frequent violence in Somalia make any
peace-keeping mission an exercise in futility.306 The greatest tragedy is
the humanitarian disaster that confronts nearly half the population who
depend on foreign shipments of food and other necessities to survive.307
Author Issaka K. Souare has concluded that “the solution to
Somalia’s protracted political problems is not to be found in battlefields,
and that insistence on sole military means can prove counterproductive.”308
In line with this reasoning, adopted by many Somalis, are the numerous
efforts by various nations and regional groups to bring the warring Somali
factions together for peace negotiations.309 The most significant of these
many attempts occurred in Djibouti and concluded with a UN-mediated
agreement announced on June 9, 2008.310 This Djibouti peace agreement
302 Kalundi Serumaga, Somalia Piracy, A Chicken or Egg?, THE INDEPENDENT, Apr. 28,
2009, available at http://www.independent.co.ug/index.php/column/interview/69-interview/
866-somalia-piracy-a-chicken-or-an-egg.
303 Dilanian, supra note 29.
304 Mohamed Mohamed, Somalia’s Kingmaker Returns, BBC NEWS, Apr. 28, 2009, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8020548.stm.
305 Muhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis, Every AMISOM Soldier is an Enemy of the
Somali Nation, AMERICAN CHRONICLE, May 7, 2009, http://www.americanchronicle.com/
articles/101708.
306 See, e.g., WALTER S. POOLE, THE EFFORT TO SAVE SOMALIA: AUGUST 1992–MARCH 1994
38–40, 66–71 (Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2005);
Xan Rice, Ethiopia Ends Two-Year Occupation of Somalia, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 27, 2009,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/26/ethiopia-ends-somalia-occupation.
307 Oxfam, supra note 110.
308 Issaka K. Souare, Conclusions: Towards a Revived Somali State, in SOMALIA AT THE
CROSSROADS: CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES ON RECONSTITUTING A FAILED STATE 206,
210 (Abdullahi A. Osman & Issaka K. Souare eds., Adonis & Abbey 2007).
309 See Marc Lacey, Somalis Reach Peace Deal After Dozen Years of Fighting, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 2004, at A3 (describing multiple failed peace agreements prior to the 2004 agree-
ment that is the subject of the article); see also Paul Salopek, Somali’s “Jubilant” at News
of Cease-Fire Agreement, CHI. TRIB., June 11, 2008, at C10 (placing Dijbouti peace agree-
ment in context as “the latest in a stack” of peace agreements and pointing out that all
previous such deals have failed); see also Rice, supra note 306.
310 See Jeffrey Gettleman & Mohammed Ibrahim, Hope and Doubt Greet Peace Deal in
Somalia, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2009, at A9.
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was almost immediately condemned by Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys311 and
has been recognized more in breach than by faithful implementation of its
provisions, which included a ceasefire, an agreement to accept an inter-
national stabilization force from friendly countries, and withdrawal of
Ethiopian troops, who supported the Transitional Government.312 Most
important, the agreement provided a road map for the cessation of armed
confrontation in Somalia.313
This discussion of the role and failure of the United Nations and
its member States in the Somali conflict served the purpose of providing
the reader with some background to appreciate the extent of havoc in the
civilian population and environment caused by the long period of political
anarchy that has prevailed in that country. As of Fall 2009, violent con-
flicts have broken out in Mogadishu and there appears to be no end in
sight to the agony of the people.314 While food is scarce in parts of Somalia,
weapons are not.315 Arms monitoring has revealed that the weapons, with
which Somalis have been killing each other for decades, come from many
countries including the United States, Iran, China, Saudi Arabia, Israel,
Ukraine, Finland, and North Korea.316 An ancillary purpose for delineating
some aspects of the history of Somalia, including international attempts
at resolution, is to learn whether there can be any future possibility of a
stable government that will overcome clan differences and unify that
tragic land. Unless all of Somalia acquires a peaceful government that is
dedicated to establishing the rule of law in a highly weaponized country,
there is little hope for resolution of either the piracy problem that plagues
outsiders or the social and environmental problems that have made life
so unbearable for Somalis.317 The prognosis for that ancient land is rather
311 See id.; The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in
Somalia, ¶ 10, U.N. DOC. S/2008/466 (July 16, 2008).
312 Id. ¶ 9.
313 See id.
314 See, e.g., Lufti Sheriff Mohamed, Somalia Shelling Leaves 20 Dead, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 23, 2009, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-somalia-shelling23
-2009oct23,0,4649696.story (describing an exchange of artillery fire that killed 20 civilians
in Mogadishu).
315 Olivia Ward, Somalia a Land of Chaos, Awash in Weapons, INSIDESOMALIA.ORG, Mar. 2,
2009, http://insidesomalia.org/20090302188/News/Editorial/Somalia-a-land-of-chaos-awash
-in-weapons.html.
316 Id.
317 Perry, supra note 39 (pointing to a lack of government as the source of piracy and
humanitarian problems); Interview by Akwe Amosu with Fatima Jibrell, Founder, Horn
of Africa Relief and Development Organization, in Johannesburg, South Africa (Jan. 13,
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grim in terms of its future and its ability to rejoin the community of peace-
ful nations.318 Philippe Lazzarini, the United Nations’ chief humanitarian
official for Somalia, expressed his belief that “this is the worst humani-
tarian crisis on the continent, possibly in the world.”319
Piracy is both a symptom of Somalia’s collapse and a consequence
of that breakdown.320 While there can be no doubt that the world has to be
extremely concerned about this situation and the way it imperils our march
to a globalized future, until Somalia acquires some national consciousness
and acts to create and sustain a viable government, it will remain a rogue
state, a failed state, and an anarchy that will be both opportunistic predator
and prey, environmentally, economically, and socially.321
II. THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS
A. Introduction: Environmental Degradation of Somalia
The story of Somalia is tragic on many levels: political, economic,
and social. The resulting anarchy, poverty, and crime affect the daily lives
of all persons unfortunate enough to be caught in the vortex of a state de-
scending into chaos.322 However, on a different level, Somalis are doomed
not just in the present but for the future as well. The extent of environ-
mental degradation that afflicts this once-fabled ancient land is a tragedy
that will impact future generations and may well be irremediable.323 Dr.
Abdulkadir Abow, commenting on the escalating environmental disasters
in Somalia, stated that “those who, due to extreme poverty, turn everything
found on Somali soil into either a commercial venture or a short-term
2003), http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200301130987.html (stating that the weakness
of Somalia’s government allows environmental destruction by Somalis and foreigners).
318 See SHAUL SHAY, SOMALIA BETWEEN JIHAD AND RESTORATION 195 (Transaction
Publishers 2008).
319 Jason McLure, Africa’s Worst Crisis, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 17, 2008, http://www.newsweek
.com/id/120119.
320 See Middleton, supra note 6.
321 See Perry, supra note 39.
322 See Middleton, supra note 6.
323 See Carolyn Hemminger, Complex Emergency Situation in Somalia Exacerbated by
Environmental Degradation, MEDIAGLOBAL.ORG, Apr. 27, 2009, http://www.mediaglobal
.org (follow “Archives” hyperlink; then scroll to April 2009 and select article title);
Abdullahi E. Mohamed, Somalia’s Degrading Environment: Causes and Effects of
Deforestation and Hazardous Waste Dumping in Somalia (Somali Ctr. for Water and
Env’t June 2001), http://www.banadir.com/a.htm (pointing out serious environmental
challenges facing Somalia and the barriers to dealing with them).
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survival solution inflict the heaviest environmental damage.”324 The
Natural Resources and Environmental Development Agency—Somalia
(“NERDA”), a non-governmental organization in Somalia, commented that
“poverty is the main direct source of Somalian ecological problems,” and
emphasized the circumstances of “extreme poverty, violations of human
rights, tribalism, xenophobia, and, not least, environmental degradation,”
which was deemed “the most serious problem.”325
It is also important to realize that those who are afflicted with
poverty depend far more on a stable and healthy environment than the
wealthier elements of society, who can utilize technology to ensure a more
comfortable lifestyle.326 The Somali Centre for Water & Environment
(“SCWE”) published a report by environmental engineer, Abdullahi Elmi
Mohamed, which emphasized that “[e]nvironmental degradation increases
the poverty of those who are already poor especially in those parts of
the world where livelihoods and lives are closely dependent on natural
environment.”327
While the atmosphere of political instability, violence, and crime
have resulted in some of the onshore pollution and ruination of the environ-
ment, the oceans of Somalia have been looted and polluted by outsiders.328
The world bears responsibility for having allowed such crimes to go un-
punished and for allowing those who have despoiled Somalia’s offshore
wealth to continue their predatory actions.
As in many parts of Africa, there is a clear nexus in Somalia
between poverty and environmental destruction.329 In Somalia, chronic
324 Abdulkadir Abow, Environmental Problems in Somalia, RIFT VALLEY WILDLIFE
FOUNDATION, http://www.riftwildlife.org/media/Rift%20Wildlife%20Flash%20site.swf (follow
“Welcome” hyperlink; then follow “Programs” hyperlink; then follow “Wildlife News”
hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 08, 2010); see also Hemminger, supra note 323; see also
MOHAMED, supra note 323 (describing use of firewood and charcoal by many Somalis as
contributing to deforestation).
325 National Res. & Envtl. Dev. Agency—Somalia, Current Environmental Degradation
in Somalia, (June 6, 1997) (prepared by Quasim H. Farah), http://www.angelfire.com/ne/
NEDRA//NEDRA.html.
326 See MOHAMED, supra note 323 (describing how large-scale charcoal production enriches
a few Somalis while making the land unsuitable for grazing).
327 Id.
328 See Craig Offman, In Defense of Pirates: Are Somalia’s Pirates Reacting to International
Abuses?, NAT’L POST, Apr. 17, 2009, http://www.nationalpost.com/story.html?id=1508124;
Leigh Phillips, Commission Ready to Investigate European Illegal Fishing Off Somalia,
EUOBSERVER.COM, Apr. 22, 2009, http://euobserver.com/13/27983?print=1.
329 See Edward G. Howard-Clinton, The Emerging Concepts of Environmental Issues in
Africa, 8 ENVTL. MGMT. 187, 187 (1984).
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underdevelopment drives people to pollute their environment because they
have few options.330 Lacking adequate garbage disposal systems, Somalis
are forced to pollute any area convenient for dumping refuse.331 The United
Nations Environment Programme (“UNEP”) explained that a garbage
tipping site was located on the coast at Mogadishu and commented that
“[u]rban solid waste dumps form another possible source of local pollution
in Somalia.”332 Dr. Abdulkadir Abow, articulating a lengthy list of environ-
mental disasters afflicting Somalia, pointed out that solid waste is scat-
tered “all over cities and villages.”333 UNEP expressed some concern over
the fact that untreated domestic and municipal waste winds up in the
Red Sea.334
This type of activity increases land and ocean pollution and gener-
ates even more disease. Absent reliable electricity, the people are compelled
to cut down trees for firewood, and this adds to the decline of soil quality,
erosion of agricultural and pastoral land, and eventually desertification.335
“Huge areas that were once tree covered rangelands have been reduced
to treeless plains, with the result that wildlife has all but disappeared.”336
With soil destruction come food shortages; consequently, hunger and mal-
nutrition are inevitable.337 In order to protect crops from insects, farmers
are inclined to overuse pesticides. The United Nations has drawn attention
to the “extensive use of pesticides, insecticides and herbicides for agricul-
ture and other purposes” in Somalia.338 Although in the West too much de-
velopment is responsible for many of the environmental nightmares being
faced today, ironically, in Africa, chronic under-development is more likely
to be the major reason for pollution and ruination of the environment.339
Although the Somalis have, as a matter of personal survival, had
to pollute and degrade their environment, the focus of this article will be
330 Farah, supra note 325.
331 UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME [UNEP], THE STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN
SOMALIA: A DESK STUDY 26 (2005), http://www.unep.org/DEPI/programmes/Somalia
_Final.pdf.
332 UNEP, RED SEA & GULF OF ADEN: REGIONAL PROFILE 24, http://www.unep.org/
regionalseas/programmes/nonunep/redsea/default.asp (follow “Regional Profile” hyperlink)
(last visited Feb. 08, 2010).
333 Abow, supra note 324; see also UNEP, THE STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN SOMALIA,
supra note 331, at 26.
334 UNEP, RED SEA & GULF OF ADEN, supra note 332, at 24.
335 See SOMALI SUPPORT SECRETARIAT, supra note 89.
336 Id.
337 See UNEP, THE STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN SOMALIA, supra note 331, at 30, 49, 51.
338 UNEP, RED SEA & GULF OF ADEN, supra note 332, at 25.
339 See Howard-Clinton, supra note 329, at 187.
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on two aspects of environmental damage committed largely by external
agents: namely over-fishing and marine pollution caused by the dumping
of toxic waste in the oceanic waters adjacent to Somalia.
B. Ocean Pollution
In recent decades, the world has become much more conscious of
and conscientious about the need to protect the ecology of Earth’s oceans,
which occupy approximately seventy-one percent of its surface.340 “From
oil to tin, diamonds to gravel, metals to fish, the resources of the sea are
enormous.”341 As these oceans produce a vital food source for millions of
human beings, it is self-evident that pollution should be avoided. Who in
their right mind would set about contaminating a vital food source? The
Somali situation provides some depressing answers.342
Expanding populations and diminishing food resources from the
oceans lend urgency to the need to protect the oceanic environment from
all forms of pollution that could imperil that food resource.343 Particularly
threatening is the waste dumped by ships and oil tankers.344 In the 1970s,
Greenpeace actively campaigned against ocean dumping, particularly
emphasizing the dangers of radioactive waste pollution.345
Although most of the toxic waste has been produced by the devel-
oped world as an unfortunate by-product of its rush to industrialization
and the creation of a consumer-oriented market economy, the most
340 Memorandum from Emily E. Baine & Margaret P. Simmons of the U.S. Army
Engineering & Support Center, Mitigating the Possible Damaging Effects of Twentieth-
Century Ocean Dumping of Chemical Munitions (2005), http://www.dstl.gov.uk/conferences/
cwd/2005/pres/17.pdf.
341 UNITED NATIONS DIV. FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA [DOALOS], THE
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1988),
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm.
342 See generally Mohamed Abshir Waldo, Somali Complains and Appeals on Illegal
Fishing and Hazardous Waste Dumping, SOMALI FISHERIES SOC’Y, http://soma-fish.org/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=11&itemid=13&showall=1 (last visited
Feb. 08, 2010) (discussing problems with toxic waste dumping and lack of meaningful
international intervention).
343 See generally David Pimentel & Marcia Pimentel, Population Growth, Environmental
Resources, and the Global Availability of Food, SOC. RESEARCH, Spring 1999, http://
findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2267/is_1_66/ai_54668885/ (warning that human popu-
lations are exceeding food supplies and preservation of land and sea resources is needed).
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sought-after dumping grounds for this waste have inevitably been in the
developing world.346 The poorer nations of the world, lacking the means
of protecting their environment, regularly became dumping grounds for
industrial, hospital, and even radioactive waste produced by the richer
nations of the West.347 The desperate requirement for hard currency has
often forced governments in the developing world—the South—to accept
such dangerous trash from the developed world—the North.348 Allegedly,
on occasion in some countries, politicians have been paid off or persuaded
to permit the pollution of their countries.349 The use of countries in the
South as dumping grounds for Northern waste has provoked intense rage
among populations in the South.350 The NIMBY, not in my backyard, effect
so familiar in North American politics, generated considerable agitation
against the polluters, who were mainly business interests attempting to
dispose of waste as cheaply as possible.351 Ironically, attempts to improve
the environment of the North via stronger legislative measures, public
awareness campaigns, and the like made it more likely that the undesir-
able waste materials generated by the North’s consumer society would
land in the soil and oceans of the South.352 The dumping has been termed
“toxic colonialism,” and widely condemned.353
The failure of some European waste disposal companies to find any
place willing to accept their unhealthy cargo impelled the situation that
has now become so serious in Somalia.354 Because there has for nearly two
decades been no effective and stable government to protect the Somali en-
vironment and no local coastguard to drag the polluters through national
judicial systems, business interests—thought to be from Europe—saw a
great opportunity of vast profits and took advantage of the situation.355
346 See, e.g., Ben Webster, Britain’s Dirty Little Secret as a Dumper of Toxic Waste,
THE TIMES, July 18, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/environment/article
6718689.ece#.
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L. Kimble, acting Assistant Secretary of State (May 8, 1998), http://www.ban.org/Library/
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Although one can accuse such interests of exhibiting egregious amounts
of greed, demonstrating crass indifference to the consequences of their
actions, and so on, it is the negligence of their home governments in
policing their national waste disposal companies that must also be con-
sidered. To turn a blind eye to such actions is, in effect, to condone by
inaction the environmental destruction of Somalia.356 That the United
Nations has also not taken effective action to stop this practice reflects
very negatively on the world organization.357 When one compares the
lethargic absence of international action to stop the waste-dumping and
over-fishing that daily despoils Somalia with the energetic, frenetic
activity from all quarters to deal with Somali piracy, the sense of imbal-
ance in approach becomes glaring indeed.358
The earlier view that the oceans constituted common property was,
in the twentieth century, replaced by an increasing tendency for nations
to extend their sovereign control over waters adjacent to their coastline.359
These oceanic waters became part of a country’s economic interests, sub-
ject to various national laws, licensing systems, fee payments, penalties
for violators, and the like.360
The discovery of offshore oil has induced most nations to claim
all oceanic territory they can; a trend begun by the U.S. President Harry
Truman, who in 1945 extended national jurisdiction over all natural re-
sources on the continental shelf.361 Other nations followed, laying varied
claims to areas up to two hundred miles into the ocean.362
“Customary international law” that assured “freedom of the seas”
became contentious,363 particularly with the appearance of enormous fish-
ing vessels that could literally scoop out entire sections of seafood from
the ocean.364 “The oceans were generating a multitude of claims, counter
356 See id.
357 See id.
358 Interview by Amy Goodman with Mohamed Abshir Waldo, Somalia Piracy Began in
Response to Illegal Fishing and Toxic Dumping by Western Ships off Somali Coast
(Democracy Now! television/radio broadcast Apr. 14,2009), available at http://www
.democracynow.org/2009/4/14/analysis_somalia_piracy_began_in_response.
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and the Commons Question, 35 GEOFORUM, 313, 313–314 (2004).
360 See id. at 314.
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364 Edward N. Kimani, Gladys M. Okemwa & Johnson M. Kazungu, Fisheries in the
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RESOURCE AND GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES 3, 9,12 (Ellen Laipson & Amit Pandya eds.
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claims, and sovereignty disputes.”365 By 1982, the international commu-
nity finally succeeded in concluding the UNCLOS, which came into force
in 1994.366 It is important to highlight the extensive international efforts
and the realization of imminent peril from competing interests that pre-
cipitated this Convention.367
The present oceanic anarchy—piracy, pollution, and predatory
fishing—that prevails off the coast of Somalia provides insight into what
the situation would have been globally if the countries had not agreed to
limit national interest in favor of the greater good of all mankind.368
Professor Donald Rothwell, a specialist in the Law of the Sea, stated that
the Convention “is generally considered to be reflective of customary
international law,” and with respect to the instant problem of piracy, he
stressed that it “outlined an international regime for the repression of
piracy and effectively recognised universal jurisdiction on the part of all
states to suppress pirate acts.”369
While any detailed analysis of the Convention is beyond the con-
straints of this article, it is imperative to note the scope of the Convention:
covering rights of navigation, territorial sea limits, economic jurisdiction,
passage of ships through straits, appropriate conservation of marine
resources, and protection of the marine environment, among other pro-
visions.370 While this Convention created a legally controlled environ-
ment in the oceans, the Somali situation with oceanic dumping of toxic
waste, over-fishing and piracy demonstrates the fragility of such a system
when land-based enforcement mechanisms are absent.371 Somalia’s oceans
are today a mirror of a Hobbesian state of nature where conditions of life
are “nasty, brutish and short.”372 For this situation, the entire world
bears responsibility. It is important to note that the Convention estab-
lishes the “fundamental obligation of all States to protect and preserve
the marine environment.”373
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Ironically, while Somali factions may disagree on almost every
issue, they appear to have one unified voice when it comes to articulating
their justified grievance concerning the environmental degradation of their
country by foreigners.374 In September 1995, leaders of all twelve major
Somali political factions complained formally to the United Nations, the
European Union, and the Arab League, among others, about the environ-
mental problems caused by illegal fishing and the dumping of hazardous
waste by foreign vessels in Somali waters.375 This letter asked the United
Nations to establish an organization, such as the International Marine
Organization, to protect their oceanic ecology until a viable government
could be formed in Somalia. Subsequently, Ministers of Fisheries from the
Puntland State of Somalia appealed to various nations and international
organizations to help prevent poaching and pollution.376
As early as 2002, BBC News reported that thousands of dead fish
were washing ashore along the coastlines of Somalia and Kenya.377 Marine
expert David Olendo suggested that this disaster could be related to signifi-
cant pollution near war-ravaged Somalia.378 According to the United Nations
Environment Programme, “[a]s much as 80% of the pollution load in coastal
waters and the deep oceans originates from land-based activities.”379 In
their study of the Indian Ocean coastline of Somalia, Federico Carbone
and Giovanni Accordi found recent acceleration in human alteration of the
ecosystem.380 These authors expressed concern that “the continental shelf
is not adequately monitored or protected, so coastal habitats are being de-
graded, living marine resources are overexploited, and pollution levels are
increasing, all of which affect natural resources and biodiversity.”381
Although human activity has caused serious damage to the ocean
environment across this planet, it is also true that awareness of this
problem has generated a plethora of international legal instruments that
address pollution in the seas.382 While length constraints for this article
374 See MOHAMED, supra note 323.
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376 Id.
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preclude concentration on all these agreements, it is important, just
briefly, to note the scope of pollution now prohibited or restricted by the
body of international law. Appropriate observance of this group of laws by
ships of all nations would have prevented the Somali ocean areas from
being turned into a toxic dumping ground.383
Acknowledgment of the environmental threat posed by oil pol-
lution inspired the 1954 International Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (“OILPOL”).384 OILPOL established prohib-
ited zones extending at least fifty miles from land and prohibited all but
minimal oil discharges in those areas.385
The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships (“MARPOL”)386 was adopted in 1973.387 It was improved with
a Protocol in 1978 and entered into force in 1983 to reduce and eliminate
garbage disposal from ships into the world’s oceans.388 Certain zones were
declared Special Areas where discharges were severely restricted.389 The
Special Areas include the Gulf areas and the Red Sea.390 Discharge of
noxious liquid substances was restricted by international agreement in
1987,391 and the agreement dealing with pollution by sewage emanating
from ships entered into force in 2003.392 Clearly, there is now an extensive
and comprehensive, albeit imperfect, body of international law that only
requires that countries, and particularly their business interests, ensure
honest compliance.393
Ironically, the growth of environmental protection in the Western
world and the proliferation of restrictive laws against pollution could have
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made Somalia an irresistible attraction for European waste disposal in-
terests, who stood to profit significantly by dumping their toxic cargo into
Somali waters instead of the more laborious and expensive disposal pro-
cedures demanded in Europe.394
It appeared to Somalis that the ocean dumping off Somalia’s lengthy
coastline was being perpetrated by foreign individual business interests,
who appeared not to be concerned about violating international law.395 A
few environmentalists and analysts across the world voiced their concern
about the practice. According to author Ken Menkhaus, “[c]ompanies
have exploited Somalia’s unpatrolled coastline to dump toxic waste.”396
Unfortunately, the world community expediently chose to ignore the pre-
cautionary warnings articulated by these environmental experts.397
Not only was the dumping in Somali waters illegal, but the very
action of ferrying such dangerous material, including nuclear waste, all
the way from Europe to Somalia was also illegal.398 Illegal traffic in haz-
ardous waste was deemed criminal by the Basel Convention,399 which
was adopted in 1989 and came into force in 1992.400 The Basel Conven-
tion attempted to deal with problems caused by the need to dispose of an
estimated 400 million tons of hazardous waste produced annually on this
planet.401 The Convention proposes to reduce such waste, manage it accord-
ing to accepted environmental standards, and dispose of it as close to the
source as possible.402
The continuation of rampant pollution of Somali waters is indica-
tive of the failure of international law to protect the environment of a weak
state. The deliberate and callous destruction of Somalia’s ocean ecology and
the resulting threat to a vital food source so important for a country that
lives on the edge of incessant famine is almost beyond comprehension.
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Where economic interest for profit precedes the food resource needs
of human beings, the inaction of organizations like the United Nations
lends credence to the apprehensions of Somalis about that world body.403
No amount of humanitarian food aid collected by the World Organization
for Somalia can atone for the organization’s inaction regarding the crim-
inal pollution of its oceans.
Humanity is moving this planet on an inexorable course toward
environmental degradation.404 The short-sightedness of some human
beings—fueled by the greed for individual short-term gain at the expense
of collective long-term pain—raises the possibility that some day, perhaps
in this new century, all the world will turn into Somalia.405 Unless the inter-
national legal instruments are not simply passed but obeyed and imple-
mented, the gloom and doom apocalyptic scenarios sketched out by some
environmental activists can no longer be written off as mere fantasy.406
If the United Nations and its leading member states, particularly
the permanent members of the Security Council, wish collectively to ad-
dress this problem of ocean pollution, ending the crime in Somalia would
be not only beneficial for that country but would also boost the credibility
of the international effort against environmental polluters.407 The United
Nations’ members have plenty of legal validation for any constructive mea-
sures they may wish to take.408 Seventeen years before the passage of the
Basel Convention and following the path charted by the milestone United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment the representatives of
ninety-four nations and eight international organizations met in London
to draft and sign the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter.409 The London Convention, re-
garded as one of the most significant instruments of international law,
was adopted on December 29, 1972, and entered into force by August 30,
1975.410 The Administrative body for this Convention is the International
403 See Somalia Under UN Transitional Administration, ALLAFRICA.COM, Oct. 31, 2009,
http://allafrica.com/stories/200911021494.html.
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Maritime Organization (“IMO”),411 which was created in 1948.412 The pur-
pose of the London Convention is to control and prevent marine pollution.413
“It prohibits the dumping of certain hazardous materials, requires a prior
special permit for the dumping of a number of other identified materials,
and a prior general permit for other wastes or matter.”414 With reference
to the apparent dumping of nuclear and toxic waste in Somalia, it is inter-
esting to note that in 1993 the London Convention was amended to phase
out the dumping of industrial wastes by December 31, 1995.415 Pursuant
to a resolution in 1983 calling for a moratorium on the dumping of low-
level radioactive waste, the 1993 London Convention amendments banned
such dumping.416
The growing global awareness of pollution precipitated a Protocol
in November 1996, which reflected the new, more restrictive approaches to
the environmental degradation of the oceans.417 The 1996 Protocol entered
into force in March 2006, and the ocean dumping indulged in by foreign
vessels in Somali waters was a clear violation of this international law.418
The 1996 Protocol seeks to replace the 1972 London Convention by initi-
ating a “precautionary approach” to the marine environment, by specifying
the principle that the polluter should bear the cost of pollution, and by
emphasizing, significantly, that the “[c]ontracting Parties should ensure
that the Protocol should not simply result in pollution being transferred
from one part of the environment to another.”419 On point for the analysis
of the Somali situation is Article 6 of the Protocol, which specifies that
“[c]ontracting Parties shall not allow the export of wastes or other matter
to other countries for dumping or incineration at sea.”420 An analysis of
the Convention and the Protocol would suggest that those nations whose
individual business interests have indulged in ocean dumping of toxic
411 IMO, LONDON CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL, http://www.imo.org/home.asp?topic_id=
1488 (last visited Feb. 09, 2010).
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waste in Somali waters and on its beaches have to hold their nationals
legally liable and force them to pay appropriately for the pollution they
have caused.421 Until that is accomplished, the Somalis can quite rightly
and justifiably be enraged that their internal problems have been exploited
by foreign criminals, who, in their eyes, are the real pirates.422
It is interesting to note that, while many sources date the emer-
gence of foreign toxic waste to the fall of the Barre Government or shortly
prior to that time frame, the UNEP, in an Environmental Assessment,
traced the notorious practice back to the early 1980s, when Somalia was
receiving “countless shipments of illegal nuclear and toxic waste dumped
along the coastline.”423 Continuing, the UNEP Report stated that much
of the waste was dumped on the beaches of Somalia “in containers and
disposable leaking barrels which ranged from small to big tanks without
regard to the health of the local population and any environmentally devas-
tating impacts.”424 UNEP emphasized that such dumping was a violation
of international treaties.425
Subsequent to the fall of the Barre Government and taking advan-
tage of the absence of effective legal authority in Somalia, multinational
companies and others were allegedly dumping toxic waste into the Indian
Ocean very near Somalia.426 According to BBC News, maritime sources
in Mombasa, Kenya, claimed that “ship captains have been paying ran-
som money to Somali militia to enable them to dump the waste.”427 Some
Somali warlords were alleged to have been complicit in accepting money
to allow the illegal toxic dumping to occur without any obstruction.428
According to the BBC, “several UN agencies in 2000 revealed massive pol-
lution by toxic materials caused by dumping along Somalia’s coastline.”429
More recently, Dr. Abdulkadir Abow explained that “[r]esearchers also
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traced contaminants in the Indian Ocean to foreign ships which use Somali
shores to dispose of thousands of gallons of toxic waste (specifically residue
of pesticides).”430 A leading Somali environmental activist, Fatima Jibrell,
complained about foreign ships that flushed their systems in Somali waters
to avoid the expense of cleaning their vessels in their home ports.431
Environmental Engineer Abdullahi Elmi Mohamed provided a
number of important reasons why Somalia became such a desirable dump-
ing ground for toxic and nuclear waste from European countries.432 Accord-
ing to Mr. Mohamed, it was more than the absence of a government in
Somalia that propelled this matter.433 Somalia’s central location reduced
the cost of transporting the waste, and it was much cheaper to dump the
barrels into the Indian Ocean than incinerate and dispose of the toxic mate-
rials in the country of origin.434 Additionally, caught up in a violent civil
war, Somalis were not initially attentive to the horror being perpetrated
offshore, and some local leaders were amenable to allowing this practice,
provided they were themselves compensated.435 As for the corporate justi-
fication that they had paid for permission to dump the waste in Somali
waters, United Nations envoy for Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, appro-
priately countered: “How can you negotiate these dealings with a country
at war and with a government struggling to remain relevant?”436
Although the international community is justifiably concerned
about Somali piracy, it is interesting to note that the Somalis themselves
appear more worried about their environmental problems, specifically
those caused by foreigners.437 Ex-Somali Army Colonel, Mohamed Nureh
Abdulle, informed the BBC of this concern, shared by his fellow residents
of Harardhere, and remembered that in 1991 when the Somali government
fell, “certain large corporations took advantage of this. European ships
started appearing off the coast of Somalia, dumping thousands of barrels
of toxic waste into the ocean.”438 According to Colonel Abdulle, the people
living near the coast fell ill, and children were born with deformities.439
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The United Nations has expressed serious concern about the fact
that Somalis are being poisoned by nuclear and hazardous waste includ-
ing chemical contaminants and radioactive uranium.440 The lethal mix
also contained mercury, cadmium, and industrial waste.441 The toxic brew
originated as waste from European hospitals as well as garbage from
factories.442
The tsunami of 2004 washed evidence of foreign dumping onto
the shores of Somalia; barrels filled with lethal waste materials washed
ashore.443 In February 2005, the United Nations confirmed that these
illegally dumped barrels contained nuclear waste, and some of them had
broken open.444 To date, there have been no consequences for the perpe-
trators.445 Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, United Nations Envoy to Somalia,
explained that “[t]here has been no clean-up, no compensation, and no
prevention.”446 He also confirmed to Al Jazeera News Service that the
United Nations had “reliable information” of European and Asian compa-
nies dumping toxic and nuclear waste in Somali waters, but stressed “that
no government has endorsed this act, and that private companies and
individuals acting alone are responsible.”447
Nick Nuttall, a spokesman for UNEP, indicated in 2005 that this
practice of European companies and others dumping nuclear and haz-
ardous waste in Somali oceans had been going on for the previous fifteen
years.448 Mr. Nuttall explained the economic reasons for this pollution,
stating that “it cost European companies $2.50 per ton to dump the wastes
on Somalia’s beaches rather than $250 per ton to dispose of the wastes
in Europe.”449 As industrialized countries produce approximately ninety
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percent of the world’s hazardous waste,450 the financial incentive to vio-
late international law and despoil the waters of a fragile political entity
is too tempting to resist. Commenting wryly, Mr. Nuttall noted that “[i]t’s
not rocket science to know why they’re doing it because of the instability
there.”451 The political instability inside Somalia and the fact that the
lengthy coastline was unguarded provided a real opportunity for the illegal
dumping.452 The health consequences for Somalis in the contaminated
coastal region were articulated in grim detail by this United Nations
spokesman: “These problems range from acute respiratory infections to
dry, heavy coughing, mouth bleedings, abdominal hemorrhages, what they
described as unusual skin chemical reactions . . . . So there’s a whole vari-
ety of ailments that people are reporting from these villages.”453 An untold
number of Somalis were said to have died after opening the containers
filled with toxic waste, and there were also reports of premature births.454
As the tsunami of December 2004 struck during the peak fishing
season, which lasts between October and February, the coastal communi-
ties were more densely populated,455 and more people became vulnerable
to the horrors both of the tsunami and its toxic aftermath.456 UNEP grimly
concluded that, after the tsunami, the “economic potential of Somalia’s
marine resources has been seriously affected and threatened, whilst dump-
ing of toxic and harmful waste is rampant in the sea, on the shores and in
the hinterland.”457 Radioactive waste contamination such as has occurred
in Somalia can, according to UNEP, have serious long-term impact on
human health and on “groundwater, soil, agriculture and fisheries.”458
Ironically, a few months before the tsunami provided Nature’s own wake-
up call to hazardous pollution, UNEP launched a three-year multimillion
dollar project, funded by Norway and the Global Environment Facility, to
cut pollution from the Western Indian Ocean in recognition of the fact that
approximately thirty million people from Kenya, Mozambique, Somalia,
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South Africa, Tanzania, Mauritius, and the Seychelles are financially
dependent on marine and coastal resources.459
Despite the existence of international laws against such activity,
decades of dumping of toxic waste in Somalia and offshore has created
a global hazard of frightening proportions. It might already be too late
to clean up so vast an area.460 Geoff Olson, writing for the Vancouver
Courier, graphically and dramatically explained: “The world’s oceans re-
main the First World’s toilet, and the global south its garbage heap—
particularly Africa.”461
Again, as with many issues of global concern, the problem lies not
with the law but with the absence of its implementation. As we have seen
from a brief view of a few of the relevant international conventions, there
are plenty of international prohibitions against the activities that are de-
spoiling the environment of Somalia, but there appears to be little or no
international will to insist on their implementation.462 By leaving the polic-
ing of such criminal activities as dumping toxic waste to the nation states,
the United Nations has left a huge loophole for polluters, who can take
full advantage of areas like Somalia that cannot, in the present political
context, protect their people or their environment.463
C. Overfishing by Foreigners
From the Somali perspective, there is a far more serious form of
piracy in their oceans than that perpetrated by their own nationals against
international shipping. This is the “piracy” of overfishing being committed
by crews of many nations that continue to fish without licenses, without
any permits, and without any thought to the sustainability of the species
they are plundering.464
The global demand for fish is so immense that fishing boat owners
and crews do not hesitate about breaking international and national laws
and conventions in their frenzied pursuit of multi-million dollar catches.465
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THE HINDU, an Indian newspaper, reported that in 2005, a staggering 85
million tons of fish were hauled out of the world’s oceans.466 Greenpeace,
commenting in September 2008 on the global fisheries crisis, concluded
that globally, 3.5 million fishing boats work the world’s oceans.467 The
United Nations stated in 2008 that “76 percent of the world’s fisheries
[were] either fully exploited, overexploited or depleted.”468
It has been estimated that in the absence of an effective Somali gov-
ernment and navy, foreign fishermen have plundered “more than $300 mil-
lion worth of tuna, shrimp, and lobster” every year from the Somali coastal
region.469 The sum is appropriately deemed staggering “[i]n any context”
by Gustavo Carvalho of the environmental group Global Witness.470 This
marine resource, one of the richest fishing grounds in the world, consti-
tuted the country’s second largest industry.471 In 2005, the United Nations
FAO estimated that approximately 700 foreign ships were engaged in
unlicensed fishing in Somalia.472 The foreign fishing vessels allegedly
originate from Italy, Pakistan, India, Korea, Yemen, Spain and Japan.473
Engaging in the notorious practice of using flags of convenience, these
ships also hail from China, France, Germany, the United Kingdom,
Honduras, Kenya, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, the Soviet Federation, Sri
Lanka, Taiwan, and Thailand.474 According to Dr. Joseph A. Bailey, II,
as these fishermen from so many countries lack permission and licenses,
“this constituted piracy (‘sea robbers’).”475
Somali fishermen alleged that they were intimidated by large for-
eign ships and “aggressive crews” fishing to excess in areas essential for
Somali fishers’ livelihood.476 In 2006, Somali fishermen complained that
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700 foreign ships were “vacuuming up” the vital food resource from the
ocean off Somalia.477 Foreign ships were accused of using illegal fishing
methods like dynamite and breakage of the fragile coral reefs.478 This
resort to blast, or dynamite, fishing has been outlawed, but absent an
effective government in Somalia, the practice continues.479 The foreign
fishing vessels were alleged to be willfully destroying endangered species
like orca, sharks, baby whales, and sea-turtles.480 The huge fishing ships
come equipped with steel nets with long metal spikes that can dig deep
into the living coral to reach the lobsters and fish, “leaving the Somali
coast an ocean graveyard.”481 These destructive practices only diminish
the sustainability of the resource over the long-term.482
A Somali fisherman, Jeylani Shaykh Abdi, complained that the
foreigners are “not only taking . . . our fish, but they are also trying to stop
us from fishing.”483 Somali fishermen complained to the United Nations,
appealing for help against the illegal activities being perpetrated in their
ocean.484 As the sea provided the only means for the survival of Somalia’s
fishing communities, the incursions of foreign vessels provoked some fisher-
men in the late 1990s into forming armed vigilante groups to guard their
coastlines.485 These village vigilantes encountered stiff opposition from
foreign vessels fishing in Somali waters. It was alleged that the Somalis
endured having boiling water poured on them, gunshots fired at them and
worst of all, having their nets and fishing boats destroyed by the far larger
vessels.486 There were also allegations that some Somali fishermen were
missing after encountering the foreign ships.487 The problem was exacer-
bated when foreign navies protected the allegedly predatory activities of
their fishing vessels.488
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The largely artisanal, small-scale fishing activities of Somalis dates
back many years and became particularly important economically after
drought in the 1970s and 1980s led to the resettlement of thousands of
starving nomadic families to the coastline,489 where they adapted to a new
lifestyle. They adjusted their formerly pastoral pursuits to fishing and
focused their livelihood on inshore fisheries that were abundant in the
Indian Ocean off the Somali coastline.490 Having once been uprooted and
having their economic base wiped out by drought, this new attack from
foreign overfishing threatened their very existence as viable communi-
ties.491 Given the importance of family and tradition in Somali culture, this
foreign action that threatened their basic way of life was viewed with as
much hostility as were the United Nations troops who had intervened in
their country.492 Many Somalis believe that they should be left to sort out
their own political future without external interference.493 They also com-
plain about the piracy of sustained and prolonged looting of their fish by so
many nations, who took advantage of their weakness and lack of an effec-
tive government.494 The Somali perspective links foreign military interven-
tion, foreign fish pillaging, and foreign ocean dumping and concludes that
all these actions harm their country, their way of life, and their economy.495
Illegal fishing by foreign vessels in Somali waters is only an exac-
erbated version of a situation that has become a serious environmental
problem worldwide. In the latter half of the twentieth century, artisanal
fishing, of a cottage industry variety, was superseded by large vessels
that literally scooped up all the living resources of the ocean and trans-
ferred the catch to even larger mother ships, capable of holding substantial
quantities of fish.496 Inevitably, such large vessels destroyed oceanic fish
stocks, and as former lucrative fishing grounds became depleted, the fishing
crews hunted desperately for fish wherever they were to be found.497 The
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combination of rich fishing grounds off Somalia and the non-existence of
any watchful government onshore ready to punish trespassers was too
irresistible a combination for the fish-hungry foreign business interests
that crowded even inside Somali coastal waters for the most prolific
catch.498 As approximately ninety-nine percent of the world’s fisheries fall
under the jurisdiction of one or another nation,499 the Somali situation of
political anarchy and a rich resource was unique, and the temptation too
great to resist.
So great was the lure of the fish that foreign business interests
from many countries freely violated international law in their frenzied
quest for all the fish they could catch.500 Their home governments were
disinclined to penalize them, and no Somali authority existed to put a stop
to their practices.501 International law was not an issue of any concern to
these crews or the ship owners, who made huge profits from looting the
oceans off Somalia.502
Length constraints of this article preclude any detailed analysis
of every international instrument that could have been utilized to protect
Somali interests from foreign predators. Suffice it to say, the examples pro-
vided in this article are relevant and on point if the international commu-
nity can adopt an ethical approach and strive to implement the laws that
already exist. In the realm of environmental matters, the plethora of wordy
instruments and the brazen and flagrant violations of those laws make for
a very disenchanting and disheartening perception of the world community.
The UNCLOS provides a viable framework that could be utilized—
if States were willing to observe the law—to provide international protec-
tion for the Somali fish resources.503 Although the situation in Somalia is
somewhat unique given the absence of an effective and stable government,
the provisions of the Convention could still be applied by governments of
all nations were they inclined to protect Somalia from predatory fishing
vessels of all nations.
Article 61 of the Convention addresses the need for appropriate
conservation and management of the resource in order to prevent over-
exploitation.504 There is a role for international organizations to play in
498 Achieng, supra note 471.
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assisting States in this endeavor.505 That provision could enable a more
ethically-inclined United Nations to urge all Member States to cooperate
to protect Somalia’s vital resource until the Somalis are able to assume
that responsibility. There is specific reference to the “economic needs of
coastal fishing communities.”506 Article 62(4) is relevant for our consider-
ation of the plundering by foreign vessels of the Somali fish resources:
“Nationals of other States fishing in the exclusive economic zone shall
comply with the conservation measures and with the other terms and con-
ditions established in the laws and regulations of the coastal State. These
laws and regulations shall be consistent with this Convention. . . .”507
The legal framework exists for the United Nations to take measures
to assist and protect Somalia by preventing illegal fishing. The Somalis
can be excused for being more than skeptical of an international commu-
nity that is determined to curb their pirates, even to the point of entering
Somali territory to accomplish this end.508 That same group of govern-
ments shows no interest or will to curb global pirates from various nations
who daily—under the benign eye of so many foreign navies—plunder the
fish without licenses or any compensation for the people of that tragic
country.509 An even-handed analysis of this tragic saga can only lead to
the conclusion that there are two groups of pirates at work here, one that
is being hunted and one that is being protected. The action of the United
Nations in ignoring the international laws it has sponsored and passed
when it is inconvenient or not expedient to promote implementation could
be considered sheer hypocrisy, particularly by any Somali pondering the
plight of his ancient country.
In 1995, the FAO sponsored and urged over 170 members to adopt
an important, but non-binding, Code of Conduct for Responsible
Fisheries.510 The Code emphasized “that the ‘right to fish’ carrie[d] the
obligation to do so responsibly.”511 In 2001, the FAO prepared the Interna-
tional Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported
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and Unregulated Fishing (“IPOA-IUU”).512 This was a voluntary instru-
ment within the framework of the Code of Conduct for Responsible
Fisheries, and it called on States to “give full effect to relevant norms of
international law, in particular as reflected in the 1982 U.N. Convention,
in order to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing.”513 The Rome Plan
attempted to make states deal with the perpetrators of IUU fishing. This
suggestion applied not merely to the expedient flag states but to the
domicile states of crew members and boat owners who were engaged in
IUU fishing as well.514 Sanctions were proposed:
States should ensure that sanctions for IUU fishing by
vessels and, to the greatest extent possible, nationals under
its jurisdiction are of sufficient severity to effectively pre-
vent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing and to deprive
offenders of the benefits accruing from such fishing. This
may include the adoption of a civil sanction regime based
on an administrative penalty scheme. States should ensure
the consistent and transparent application of sanctions.515
Had the nations that have dispatched navies to the Horn of Africa
intended to protect both their own interests as well as those of Somalia,
they could voluntarily have implemented measures like these to prevent
over-fishing and consequent depletion of this Somali food resource. Their
focus on Somali piracy and their negligence concerning global piracy over
fish stocks have deprived the foreign armadas of the high moral ground,
and that will probably come back to haunt the West in the future.
The nexus between the onset of piracy and the depleted fishery is
fairly obvious. Helplessly seeing their fish disappearing into foreign trawl-
ers that also destroyed the vital coral and ocean plant life, several fisher-
men sought the far more lucrative, albeit dangerous, world of piracy.516
The plunder and destruction of their environmental resources left them
few alternatives.517 While so many nations were happily looting Somalia’s
resources in a predatory free-for-all, the world was largely ignorant of
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the ecological and environmental disaster that was occurring in a vital
and strategically important area.518 Without excusing or justifying their
present penchant for criminally attacking peaceful shipping, the initial
motivation of these “pirates” was to protect their own livelihoods from
foreign predators.519 One of their vigilante fleets was titled the “National
Volunteer Coastguard of Somalia.”520 Their efforts in small boats to scare
off large shipping vessels appeared to Somalis to be very much a David-
Goliath saga in modern times.521 Their success was both astounding and
bewildering to a world that had consigned the notion of pirates to a color-
ful past portrayed very romantically by Hollywood.522 Their vigilante moti-
vation made the pirates initially very popular within Somalia.523 This
further entrenched their influence and drew vast numbers of unemployed
young men to the pirate gangs.524 Bronwyn Bruton, an International Affairs
Fellow at the US Council of Foreign Relations, commented that Somali
“awareness of how foreign countries are profiting from their country’s
misery has increased the pirates’ popular support.”525
The sophistication of the Somali pirates can be gauged by their
focus on promoting the cause that allegedly drove them to their criminal
action, namely the need to protect Somalia’s oceans from over-fishing and
toxic dumping.526
This public relations exercise has resulted in a significant amount
of international media coverage. Pirates have spoken with, and even
courted, the world’s media, giving numerous interviews—a somewhat
unusual activity for pirates—during which the justification has been
articulated time and again.527 Indeed, in this rather bizarre situation,
pirates from Somalia now have media spokesmen to deal with the press.528
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The Somali pirates have deemed themselves protectors of their
country.529 “Think of us like a coast guard,” said Sugule Ali, pirate
spokesman, in a satellite phone interview conducted from one of the
hijacked ships.530 Ali continued, denouncing the illegal fishers and waste
dumpers as the real sea bandits.531 According to commentator Najid
Abdullahi, the pirates argued that the ransom demanded was “nothing
compared to the devastation that we have seen on the seas.”532 Clearly,
among some Somalis the pirates have found a sympathetic audience. As
Somali-Canadian musician, K’naan, commented, “our pirates were the only
deterrent we had from an externally imposed environmental disaster.”533
Many Africans and global African experts understand the reason
for the initial ventures by fishermen against foreign ships, even if they
are apprehensive about the escalating crime and violence that now exists
in the western Indian Ocean. “[I]llegal trawling has fed the piracy prob-
lem,” commented Tsuma Charo of the East African Seafarers Assistance
Programme.534 Roger Middleton, writing for BBC News, pointed out that
“people who have been forgotten by the world and who hear of toxic waste
being dumped on their beaches and foreigners stealing their fish have
difficulty being concerned when representatives of that world are held to
ransom.”535 Jerry Okungu, writing a column from Kampala, Uganda, ad-
mitted that the pirates “have taken the law into their own hands, which
is wrong, but desperate circumstances may call for desperate measures.”536
Ironically, while nonviolent Somali complaints about the preda-
tory activities of foreigners were largely ignored by the world, the pirates,
by dramatically engaging in violence, were able very successfully to draw
international attention to themselves and to their country.537 As Eid, a
Somali lobsterman, commented to a journalist, “ ‘we were shouting to the
world about our problems. . . . No one listened.’ ”538 Merca fisherman
Mohamed Hussein accused the international community of being con-
cerned only with the piracy problem and neglecting the very real problems
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of foreign over-fishing and waste dumping.539 Puntland’s minister of plan-
ning and international cooperation, Farah Dala, commented: “ ‘After all
the suffering and war, the world is finally paying attention to our pain be-
cause they’re getting a tiny taste of it.’ ”540 A Somali pirate named Dahir
Mohamed Hayeysi told BBC News that the only solution was to have an ef-
fective government in Somalia that would protect the fishery.541 “ ‘Then,’ ”
said Hayeysi, “ ‘we will disarm, give our boats to that government and will
be ready to work.’ ”542
In the wake of their dramatic hijacking of numerous ships, the
pirates’ media blitz has won converts in the West among those who have
studied the problem.543 In a thought-provoking article, You Are Being Lied
to About Pirates, journalist Johann Hari asked:
Did we expect starving Somalians to stand passively on
their beaches, paddling in our nuclear waste, and watch
us snatch their fish to eat in restaurants in London and
Paris and Rome? We didn’t act on those crimes—but when
some of the fishermen responded by disrupting the transit-
corridor for 20 percent of the world’s oil supply, we begin to
shriek about “evil.” If we really want to deal with piracy,
we need to stop its root cause—our crimes—before we send
in the gun-boats to root out Somalia’s criminals.544
Maritime analyst Jim Wilson was equally blunt, commenting that
“[t]he international community can keep killing Somali pirates until the
end of time; that will not stop piracy.”545 Robert Maletta, the policy adviser
for Oxfam, deplored the lack of economic opportunity that was the moti-
vation for piracy and the simultaneous absence of law and order to control
that criminal activity.546 And Mara Caputo, writing for ISN Security Watch,
Zurich, commented that “piracy has emerged as a backlash against the
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exploitation of Somali natural resources by foreign powers—a situation
that receives much less attention in the media in part because it levies
a stinging indictment against much of the international community.”547
Ms. Caputo continued, blaming foreign governments for playing a “damna-
ble role in creating and perpetuating the piracy phenomenon.”548 Writing
to the United Nations Development Programme, John Laurence, Fishery
Consultant for PanOcena Resources, faulted the United Nations for taking
no action to prevent the ravaging of one of the five richest fishing zones
in the world.549 Laurence blamed the United Nations for “turning a blind
eye to the activities of the fishing vessels.”550 Notably, it was reported that
United Nations monitors proposed an embargo on fishing off Somalia in
2005 and 2006, but “their proposals were overruled by members of the UN
Security Council.”551
It appears that pirate activities may be having some impact. Accord-
ing to BBC News, French and Spanish fleets that normally catch significant
amounts of tuna near Somalia had to move further east away from the
pirate-infested Somali coast.552 As these fleets are based in Seychelles, that
island economy suffered losses, and the Somali pirate impact on foreign
fishing was measured by reduced supply and higher prices.553
In an effort to avoid the pirates and protect their own crews and
vessels, some shipping companies have opted to avoid the Gulf route al-
together.554 One of the world’s largest shipping companies, Denmark’s
Maersk Line, decided to abandon the Gulf with its perils and instead send
its vessels via the much longer southern African sea route.555 If this trend
spreads to other companies, it could well have a very damaging impact
on tolls collected in the Suez Canal.556 Shashank Bengali explains the
fact “[t]hat a few hundred men like these have wreaked so much havoc
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in the seas off of East Africa is a testament to the sheer power of guts
and greed.”557
Almost two decades of foreign degradation and destruction of
Somalia’s coastline and oceanic zones cannot be halted or effectively
curbed by small bands of pirates demanding, and often acquiring,
million-dollar ransoms from some vessel owners who would rather pay
quietly than admit their ships are fishing without licenses and their
dumping of toxic waste violates all norms of international law.558
It is now quite obvious that the enormous ransoms acquired by the
pirates of Somalia are luring increasing numbers of predators to this type
of very lucrative criminal activity. Although some pirates may have begun
as vigilantes with the intention of saving their environment and their way
of life,559 that justification does not appear as convincing now. The lure
of easy plunder has attracted “ex-warlord-affiliated militiamen,”560 and
such additions inevitably dilute the moral base that might have explained
the earlier vigilante-pirate attacks on foreign shipping. The crime has
proven to be too lucrative, and, as much of the wealth has not apparently
been used in any organized or comprehensive way to rebuild Somalia, the
economic consequences are not, in the long term, of any visible benefit to
its starving people.
There can be little debate about the grim fact that “Somalia is in
a state of a major environmental degradation,”561 and that “[v]ast marine
resources are under unprecedented threat from overexploitation and pol-
lution by outsiders.”562 Aside from the cycle of drought and flooding, much
of the environmental damage is attributed to human intervention includ-
ing water pollution, deforestation, overgrazing, soil erosion, salinization
caused by inefficient irrigation systems, waste dumping into the ocean,
unhealthy land disposal of human and other waste, excessive hunting,
and degradation of the coastline.563 The United Nations commented that
“[s]ince 1991, Somalia has been subjected to extreme environmental degra-
dation both natural and manmade associated with the current war and
557 Bengali, supra note 537.
558 Tharoor, supra note 68.
559 See, e.g., Gettleman, Q. & A. With a Pirate, supra note 526 (documenting an interview
with a Somali pirate spokesman who characterized the pirates’ actions as protective of
their seas and as a response to the illegal actions of others).
560 Caputo, supra note 500.
561 FARAH, supra note 325.
562 MOHAMED, supra note 323.
563 Id.
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lawlessness.”564 This destruction has imperiled energy sources.565 The
United Nations Environment Programme explained how increased demand
for forest products and wood used for firewood and charcoal exports to
the Middle East “contributed to the destruction of the forests, woodlands,
mangroves and the entire natural habitat in Somalia.”566
To some extent, the Somali situation is only a more severe form
of an ecological disaster that affects many parts of the African continent.567
The Food and Agriculture Organization has commented that “anyone who
has travelled through the continent has observed that land degradation
is widespread and serious.”568 The Somali situation is particularly tragic
because the nationals of so many countries have taken advantage of that
country’s internal problems to wreak environmental and ecological havoc
that will have an impact for generations.569 The prognosis for Somalia’s
environmental future is grim. There can be no doubt that “[i]n its totality,
the damage done to Somalia’s natural environment is unimaginable and
seems unmanageable even long after a solution is found for the current
difficult prolonged political crisis.”570 Environmentally, even if the world
now belatedly acknowledges responsibility for the plundering and despoil-
ing of Somalia’s oceanic wealth, the damage done may well be irreversible,
with much of Somalia a wasteland and nothing left to salvage.571
The environmental problems that have been inflicted on Somalia
since the dissolution of effective government in 1991 leave any researcher
with a distinctive ambivalence about the moral issues surrounding this
subject of piracy. On the one hand, there can be absolutely no doubt, on
any moral plane, that pirate attacks against unarmed vessels engaged in
peaceful trade are illegal and immoral and unjustifiable. That the Somali
pirates have not killed many sailors and travelers thus far is fortunate
for all concerned. International law outlaws such activity,572 and rightly
564 UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, AFTER THE TSUNAMI, supra note 423, at 129.
565 Id. at 130.
566 Id.
567 See S.C. NANA-SINKAM, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
(FAO) LAND AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AND DESERTIFICATION IN AFRICA, THE
MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM (1995), http://www.fao.org/docrep/x5318E/x5318e00.htm
(discussing the various types of land degradation that affect the continent).
568 Id.
569 See MOHAMED, supra note 323.
570 Id.
571 Dalmir Kahin, Somalia: Piracy vs. Blind Western Justice, SOMALILAND TIMES, Issue 379,
May 2–7, 2009, http://www.somalilandtimes.net/sl/2009/379/41.shtml.
572 See UNCLOS, supra note 49, at 436–37.
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so. However, from a different perspective, the Somalis’ activities in taking
the law into their own hands—when no one else would—in defense of their
way of life and to protect their environment, also deserve some consider-
ation on a moral plane. Human Rights Watch commented that, “Somalia
was the most ignored tragedy in the world.”573 It is all too regrettably
true that the Somalis were largely ignored until they committed their
actions of piracy, specifically against the American vessel, the Maersk
Alabama.574 That single action propelled the story to the forefront of
global concern, and with it came some acknowledgment that Somali
piracy is not as clear-cut a case of criminality as initially assumed.575 The
analysis of the environmental issues—particularly those perpetrated by
foreigners576—leaves a researcher laying equal responsibility on the
community of nations and on the United Nations for not having taken
active steps to deter foreign plundering of Somalia’s fisheries and foreign
violations of international laws against ocean dumping.577 As with most
matters involving international law, the problem is not necessarily with
the intention or with the law but with its non-implementation and the
absence of accountability, particularly for politically significant states.578
In an incisive commentary, writer Alie Kabba provides an inter-
esting comparison to situations prevailing in other parts of Africa where
the collapse of government precipitated foreign predatory activities. Kabba
explains:
Like Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of
[the] Congo, Angola, and other places that have witnessed
civil wars and collapse of all institutions of governance,
greedy armies of foreign corporate interests saw the chaos
in Somalia as an opportunity to loot the natural resources
of this warring nation. It was blood diamonds in the case
573 Somali Shoppers Killed by Shells, BBC NEWS, Oct. 7, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
africa/7656272.stm.
574 See U.S. Crew Seized by Somali Pirates, BBC NEWS, Apr. 8, 2009, http://news.bbc.co
.uk/2/hi/7989474.stm.
575 See id.
576 See generally Hari, supra note 442 (suggesting that although some pirates are
criminals, others are trying to thwart illegal dumping and overfishing).
577 See Alie Kabba, Somalia: Pirates or Patriots of the Sea?, THE PATRIOTIC VANGUARD,
Apr. 27, 2009, http://www.thepatrioticvanguard.com/spip.php?article4078.
578 See generally Hari, supra note 442 (stating that Western nations have used the
unstable political system in Somalia to overfish and dump nuclear waste in the country’s
water without any consequences).
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of Sierra Leone, timber and gold in the case of Liberia, and
enormous amount of mineral wealth in the case of the
Congo. It’s the old law of the jungle: You fall on your back,
the vultures soon land for a good meal.579
III. POVERTY, PIRACY AND PLENTY
The nexus between poverty and piracy is clear. “Poverty is the
driving force behind the increase in piracy, not just off the coast of Africa,
but in the Caribbean, South America, India, Bangladesh, and Southeast
Asia.”580 To appreciate the extent of the inducement to join the pirates for
young Somali men from very deprived families, consider that the estimated
amount paid to them in ransom in 2008 was said to be approximately $150
million.581 As some shipowners are reluctant to reveal exactly how much
they paid to get back their vessels and crews, there are widely varying
figures for the total amount of ransom collected by pirates.582
The Somali pirates appear to be aware that they have crossed the
strongly-held moral and religious boundaries of their ancient and tradi-
tional way of life.583 Their justification is grounded in absolute necessity
because, as they see it, piracy is their only route out of poverty.584 A pirate
nicknamed Boya commented: “We understand what we’re doing is wrong.
But hunger is more important than any other thing.”585 Donna Hopkins,
the State Department’s program manager on piracy issues, commented
that “[p]iracy offers quick money to young Somalis who have few alterna-
tives that pay as well as piracy.”586
579 Kabba, supra note 577.
580 JOHN S. BURNETT, DANGEROUS WATERS 117 (2002).
581 Bettocchi, supra note 119.
582 See, e.g., Jan M. Olsen, Owner: Pirates Free Danish Ship Held for 2 Months, AP, Jan. 16,
2009, available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20090116/piracy/ (explaining
that ransom usually ranges between one and two million dollars); David McKenzie, Somali
Pirates Free Tanker After Ransom, CNN.COM, Jan. 10, 2009 , http://www.cnn.com/2009/
WORLD/africa/01/10/pirates.tanker/index.html(reporting that allegedly the pirates
demanded three and a half million dollars in ransom).
583 See Gwen Thompkins, Morning Edition: In Somalia, Piracy Is An Attractive Career
Option (NPR radio broadcast May 6, 2009), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyId=103815312.
584 See id.
585 Id.
586 Caldwell, International Community Uniting Against Pirates, supra note 508.
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For a while, there was considerable social cachet for Somali pirates
when they returned to their home ports, their pockets bulging with ransom
money.587 “They wed the most beautiful girls,”588 built large homes, trav-
eled in expensive cars, and enjoyed a life far removed from their poverty-
stricken origins. The short-term and immediate financial impact of the
huge million-dollar ransoms can be observed in a number of pirate havens
like the Somali port of Eyl, where now “[b]ig villas and hotels are sprout-
ing, former subsistence fishermen are driving Mercedes-Benzes, and gold-
digging women are showing up. So are accountants.”589
Local girls “speak of pirates as good marriage prospects.”590 Some
small towns in Somalia have seen the influx of sudden wealth, with pirates
displaying their social skills by hosting lavish parties.591 Having attended
an expensive two-day wedding with abundant food, a foreign band, and
non-stop dancing, Fatuma Abdul Kadir declared that she was “now dating
a pirate.”592 A pirate boasted that his wife did not ask where the money
came from.593 “She just takes it,” he said.594
Pirates have definitely stimulated the economy of their home
ports and villages, injecting an estimated $35 million USD into Puntland
in 2008.595 Peter Lehr of the University of St. Andrews also commented
on the very visible economic boon in the pirate port of Eyl that now
boasts new hotels, restaurants, and “a whole entertainment industry,”
thanks to the pirates.596 Pirates may, legally, also marry an additional
wife, and these weddings, as described above, are paid for from their
587 See Robyn Hunter, Somali Pirates Living the High Life, BBC NEWS, Oct. 28, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7650415.stm.
588 Id.
589 Kennedy, supra note 60.
590 Colin Freeman, Parties, Women and New Cars in Lawless Land where Everyone Wants
to be a Somalian Pirate, TELEGRAPH.CO.UK, Nov. 22, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/piracy/3502475/Parties-women-and-new-cars-in-lawless-land-where
-everyone-wants-to-be-a-Somalian-pirate.html.
591 Id.
592 Gettleman, supra note 8.
593 See Freeman, supra note 590.
594 Id.
595 Jonathan Clayton, Business Booms in Somalian Pirate Village Eyl, THE AUSTRALIAN,
Nov. 19, 2008, http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,24674415-32682,00
.html.
596 Barrett Sheridan, Treasure Ship: Seizing the Sirius Star was an Audacious Raid for
Somalia’s Emboldened Pirates, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 19, 2008, http://www.newsweek.com/id/
169886.
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ransom money.597 News accounts detail lavish pirate celebrations for
various occasions, also financed with ransom money.598 The leap from
abject poverty to sudden affluence on this scale has led to inevitable
spending sprees as pirates purchase all the consumer items they want
and enjoy life in a way they had not imagined possible.599
Peter Chalk, a maritime security analyst with the Rand Corpora-
tion, believes that “at least 20 percent of ransom payments are re-invested
back into coastal communities,”600 creating a vested interest in protecting
the pirates.601 The millions paid in ransom to the pirates may have led to
an economic boost of sorts in some parts of that country,602 but the long-
term impact is likely to be negligible given the vast and serious economic
crisis that prevails in Somalia. True, some formerly poverty-stricken people
have become millionaires and are now enjoying lives beyond their wildest
dreams. Their good fortune, however, cannot alleviate the misery of the
starving millions who every year depend on humanitarian aid from over-
seas.603 By one estimate, about three and a half million Somalis require
emergency assistance.604 Nor is the acquisition of sudden wealth by a few
individuals engaged in illegal enterprises likely to assist Somalia’s return
back to economic viability that can attract investment, infrastructure
development and reconstruction of social services such as schools and
hospitals.605 Economically, piracy as a ‘make-work project’ has paid very
handsomely for the few who participated and for their beneficiaries. How-
ever, its economic impact on the country as a whole is negligible and possi-
bly more harmful in the long term because it has attracted career criminals
to the coastline, denigrated the country to the status of not just a failed
state but a pirate haven, and thwarted the possibility of sound economic
growth and development for some time to come.606
597 See id.
598 See Freeman, supra note 590.
599 Id.
600 Andre de Nesnera, Lack of Effective Somali Government Root of Piracy Problem, Experts
Say, VOANEWS.COM, Apr. 16, 2009, http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-04
-16-voa47-68733422.html.
601 Id.
602 See id.
603 See Menkhaus, Prendergast,& Thomas-Jensen, supra note 259.
604 Id.
605 See generally Freeman, supra note 590 (“[I]t is a profession where a grim end to the
good times is always on the horizon.”).
606 See generally Corey Flintoff, Somali Pirates Threaten Revenge, NPR, Apr. 13, 2009,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyid=103035759 (reporting that the port
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IV. THE PIRACY CRISIS
A. Introduction: Dealing with Piracy in Somalia
International law provides us with a clear definition of what con-
stitutes piracy, as seen in Article 101 of the UNCLOS.607 However, while
semantically this definition may be acceptable, in the real world that daily
faces numerous attacks from pirates, legal definitions can frequently be-
come a hindrance in the search for solutions. As journalist Daniel Sekulich
explained, “[t]echnically speaking, piracy only occurs on the high seas—
outside the twelve-nautical mile limit of a state’s territorial waters. Any
acts that occur within those territorial waters are defined as being merely
‘maritime crime.’ ”608 Professor Donald Rothwell explains further that the
UNCLOS definition of piracy relates to actions occurring on the high seas,
including “the adjoining exclusive economic zone which extends from the
edge of the territorial sea to 200 nautical miles.”609 Rothwell’s conclusion
is that “the modern law on piracy has been significantly constrained,” and
now a differentiation has to be made between piracy beyond the twelve mile
limit and such crime within territorial waters, where the “vast majority
of global pirate attacks take place.”610 For the latter, it is generally up to
States and governments to police their own waters and arrest those
violating their national laws.611
Piracy has thrived, not just off Somalia but in Southeast Asia and
other parts of the world,612 because pirates are notoriously hard to
catch613 and because those arresting and prosecuting them have to rely
on a complex web of international and national legal instruments to
pursue these cases.614 Additionally, shipping crews are constantly on the
move, and it is very inconvenient to bring them to a specific place at a
of Eyl is a well-known pirate haven); Raymond Gilpin, Counting the Costs of Somali Piracy
(U.S. Inst. of Peace, Working Paper, 2009), available at http://www.usip.org/files/resources/
1_0.pdf (asserting the upsurge in piracy is a reflection of maritime lawlessness, which will
have negative implications on Somalia’s economic development).
607 For the UNCLOS definition of piracy, see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
608 Bezmozgis, supra note 5.
609 Rothwell, supra note 10.
610 Id.
611 Id.
612 See id.
613 See Why Somali Pirates Are Hard to Defeat, MSNBC.COM, Nov. 18, 2008, http://www
.msnbc.msn.com/id/27789400/.
614 See Rothwell, supra note 10 (discussing international and national laws existing before
and after the increase of Somali pirate activity).
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specific time to testify in court.615 The more bloodthirsty pirates are inclined
to kill all crew members and leave no witnesses to their crimes.616 There
are, therefore, many advantages for pirates and, conversely, many hin-
drances for authorities who wish to end such illegal activities.
Hijacking a ship is not all that difficult to achieve, particularly since
many of the world’s oceans are not regularly patrolled by navies.617 Pirates
today have the advantages of modern technical gadgets to facilitate their
crimes, and many ship crews have to fight armed gangs with nothing but
fire hoses.618 The enormous size of many container vessels and oil tankers
makes them easy targets. They move at such slow speeds that it is rela-
tively easy to board them.
Article 105 of the UNCLOS specifies that on the high seas or any-
where outside state jurisdiction, “every State may seize a pirate ship . . .
and arrest the persons and seize the property on board.”619 The arresting
State may determine the penalties to be imposed.620 However, according to
Article 107, seizures “on account of piracy may be carried out only by war-
ships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and iden-
tifiable as being on government service and authorized to that effect.”621
The search for a solution to the Somali piracy problem cannot, in
the present context, allow for too much of a bleeding-heart approach.
Unfortunately, the piracy the world is now confronting is quite different
from the initial efforts by rag-tag bands of fishermen to defend their
coastline by exacting tolls on passing and polluting ships.622 To the pi-
rates’ credit, they have treated their hostages tolerably well.623 As of the
time of this writing, the pirates have exhibited violence mainly by selec-
tively beating their victims,624 as what they want is cash and loot, not
615 See Andrew Robinson, The Prosecution of Pirates—No Walk on the Plank, DENEYS REITZ
ATTORNEYS, Apr. 1, 2009, http://www.deneysreitz.co.za/index.php/news/the_prosecution
_of_pirates_-_no_walk_on_the_plank/.
616 See Somali Pirates Kill Syrian Captain, Ship Rescued, CHINA DAILY, Sept. 25, 2009,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2009-09/25/content_8736437.htm.
617 See Why Somali Pirates Are Hard to Defeat, supra note 613.
618 See BURNETT, supra note 580, at 131.
619 UNCLOS, supra note 49, at 437.
620 Id.
621 Id.
622 See Shani Ross & Joshua Ben-David, Somali Piracy: An Escalating Security Dilemma,
5 HARV. AFR. POL’Y J., 55, 55–57 (2009).
623 Mark Thompson, Washington Wrestles with the Pirate Problem—On Land, TIME,
Apr. 14, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1891129,00.html.
624 See, e.g., Alison Bevege, NATO Warship Rescues Indian Sailors Freed by Pirates,
REUTERS.COM (India), June 13, 2009, http://in.reuters.com/article/topNews/idINIndia
-40307220090613?sp=true (“A NATO warship picked up fourteen Indian sailors off Somalia
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trouble.625 Ship owners are inclined to prefer paying ransom to dealing
with fatal attacks on their crews.626 As serious as Somali piracy is and as
threatening as this problem has become on a global basis, it is still largely
an economic issue.627 “The actual cost to global shipping is negligible.”628
However, there is no guarantee that this situation will continue.
Piracy in Somalia has morphed,629 and it may soon become as dangerous
and as bloodthirsty as piracy in Southeast Asia630 and other parts of the
world where private yachts, sailing vessels, large ships, and enormous con-
tainer vessels and their crews have been attacked with extreme violence
and with no regard for human life.631 In his book, Dangerous Waters, John
Burnett wrote a very insightful personal account of the perils that threaten
anyone brave enough these days to venture onto the world’s oceans.632 In
an age of increasing globalization, the fact that trade routes are no longer
safe and secure is a serious impediment to peaceful commerce between
nations.633 So whether the piracy is the rather ruthless type that afflicts
the waters of Southeast Asia,634 or the more environmentally-motivated,
comparatively less violent sort that is considered in this article,635 the fact
remains that the action is criminal and has to be dealt with in that
context. The Somali people acknowledge that piracy is an affliction and not
a benefit for their country.636
on Saturday, a day after they were freed by pirates who had beaten them during 10 days
of captivity.”).
625 Thompson, supra note 623.
626 See id. (comparing the shipping route through Gulf of Aden to a toll road costing up
to three million dollars for a single vessel).
627 Dilanian, supra note 29.
628 Id. (quoting Peter Chalk, a senior analyst at Rand Corp.).
629 See Ross & Ben-David, supra note 622, at 57.
630 See, e.g., Dana Robert Dillon, Piracy in Asia: A Growing Barrier to Maritime Trade,
THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, June 22, 2000, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Asiaandthe
Pacific/BG1379.cfm (“[A]lmost all reported acts of piracy involve armed intruders who
threaten and often injure, kidnap, or kill members of the crew.”).
631 See id.
632 See generally BURNETT, supra note 580.
633 BURNETT, supra note 580, at Note to the Reader.
634 See, e.g., Dillon, supra note 630.
635 See Beliefnet.com, Are Somali Pirates Like Terrorists?, Apr. 14, 2009, http://blog
.beliefnet.com/cityofbrass/2009/04/are-somali-pirates-like-terror.html; see also Vijay Joshi,
Somalia Says New Coast Guard Can Stop Piracy, ABC NEWS, May 18, 2009, http://abcnews
.go.com/International/wireStory?id=7611442 (explaining that, in the beginning, the Somali
fisherman-pirates would just capture foreign fishing boats and make them release their
illegal catch).
636 See Hunter, supra note 587; see also Thompkins, supra note 583 (acknowledging that
piracy conflicts with traditional Somali values).
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It is interesting to note that clan inhibitions do not appear to hinder
the effective creation of pirate gangs that cross clan lines “to open new,
lucrative, multiclan franchises.”637 Pirates have also apparently felt a need
for division of labor in their operations.638 The former fishermen who began
these ventures are important for their familiarity with the seas.639 How-
ever, former militiamen now form the “muscle” required for the attacks.640
They are not likely to flinch from inflicting violence when required.641 Addi-
tionally, in this complex technological world, pirates, like everyone else,
require the services of computer specialists to operate the satellite phones,
global positioning systems (“GPS”) and other hardware they routinely
carry on their missions.642 Where they have actually seized large vessels,
pirates have realized a need to understand the complex mechanisms and
computer systems that are used to steer these huge ships.643
With practice and on-the-nefarious-job training, the pirates are
becoming more effective and acquiring relevant information to carry out
their activities.644 Nicolaos Charalambous, Deputy Director of the Inter-
national Maritime Organization, explained that piracy off East and West
Africa accounted in 2009 for seventy-five percent of incidents reported
globally.645 The figure for 2008 was sixty-one percent.646 According to the
International Maritime Bureau, more ships were attacked off Somalia in
the first half of 2009 than during the entire previous year.647 The reported
figure for the first half of 2009 was 133, as compared to 111 throughout
2008.648 It might be somewhat consoling to know that fewer of the present
attacks are as successful.649 Again, it is important to reiterate that ship
crews have often not recorded or reported minor incidents, particularly
637 Gettleman, supra note 8.
638 See Hunter, supra note 587 (discussing three different types of pirate gangs).
639 See id.
640 See id.
641 See id. (noting that the ex-militiamen previously exhibited violence when fighting for
Somali warlords).
642 See id.
643 See Barrett Sheridan, supra note 596 (noting the difficulties associated with hijacking
large ships while possessing little knowledge of their operations).
644 See Ross & Ben-David, supra note 622, at 55, 58 (discussing the pirates’ increased
attack capabilities).
645 Somalia Needs Stability, BERNAMA, May 18, 2009, http://www.bernama.com/bernama/
v5/newsindex.php?id=411876.
646 Id.
647 Bevege, supra note 624.
648 Id.
649 Id.
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where the pirates were chased away.650 Hence, actual statistics of pirate
activity could be much higher.
Commenting on the changes in the tactics of pirates, Nicole Stracke,
researcher at the Dubai Gulf Research Centre, explained that “Somali
piracy has become a highly organised activity. . . .”651 Stracke continued:
“[P]iracy has developed its own dynamic and now resembles a professional
and highly organised business venture, starting from the selection of mari-
time targets to the final stage of receiving and dispensing the ransom.”652
Along with faster boats, pirates now use GPS, satellite phones, and
rocket-propelled grenade launchers.653 There is some indication that they
even hire caterers to provision their pirate boats.654 Per Gullestrup, CEO
of the Clipper Group, a shipping company based in Denmark, recounted
his experience when one of his ships and crew were attacked.655 After the
ransom was paid and the pirates given a ride back to their home base, the
crew found pirate time sheets left on board, detailing the dates and hours
each pirate spent on board and the total sum he earned.656 Mark Hosen-
ball of Newsweek reported that a document found on a hijacked ship
contained a list of rules of conduct pirates were required to follow, and
punishments for infractions such as hitting a hostage.657 Some of these
conduct rules may be self-serving to prop up the public relations image of
pirates as essentially civilized persons driven by deprivation to commit
such crimes.
Keeping a positive public image while committing serious inter-
national crimes appears to be important for some of the Somali pirate
gangs.658 There are indications that some of them may have ‘life after
650 Torchia, supra note 12.
651 Jumana Al Tamimi, Military Action Could Make Pirates More Aggressive, GULF NEWS,
May 7, 2009, http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/general/military-action-could-make-pirates
-more-aggressive-1.67936.
652 Id.
653 Barbara Surk, Somali Pirates Hijack Saudi Tanker Loaded with Oil, ABC NEWS,
Nov. 17, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=6269111.
654 See Chana Joffe-Walt, All Things Considered: Behind the Business Plan of Pirates Inc.
(NPR radio broadcast Apr. 30, 2009), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story
.php?storyId=103657301 (citing Peter Pham).
655 Id.
656 Id.
657 Mark Hosenball, The Danger of Escalation, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 27, 2009, at 6, available
at http://www.newsweek.com/id/194625/output/print.
658 See, e.g., Thompkins, supra note 636 (quoting a pirate who emphasizes that pirates
are humans, not animals).
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piracy’ ambitions to fulfill, now that they have the money to do so.659 One
former pirate leader expressed his ultimate ambition for a new life when
he told a journalist that he wanted to move to the West and work in a
chicken processing plant.660
Clearly, the pirates of Somalia are now a varied bunch, some still
representing the vigilante fishermen and their agenda; others–possibly
the majority now–in the crime for the money.661 Their treatment of hos-
tages is also varied.662 There is less violence in Somalia toward hostages
than in Southeast Asia.663 However, it is also apparent from the accounts
of some freed hostages that they have been exposed to regular beating by
Somali pirates.664
The Somali pirates have demonstrated their expertise by attack-
ing and holding for ransom enormous oil tankers like the Saudi Sirius
Star, the largest ship ever hijacked,665 with a cargo worth over one hun-
dred million dollars.666 Seven times the size of the Titanic and longer than
the height of the Chrysler Building, the Sirius Star was hijacked by about
a dozen pirates in two tiny boats,667 and eventually ransomed for three
million dollars.668
The amount of sophistication can be gauged by the fact that pirate
gangs now need not only spokesmen but also feel a necessity for “publicists
to handle media calls.”669 One New York Times journalist grumbled about
the fact that the pirate spokesman could not be reached for a comment on
a particular Friday in September 2008.670
659 See id. (interviewing pirates who see piracy as a means of escaping their poverty and
moving on to a better life).
660 Id.
661 See Ross and Ben-David, supra note 622, at 56–57 (discussing the varying levels of
aggressiveness by pirates toward hostages).
662 See Al Tamimi, supra note 651.
663 Compare Thompson, supra note 623 (“The [Somali] pirates generally want cash, not
trouble. They’ve treated their hostages well, and violence has been rare.”), with Roland
Buerk, ‘Pirates’ Kill Bangladesh Crew, BBC NEWS, Oct. 28, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/south_asia/3961883.stm (discussing the killings of 14 Bangladeshi fishermen).
664 See Bevege, supra note 624.
665 Mohammed Ibrahim & Graham Bowley, Pirates Say They Freed Saudi Tanker for $3
Million, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2009, at A6.
666 Daly, supra note 40.
667 Burnett, supra note 295, at A39.
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670 Jeffrey Gettleman, Somalia Pirates Capture Tanks and Global Notice, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 27, 2008, at A1.
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The pirates’ lavish expenditures on technical gadgetry and person-
nel to facilitate these pirate attacks and their aftermath does lend credence
to the assumption that the ransom money has totaled multiple millions
of dollars.671 Although estimates may vary, it does appear as though the
pirates of Somalia netted about 150 million dollars in 2008.672
London, England serves as the ransom-negotiation center because
it is “the business capital of the world’s maritime industry.”673 The nego-
tiation for ransom and its delivery is now a detailed operation involving
highly-paid, skilled and polite professional negotiators on both sides,674
including intelligence officers.675 Also needed by all parties are Western-
based private security firms to protect the vast amounts of cash involved.676
The security teams certainly earn their salary because, on occasion, they
have to deal with other gangs of pirates attacking them while delivering
ransom to the initial group.677 “Navigating the high seas with a stash of
money is not for the fainthearted.”678 There were reports in 2008 of a pirate
boat capsizing because it was overloaded with cash.679 In January 2009,
five pirates drowned when their boat capsized.680 They had just received
three million dollars in ransom and some of the payout was found in the
pocket of a dead pirate.681 Banks are not inclined to get involved with
pirate ransom money because it is “now too high-profile, too hot.”682
Additionally, the ship owners use teams of lawyers to assist in this
surreal process.683 It is in everyone’s interest to be civil and professional in
demeanor, to negotiate as though this is just one more commercial trans-
action.684 The payment of ransom to pirates is not illegal under British
671 See Ross & Ben-David, supra note 622, at 58.
672 Ogunbayo, supra note 551.
673 Who Do Pirates Call to Get Their Cash?, BBC NEWS, Jan. 29, 2009, http://newsvote.bbc
.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/7847351.stm?ad=1.
674 Joffe-Walt, supra note 654.
675 See Maxim Tkachenko, Pirates Release Ship Carrying Tanks, Other Arms, CNN.COM,
Feb. 5, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/02/05/somalia.piracy.ukraine/index
.html.
676 See Who Do Pirates Call to Get Their Cash?, supra note 673.
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680 Body of a Somali Pirate, Carrying $153,000 of a Ransom, Washes Ashore, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 12, 2009, at A7.
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683 See Who Do Pirates Call to Get Their Cash?, supra note 673.
684 See id.
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law,685 so “as soon as pirates set foot on a ship they know pay day is only
a matter of time.”686 Pirates have purchased specialized equipment to
ascertain that the ransom is not fake currency, and also have cash count-
ing machines to expedite their tabulation.687
Many groups are profiting from the activities of the pirates.688 A
pirate named Ahmed Gel-Qonaf told Nick Wadhams of Time that shares
of the ransom have to be provided to the Islamic Shabab militia, leaders
of the Somali transitional government, regional and federal politicians,
as well as pirate commanders.689 These payments leave very little for the
actual pirates, but they assure that the pirates can operate freely.690 It is
now deemed essential that prior to a ship’s release, all these vested in-
terests “have to agree about the money.”691 This considerably delays the
negotiations for ransom.692 Peter Lehr explained that because “the Islamic
movements could clamp down on piracy very hard if they liked. . . . lots
of money is flowing into their coffers as well.”693
Piracy has become a lucrative business, not just for Somalis and
individuals from London who become part of the resolution process, but
also for Egyptians and Yemenis who operate vessels as pirate taxis, or as
mother ships from which pirates set off in small boats to attack the world’s
commercial ships.694 The Egyptian flag is thought to be a successful lure
when a false distress signal is issued.695
Additionally, considerable sums of ransom money are being used
by pirates to purchase hotels, shopping malls and trucking companies in
Kenya, suspected to be “awash in ransom money.”696 Stig Jarle Hansen
685 Id.
686 Id.
687 Ogunbayo, supra note 551. See also Joffe-Walt, supra note 654 (discussing accounting
practices of pirates and their use of time sheets).
688 See Nick Wadhams, A Pirate Ransom Deal: Who Gets the Money?, TIME, Dec. 4, 2008,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1864300,00.html.
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694 Pirate Taxi for Hire: Egyptian Fishermen Change Jobs, HINDUSTAN TIMES (India),
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-fishermen-change-jobs/Article1-398624.aspx.
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of the Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research is certain
that pirate money is being invested in Kenya, without apparent Kenyan
controls or monitoring.697
Article 110 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea provides for the “right of visit,” when there is a reasonable suspicion
of piracy.698 Were the United Nations to equip Somalia with an effective
coast guard, an appeal frequently articulated by Somali leaders,699 such a
fleet would acquire a coastal state’s right to “hot pursuit” as per Article 111
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.700 Such pursuit
is allowable if there is “good reason to believe that the ship has violated
the laws and regulations of that State.”701
In the meantime, including Somali authorities in any international
flotilla or armada would lend more credibility and weight to the entire oper-
ation.702 It might also allay the apprehensions felt by Somalis whenever
foreigners attempt to interfere with, or get involved in, their country.703
If Somalia had an effective functioning government, any piracy
emanating from its shores would be subject to Somali law.704 Somalis have
long contended that they are in the best position to root out the pirates,
as they are more familiar with the terrain of pirate havens than any out-
side elements could be.705 The terrible fate suffered in the past by United
Nations troops and American soldiers in Somalia should caution against
further territorial intervention by any outside powers.706 Additionally, the
involvement of foreign navies with Somali advisors having representatives
697 Id.
698 UNCLOS, supra note 49, at 438.
699 Edmund Sanders, Let Us Handle Prates, Somalis Say, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2009, at A22.
700 UNCLOS, supra note 49, at 439.
701 Id.
702 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Announcement of Counter-Piracy Initiatives
(Apr. 15, 2009), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/04/121758.htm
(discussing the need to work together with Somalians to combat piracy).
703 See Katie Stuhldreher, To Turn the Tide on Piracy, Bring Justice to Its Fisheries,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 20, 2008, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/
2008/1120/p09s01-coop.html (suggesting that Somalis have good reason to dislike and dis-
trust foreign involvement). For a summary of Somalia’s lengthy history of international
interference, see BBC News, Africa, Country Profiles: Somalia, supra note 252.
704 See UNCLOS, supra note 49, at 439 (extending power contained in the right of hot
pursuit to the coastal state’s authorities).
705 Sanders, supra note 699, at A22.
706 For a discussion of U.N. and U.S. military and diplomatic actions in Somalia during
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of Somali authority on board could allay some of the fear in that country
about again becoming the target of a foreign invasion.707
The entire global community and the United Nations must shoulder
some responsibility for the fact that the vigilante retaliations of angry
Somali fishermen have now developed into a far more sinister and dan-
gerous threat—potentially including terrorism708—for all the nations of
the world. Had the United Nations taken some effective action to deter
egregious violations of international law, such as combating the over-
fishing and toxic waste dumping that has probably caused permanent
damage to the oceans off Somalia,709 the acts of piracy might not have
escalated to the danger point confronting international commerce today.
Had the various nations whose ships were plundering Somali waters and
using the area as a dumping zone taken effective action to hold captains
and vessel owners legally liable for such violations, the problem might
have diminished rather than increasing to this level of threat.710 By simply
neglecting to take effective action in the early stages,711 the United Nations
allowed this matter to increase in scope and peril. Somalis are certainly
justified in their anger when they compare the frenetic United Nations
activity against piracy with its lethargic non-action about the initial poach-
ing and polluting that precipitated their piracy.712 If the world is now facing
an international crisis, it is very much the fault of all involved nations, par-
ticularly in their capacity as members of the United Nations. The United
Nations could, at the very least, have let loose its usual flood of speeches
707 See Country Profile: Somalia, supra note 252 (discussing the history of foreign involve-
ment in Somalia).
708 See Thomas P.M. Barnett, Can We Stop a Pirate 9/11?, ESQUIRE, May 7, 2009, http://
www.esquire.com/the-side/war-room/pirate-terrorism-050709.
709 See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, Advisory Services and
Technical Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights, Assistance to Somalia in the Field
of Human Rights: Report of the Independent Expert, Mr. Ghanim Alnajjar, ¶ 49, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/2003/115 (Dec. 31, 2002) available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/
huridoca.nsf/2848af408d01ec0ac1256609004e770b/460846883b48bfb6c1256cda00367522/
$FILE/G0216248.pdf.
710 See Christopher Jasparro, Somalia’s Piracy Offers Lessons in Global Governance, YALE
GLOBAL ONLINE, Apr. 6, 2009, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/somalia%E2%80%99s
-piracy-offers-lessons-global-governance (“What began as a defensive movement by local
fishermen has evolved into a complex amalgamation of banditry and insurgency.”).
711 See id. (noting that in 2005 the UN estimated there were seven hundred foreign ships
in Somali waters, many of which were using “illegal and destructive” fishing methods,
and yet the UN did not act on the issue until 2008).
712 See infra notes 827–839 and accompanying text (comparing UN activity in response
to piracy concerns with UN activity in response to environmental concerns in Somalia).
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and wordy resolutions on behalf of the fishermen of Somalia before they
became the far more dangerous pirates of Somalia.713
There are also indications that Somali piracy is expanding to in-
clude criminal and other elements in neighboring Yemen.714 According to
the United Nations, Somali pirate vessels have been using Yemeni ports
as supply stations to provide arms, ammunition, and fuel for pirate mother
ships.715 Yemen also has high levels of unemployment and poverty, factors
that could make involvement in piracy an attractive alternative.716 Peter
Lehr of the University of St. Andrews explained that Yemen could mirror
the situation in Somalia with its unemployed joining the pirates.717 The
World Bank has expressed concern about the grim fact that nearly half
the population of the world, over three billion people, survives on less than
$2.50 per day, a situation likely to worsen in the current economic reces-
sion.718 For such economically deprived people of many countries, the lure
of easy money could be irresistible. One can only hope that the Somali
pirates have not created the template for a modern version of the rags-to-
riches saga.
Unless the Western world is able and willing to fund the long-term
cost of naval convoys to patrol the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters during
the worst global economic crisis since 1929,719 it is likely that Somali piracy
will not only increase but evolve to far more dangerous forms than we have
presently seen. While there have been some successes in capturing pirates
in 2009, the problem of piracy has not been solved.720
B. Somali Reactions to Piracy
While the Somalis initially lauded the actions of the young men
who challenged the large foreign vessels and fought against the pollution
713 See Alisha Ryu, Somali Piracy Exposes Weakness in UN Law of the Sea, VOANEWS .COM,
Apr. 8, 2009, http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-04-08-voa67-68785907.html.
714 Alisha Ryu, UN Warns of Ties Between Lawless Groups in Somalia and Yemen,
VOANEWS.COM, May 7, 2009, http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-05-07-voa47.cfm
?renderforprint=1.
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718 Cho Sung-joon, Opinion, A Pirate’s Life for Me, KOREA TIMES, May 6, 2009, http://www
.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2009/05/137_44449.html.
719 Chris Isidore, The Great Recession, CNNMONEY.COM, Mar. 25, 2009, http://money.cnn
.com/2009/03/25/news/economy/depression_comparisons/.
720 See Mike Corder, EU Says War on Somali Pirates Not Over, ABC NEWS, Sept. 29, 2009,
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=8701165.
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and over-fishing of their oceans,721 it does appear that this enthusiasm
has been dulled and muted by the realization that their country is now
internationally considered not merely a failed state but a criminal haven
as well.722 For a proud people who come from an ancient land with rich tra-
ditions and a vibrant culture,723 this realization must be bitter medicine
to swallow. The pirates themselves are now clearly not motivated solely
by patriotic or environmentally-protective impulses,724 nor are the present
groups of pirates composed mainly of angry fishermen, eager to save their
way of life.725 As one journalist has stated: “Somali piracy started two
decades ago with more noble goals of deterring illegal fishing and protect-
ing the nation’s resources and sovereignty at a time when the state was
collapsing. Today’s pirates have morphed into a sophisticated criminal
ring with international ramifications.”726
The huge ransoms collected have dynamically changed per-
ceptions and reality in a number of ways. The monetary rewards of
piracy have possibly corrupted and diluted the original motivation and,
although pirates repeat their environmental justifications to any jour-
nalist willing to hear them, it is also true that the ransom money has not
been generally utilized to improve conditions within Somalia.727 The
unprecedented growth in Eyl cannot be deemed a serious boost for the
overall Somali economy.728 A comment by a Somali politician explains the
process by which fishermen/ pirates have morphed into something far
more powerful and more sinister. According to Deputy Prime Minister
Abdirahman Aden Ibbi, Somali fishermen initially captured foreign fish-
ing boats, seized their catch and let them sail away.729 Then they began
721 See Somalia Appeals for Help to Fight Piracy, AFP, May 17, 2009, http://www.google
.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gn7VBhev-2F3I3elRqiYAVhHd6Mg (describing the
early goals of piracy as “noble”).
722 Id.
723 ADDIS ABABA OFFICE, UNESCO, MEETING ON INVENTORYING INTANGIBLE CULTURAL
HERITAGE IN ETHIOPIA, DJIBOUTI AND SOMALIA 2 (2007), available at http://www.unesco
.org/culture/ich/doc/src/00062-EN.pdf.
724 Somalia Appeals for Help to Fight Piracy, supra note 721.
725 See id.
726 Id.
727 See Katharine Houreld, Somali Pirates Seize German Ship, 11 Crew, ABC NEWS,
May 6, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=7514190 (noting that public
institutions have crumbled despite Somali pirates being paid an average of $10,000 per
successful hijacking).
728 See Abdiqani Hassan, Ransoms Bring Wealth to Somali Pirate Bases, REUTERS.COM
(U.K.), Nov. 23, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE4AM0QQ20081123.
729 Joshi, supra note 635.
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demanding ransom and that produced the “powerful pirates that we see
today.”730
Being in the immediate vicinity of the pirate havens, Somalis have
realized that piracy has imperiled their country in a way they could not
have imagined a few years ago.731 Easy and quick ransom money has drawn
significant numbers of professional gangsters and former militiamen,732
whose activities cannot be considered motivated by good intentions. Be-
cause shipping company owners paid up vast ransoms without protest,
they created a situation that was almost irresistible for criminal elements
around the world.733 The huge publicity generated by the pirate situation
and the widespread knowledge about the enormous sums to be made have
apparently lured far more predatory types to Somalia and thereby threat-
ened the fragile situation in that country even further.734 According to
Roger Middleton, an analyst at Chatham House, “what began as a legiti-
mate fight against foreign exploitation turned into a criminal enterprise
when everyone discovered its lucrative potential.”735 It appears that the
fishermen ventures into piracy have now been largely superseded by more
professionally-directed gangs whose motivation is simply monetary, who
are very well armed, who are accustomed to using modern technology to
carry out these operations, and who likely report to dispatchers and chiefs
who reside on-shore or even in foreign countries.736 Whether the original
angry fishermen have been subsumed into the new gangs of pirates or
whether they operate independently is not clear.737 The Deputy Director
of Somalia’s National Security Agency, Nur Mohamed Mohamoud, alleged
that “[p]owerful criminal businessmen consider piracy a new business area
and want to participate and share in the profits.”738 The ransom payments
are a huge attraction.739 As Peter Pham, writing for World Defense Review,
wryly commented: “[i]ndividual Somalis do not need much persuading to
730 Id.
731 Letter from the U.N. Pol. Office for Somalia to Members of the Somali Diaspora (May 7,
2009), available at http://un-somalia.org/Letters_to_Diaspora/index.asp (follow the May 7,
2009 hyperlink) (discussing the negative image of Somalia as a result of piracy).
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734 Hassan, supra note 728.
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embark on careers in piracy.”740 So murky is the situation that it is next to
impossible to distinguish between pirates who are only opportunistic pred-
ators and those who are reacting to being made environmental prey.741
Assuming that the pirates form “part of an interconnected, international
seafaring mafia of sorts”742 may be premature, but the potential risk of
that eventually occurring is fairly high.743 The consequences of any such
development for global commerce are very serious indeed.744 In 1696, Dr.
Henry Newton commented about the result of piracy on trade during a
trial before the Old Bailey: “Suffer pirates and the commerce of the world
must cease.”745 Although the Somali problem may not produce that drastic
a consequence, there is the potential for considerable damage to the
peaceful flow of trade across the world.746
Another reason why there is growing disenchantment within
Somalia about piracy relates to the realization that as this type of activity
continues and proliferates, the country itself could be doomed to a future
of endless violence and anarchy.747 Somalis have been urged to condemn
piracy, even if it is well-intentioned, because “it is the official authorities
not individuals who should be implementing the law concerning illegal
fishing activities or waste dumping.”748 Condonation of criminal activity
is not acceptable to Somali traditional thinking and Somalis are becom-
ing concerned about the international perception of their country as a
pirate haven.749
740 J. Peter Pham, Pondering Somali Piracy, WORLD DEF. REV., Apr. 23, 2009, http://
worlddefensereview.com/pham042309.shtml.
741 See Daniel Flynn & Antonella Cinelli, G8 Vows Legal Cooperation to Tackle Somali
Piracy, REUTERS.COM (U.K.), May 30, 2009, http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE54T1
RH20090530?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews (highlighting that pirates range from
poor local fisherman to powerful international businessmen).
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When pirates roam the seas at will, attacking ships of various
nations, they also threaten the national interests and relations of their own
country.750 Such was the case when the Maersk Alabama and its American
crew–particularly its Captain–were attacked.751 Somali politicians do not
particularly relish the thought of alienating the world’s only super-
power.752 Somali leaders also acknowledge the humanitarian role the
United States has played in their country as the largest donor of aid, and
are therefore anxious to ensure that Americans are not harmed in en-
counters with pirates.753
Somali concerns also relate to the fragmentation of their state with
the breaking away of Somaliland in 1991 and the self-declared autonomy
of Puntland in 1998, the latter being infamous for some time as the home
base for many pirate gangs.754 Despite this, the president of Puntland,
Abdurahman Mohammed Farole, sought international help for an anti-
piracy task force and denied any linkage between his officials and the
pirates.755 In an apparent show of good faith the Puntland forces in May
2009 arrested some pirates and demonstrated that dozens of others had
already been sentenced.756
Somalis, being on the spot, have more detailed knowledge of the
identities of the pirates and therefore have insisted on their right to deal
with the problem, seeking only logistical support from the outside world.757
They are quite possibly right. A foreign naval crew would have no way
of distinguishing between legitimate Somali fishermen and criminally-
inclined pirate boats.
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Arrives, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2009, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/09/
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Until they actually attempt to board a ship, pirates look and must
legally be perceived as just civilian men in a boat.758 The success of piracy
in the past and present has often depended on its ability to appear to be
non-threatening, that is until the target vessel comes too close.759 Profes-
sor E. Kontorovich also points to the examples of history, explaining that
“[i]n wars against non-uniformed combatants and terrorist groups,
national forces have been accused of violating humanitarian law when
they did not successfully distinguish between combatants and civilians
in an environment where the former freely commingle with the latter.”760
Somali politicians have also complained about the foreign navies
that have taken over their waters, with the acquiescence of the United
Nations. Aside from the infringement this implies on Somali sovereignty,
Somalis question whether the vast sums paid in ransom and in naval
operations could not have been better directed to assisting their own gov-
ernment to deal with the piracy menace.761 Their exasperation with the fu-
tility of Western efforts is echoed by Peter Pham who argues that, “Somali
pirates have hardly been cowed by the international naval presence.”762
They have simply moved the piracy activities to unpatrolled areas.763
Roger Middleton echoed these many Somali concerns when he
stated:
Lots of people who are pirates now are not from coastal vil-
lages. They are not fishermen. They are from inside, former
militiamen and they are motivated entirely by money. The
fact that illegal fishing and dumping of toxic waste still
goes on in Somalia is excellent PR [public relations] for the
pirates. It means that when they capture a ship and they
talk to a news organization and say, “We are just defending
Somali waters,” and so on, that plays very well in the com-
munities they need to get support from along the coast.764
The pirate perception is that their work is viewed by coastal vil-
lages as legal, and they believe that they are regarded as heroes by people
758 Eugene Kontorovich, Piracy & International Law, GLOBAL LAW FORUM, Aug. 2, 2009,
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2010] THE PIRATES OF SOMALIA 465
who depend on them for financial support.765 Somalis, having endured
years of misrule and anarchy,766 are not that naïve.767
That said, it has also to be pointed out that despite their interna-
tional notoriety, the pirates of Somalia may be ranked among the least vio-
lent of the various militias and gangs that commit random acts of mayhem
and murder in Somalia.768 They have generally made a considerable effort
to take good care of their foreign hostages,769 although there are excep-
tions involving violent beatings of victims.770 According to the BBC, there
are special pirate restaurants in Eyl, a Somali home port for pirates, to
feed the kidnapped crews.771 Whether this generally civilized behavior and
treatment will continue, remains to be seen.
When they have functioning governments, which can occur between
the terrible bouts of random violence, particularly afflicting Mogadishu,772
the Somali representatives have appealed to the world community for
funding to create an effective national coast guard that would be equipped
and trained both to deter the pirates and to deter foreign predators.773
Nur Mohamed Mohamoud, deputy director of Somalia’s national security
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771 See Kennedy, supra note 60.
772 See Eyewitness: Mogadishu Violence Abates, BBC NEWS, March 28, 2006, http://news
.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4852390.stm (describing the “fierce fighting and horrific war of the
last few days”).
773 Somali Anti-Pirate Coastguard Bid, BBC NEWS, May 18, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
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agency, told an international conference in Malaysia that Somalis “do not
want pirates in our waters.”774 For a variety of reasons, Somali opinion
would doubtless agree on the need to eradicate the piracy problem so that
nation-building and other constructive forms of development can some-
day proceed.775
C. International Reactions to Somali Piracy
The initial reaction in the West to Somali pirates was bewilderment
and disbelief, a combination of amazement and some amusement that a
group consigned to the dusty pages of history had re-emerged as a serious
peril in this sophisticated and technological modern world. Additionally,
the world has been conditioned to think of piracy through the lens provided
by Hollywood. The Somali pirates do not measure up or down, depending
on one’s perspective, to any Hollywood representation.776 We in the West
have had to adjust our perceptions away from Long John Silver, eye-
patches, parrots, and lots of ‘yo ho ho’s’ to the new reality of journalist
Daniel Sekulich’s description of the ‘average’ pirate as a male, “living in
poverty in a coastal nation, who has been driven to engaging in a life of
maritime crime,” because of a feeling that there are no other viable ways
to make a living.777 In this incisive profile, Sekulich commented that the
pirate “may feel a sense of injustice because of his situation, especially
when the wealth of the world sails by just off the coast.”778 Sekulich con-
cluded, as have many of those who have researched this subject, that while
the reasons for individuals to engage in such activity are understandable,
their criminal actions are not justifiable.779
Agreeing that modern pirates have “little in common with the
romantic rum-swilling rogues of Hollywood,”780 John Burnett, who has per-
sonally encountered pirates and survived,781 explains that pirates these
774 Somalia Appeals for Help to Fight Piracy, supra note 721.
775 See Beliefnet.com, Are Somali Pirates Like Terrorists?, Apr. 14, 2009, http://blog
.beliefnet.com/cityofbrass/2009/04/are-somali-pirates-like-terror.html (explaining the need
for increased investment in Somalia to improve its economic situation and reduce the
financial incentives provided by piracy).
776 See Bezmozgis, supra note 5 (describing pirates as “criminals who prey on the weak”).
777 Id.
778 Id.
779 Id.
780 BURNETT, supra note 580, at 10.
781 See generally BURNETT, supra note 580 (discussing a first-hand experience of a pirate
attack).
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days are “organized gangs of poverty-stricken young men living alongside
busy shipping lanes who attack slow-moving ships that lumber by, rich
pickings and perfect targets of opportunity.”782 Divergent perceptions,
fueled by a lot of disbelief at the re-emergence of a historical criminal
menace, may account for the rather sporadic and “haphazard” reaction
of the world community to this problem.783
In acknowledgment of the serious threat to global commerce, to
humanitarian aid, and to the lives of thousands of crewmen and women,
on January 14, 2009, twenty-eight nations, including the United States of
America and six international organizations including the Arab League
and the European Union, established the Contact Group on Piracy off the
coast of Somalia.784
This international Contact Group arose after United States spon-
sorship of Security Council Resolution 1851, adopted on December 16,
2008.785 The Contact Group “serves as an informal venue for governments
to share information about their policies and programs.”786 American self-
interest dictates and deems assertive involvement in this matter a pri-
ority. U.S. President Barack Obama has stated that, “we are resolved to
halt the rise of piracy in that region. And to achieve that goal, we’re going
to have to continue to work with our partners to prevent future attacks.”787
As the world’s largest importer of oil,788 the United States of America has
to secure the safety of oceanic routes that facilitate its consumption of
twenty-five percent of the world’s total oil demand.789 The new American
Government is also more inclined to multilateral approaches than the
previous Government of President George Bush,790 and this may well be
782 Id. at 10.
783 Rothwell, supra note 10.
784 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, The Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia
(May 18, 2009), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/05/123584.htm. The
Contact Group is now composed of forty-five countries and seven international organi-
zations. U.S. Dept. of State, Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia, http://www
.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/piracy/contactgroup/index.htm (last visited Feb. 08, 2010).
785 S.C. Res. 1851, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008).
786 Caldwell, International Community Uniting Against Pirates, supra note 508 (citing
Donna Hopkins, State Department program manager on piracy issues).
787 Id.
788 Lester Brown, Does Saudi Arabia Have the United States Over a Barrel?, THE
GLOBALIST, Apr. 29, 2004, http://www.theglobalist.com/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=3893.
789 BURNETT, supra note 580, at 28.
790 See, e.g., Gary J. Schmitt, The Obama Administration’s Approach to Asia: Early Signals,
AM. ENTERPRISE INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y RES., Oct. 2009, http://www.aei.org/outlook/100075 
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appropriate for dealing with the piracy problem. No nation today—not
even a superpower—has the financial means to conduct an unending
unilateral policing role in the Indian Ocean.
Insofar as land incursions are involved, active American military
involvement once again in Somalia would probably be another tragic mis-
take. As Bronwyn Bruton, International Affairs Fellow at the US Council
of Foreign Relations, commented: “We have a limited capacity to influence
events in Somalia. . . . But we have an almost unlimited capacity to make
a mess of things.”791
After the fortuitous and brilliant rescue by U.S. Navy SEALS of
American Captain Richard Phillips from his Somali pirate captors,792
United States Defense Secretary Robert Gates acknowledged that “[t]here
is no purely military solution,” for the Somali pirate problem.793 Explaining
the seriousness of the problem, Gates predicted that “it’s probably going
to get worse.”794
Malaysian Foreign Minister Datuk Anifah Aman told fellow dele-
gates to an International Conference on Piracy and Crimes at Sea, held in
May 2009, that the piracy situation in Somalia was serious and complex
and required a multi-dimensional solution.795
The trading countries of the world that rely on the Gulf-Suez route
have reacted to the problem of piracy in the Indian Ocean mainly with an
emphasis on their national self-interest.796 Although there has been some
sympathy for the destruction of the Somali environment, there is far more
serious apprehension about the threat to world commerce implicit in
allowing a vital oceanic route to become a virtual pirate alley.797 However
well-intentioned the original pirate attacks might have been, the prevalence
(recognizing President Obama’s intention to utilize a multilateral forum in dealing with
North Korea).
791 See Corbett, supra note 523.
792 See Robert D. McFadden & Scott Shane, In Rescue of Captain, Navy Kills 3 Pirates,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/
13/world/africa/13pirates.html.
793 Thompson, supra note 623.
794 Id.
795 Vital to Address Root Causes of Somali Piracy: Anifah, SOMALILAND TIMES, May 18,
2009, http://www.somalilandtimes.net/sl/2009/382/25.shtml.
796 See Jasparro, supra note 710.
797 See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of State, Threat to Maritime Commerce, Humanitarian
Assistance, Disaster Relief, and Regional Security and Development, http://www
.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/piracy/c32661.htm (last visited Feb. 08, 2010) (noting that pirate attacks
off the coast of Somalia “threaten international security, the global economy, and American
citizens and commercial interests.”).
2010] THE PIRATES OF SOMALIA 469
of lawlessness in the oceans opens the door to all types of illicit activity
to flourish along one of the world’s most important trading routes.798
The Somali government has appealed for assistance to establish
a coast guard to deal with the pirates, but has balked at the idea of any
foreign interventions on Somali territory.799 The Puntland authorities have
also negated any idea of a foreign force entering their land.800 Somali
leaders have explained their concerns about foreign navies not being suf-
ficiently familiar with the local milieu to be able to distinguish between
legitimate Somali fishing boats and pirates, and this ignorance leading to
unnecessary violent pre-emptive attacks.801 There is some merit to those
fears. In 2008, an Indian warship mistook a Thai fishing boat for a pirate
ship and sank it, killing fifteen Thai fishermen.802 It is also apparent that
the Somalis fear that their own fishermen venturing out either to fish, or
more courageously, to deter foreign fishing boats, will be labeled pirates
and attacked by all those naval forces.803
There is a significant difference in focus between the international
community and Somali leaders. This became quite evident during the
third meeting of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia,
held in New York on May 29, 2009.804 Mohamed Omaar, Foreign Minister
of the Somali Transitional Federal Government, articulated his plea for
the development of a Somali Coast Guard, and reiterated his country’s fears
about illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping, requesting more effective
international action on those issues.805 However, the international Con-
tact Group’s focus was obviously on piracy.806 Its working groups con-
centrated on security for shipping, facilitation of arrest and prosecution
of pirates, including by international or regional mechanisms, and other
measures to deal specifically with piracy.807
798 See Vital to Address Root Causes of Somali Piracy, supra note 795.
799 See Bengali, supra note 767.
800 See Joshi, supra note 635.
801 Somali Government Knows Details on Pirates, USATODAY, Apr, 16, 2009, http://www
.usatoday.com/news/world/2009-04-16-somalia-pirates_N.htm?csp=34; see also Clottey,
supra note 757 (explaining that Somali leaders know the pirates, where they come from,
and their tactics).
802 Michael Knigge, Fighting Piracy Requires Better International Cooperation, DEUTSCHE
WELLE, May 18, 2009, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4251224,00.html.
803 See Mohamed Abshir Waldo, The Shipping Piracy & the Invasion of the Somali Seas,
BLACK STAR NEWS, Apr. 26, 2009, http://blackstarnews.com/print.php?a=5615.
804 Press Release, U.S. Dept. of State, Statement of Contact Group on Piracy off the East
Coast of Somalia (May 30, 2009), available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200905300009.html.
805 Id.
806 See id.
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By not giving Somali concerns about pollution and over-fishing the
appropriate recognition and attention they deserve, the Contact Group,
international navies, the United Nations, and all other involved parties
and organizations are dooming their collective efforts and appear both
one-sided and hypocritical. One can hardly blame the Somalis for feeling
that their priorities count for little or nothing, and that their nation is
now being victimized with the connivance of international flotillas and
the world organization.
In April 2009, Somali Prime Minister, Omar Abdirashid Ali
Sharmarke complained that Somali personnel were “not being utilized
as much as we could be,”808 and told reporters that Somalia needed “to
fight pirates on land,”809 claiming that his people had “information about
how [pirates] function and who they are.”810 The Somali leadership wants
to tackle this piracy issue and only seeks a little technical and logistic
assistance from the West.811 Instead, they now have to wonder about the
prospect of further Western incursions against Somali sovereignty, all in
the name of curbing piracy.812 However, Western landings onto Somali
territory appear unlikely in the present context.813
There is clear opposition within Somalia, and obvious hesitation
among foreign powers, about any land assault against pirate villages or
pirate homes.814 At the moment, no nation appears willing to dispatch
amphibious landing crafts and/or a fleet of military helicopters just to
attack a few pirates. Jim Wilson, a correspondent for Fairplay Interna-
tional Shipping Weekly, a maritime newspaper, commented on the improb-
ability of any pirate in his right mind just standing around and waiting
for the helicopters and marines to land and kill him.815 Wilson then asked
the crucial question: “[e]ven if they did how would you be able to tell the
808 Corbett, supra note 523.
809 Id.
810 Id.
811 Somali Anti-Pirate Coastguard Bid, supra note 773.
812 See id.; see also Corbett, supra note 523 (noting that the U.S. may have plans for a
land assault).
813 See Corbett, supra note 523 (“Boots on the ground will not seriously be considered by
the international community”) (quoting Corinne Graff of the Brookings Institution).
814 Douglas Mpuga, Use of Force May Not be Enough to Deter Somali Pirates, VOANEWS
.COM, Apr. 16, 2009, http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2009-04/2009-04-16-voa33
.cfm?CFID=301131980&CFTOKEN=53160893&jsessionid=0030eaa88267c2f9e9796c744
5131e6b3e6f.
815 Id. (“No pirate in his right mind is going to stand around and wait for a fleet of
helicopters to come disgorge a lot of marines ready to kill him.”).
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difference between a Somali pirate and a Somali citizen?”816 Peter Pham
counters that ninety percent of Somali piracy originates from two Somali
ports, Eyl and Harardhere.817 Pham also suggests that having built
“ostentatious mansions,” the pirates’ locations are known.818 It is now also
common knowledge that many Somali pirates come from Puntland (the
self-declared autonomous province of Somalia),819 live in the town of
Boosaaso,820 and dock their vessels in Eyl, Hobyo, or Harardhere.821
The previous experiences of the United States of America and of the
United Nations in its two missions UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II might
deter any serious notion of intervening on Somali territory,822 particularly
when the Somalis have such a negative reaction to the very idea of hosting
a foreign force again on their soil.823
At a crucial moment when the world, through the United Nations,
could have demonstrated a sense of balance and justice in its search for
a solution, the Security Council concentrated on the Somali piracy prob-
lem while unfortunately neglecting the foreign dumping and over-fishing
problem that plagues Somalia.824 One cannot over-emphasize how critical
this mistake has been. If the nations of the North expect to gain any credi-
bility in the South, they have to demonstrate an ability to understand and
appreciate the priorities, apprehensions and perceptions of the South.
Although the pirates are not thus far terrorists, they have demonstrated
in a terrifying manner that a few men in small boats can effectively jeopar-
dize the normal commerce on which the world economy functions.
Dealing with this threat militarily without simultaneously engag-
ing Somalia diplomatically, politically, and in terms of mutual respect
and potential friendship is just not feasible. If America, and all the other
nations who have navies in Somalia, arrest several hundred pirates every
month there will still be hundreds more to take their place. President
Obama needs to ensure urgently that the navies in the Gulf of Aden and
Indian Ocean do not appear to be an exclusively self-serving military force
816 Id.
817 Nesnera, Lack of Effective Somali Government, supra note 600.
818 Id.
819 Rod Nordland, Sharks in the Water: How to Finally Rid the Seas of Somalia’s Growing
Pirate Problem, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 29, 2008, http://www.newsweek.com/id/171315.
820 Id.
821 Id.
822 See Corbett, supra note 523.
823 See Joshi, supra note 635.
824 Offman, supra note 328.
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bent on eradicating piracy. By insisting that the Americans are there to
protect Somali interests as well, by preventing ocean dumping and over-
fishing, the Americans will have gone a long way to rehabilitating their
image in the minds of Somalis.
In 2009, at the time of the writing of this article, the United
Nations Security Council has passed two resolutions on Somalia, 1863
on January 16, 2009825 and 1872 on May 26, 2009.826 To appreciate the
serious situation of imbalance between the priorities of the Somalis and
those of the United Nations, it is interesting to note that neither of those
resolutions mentions the problems of illegal dumping of toxic and nuclear
waste off Somalia’s long coastline, or of unlicensed over-fishing by so many
foreign vessels operating openly in Somali waters.827 These are two im-
portant matters for Somalis who daily witness what could become the
irreversible degradation of their environment. The priorities of the inter-
national community include various measures to support the creation of a
stable government in Somalia and an end to the humanitarian disaster.828
These are laudable goals, but it is the complete absence of any mention
of the dumping and over-fishing that calls into question the credibility
and honesty of the United Nations in its efforts to resolve this Somali
crisis. An expression of concern by the Security Council—repeated in every
resolution—about the two environmental problems afflicting Somali waters,
would have gone a long way to demonstrating a sense of balance and fair-
ness. What, after all, would be the point of establishing a stable govern-
ment for a country despoiled by nuclear radioactive waste and deprived
of a primary food resource by foreign pillaging? To add insult to injury,
it is equally worth noting that Resolution 1872 acknowledges the linkage
between political instability and the problem of piracy and armed rob-
bery at sea.829
It is beyond the length constraints of this article to analyze the
entire body of Security Council resolutions on Somalia passed in recent
years. Given the multi-lingual gabfest that resonates at every meeting of
the Security Council and the wordy resolutions that follow from the behind-
the-scenes horse-trading sessions, such an exercise would require an en-
tire article in length. However, to further illustrate the point of serious
825 S.C. Res. 1863, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1863 (Jan. 16, 2009).
826 S.C. Res. 1872, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1872 (May 26, 2009).
827 See Offman, supra note 328 (noting that to date “the eco-pirating problem has not been
mentioned as part of a general solution”). See generally S.C. Res. 1872, supra note 826;
S.C. Res. 1863, supra note 825.
828 See S.C. Res. 1863, supra note 825.
829 S.C. Res. 1872, supra note 826.
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imbalance in the ordering of United Nations priorities, one might briefly
consider Resolution 1816, which was adopted by the Security Council on
June 2, 2008.830 In that resolution, the Security Council expressed its
grave concern about, and deplored and condemned the acts of Somali
piracy, but was silent about the dumping of toxic waste and illegal
fishing.831 The United Nations went further in Resolution 1816, granting
foreign vessels an initial time frame of six months—later extended to
December 2, 2009832—to enter Somali territorial waters in order to re-
press piracy and urged flag, port, and coastal states to cooperate with each
other to determine jurisdiction for the prosecution of the pirates.833 The
step was unusual, but felt to be justifiable, given the circumstances. Nor-
mally, states have “absolute sovereignty over internal waters.”834 Professor
Eugene Kontorovich called this United Nations action, “an unprecedented
grant of authority to interdict coastal piracy.”835 The resolution was un-
precedented but it acknowledged “the reality of Somalia’s inability to
provide maritime security within its own waters and the need for the
international community to effectively undertake ‘national-type’ policing
and enforcement operations.”836 From the Somali perspective, it is impor-
tant to note that the acknowledgment of Somalia’s inability to protect its
own waters was not extended to include a commitment to prevent toxic
dumping and over-fishing for Somalia’s benefit.837 The focus on piracy
made this resolution appear self-serving.
In Resolution 1838, adopted on October 7, 2008, the Security
Council emphasized the importance of “peace and stability, the strength-
ening of State institutions, economic and social development and respect
for human rights and the rule of law” as necessary for the eradication of
piracy.838 Conspicuously absent was any mention of toxic waste dumping
and illegal fishing.839 The Special Representative of the Secretary General
for Somalia, Mr. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, was quoted by one news source
as commenting about the absence of “mention of the illegal fishing piracy,
830 S.C. Res. 1816, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008).
831 See id.
832 S.C. Res. 1846, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008).
833 S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 830, ¶¶ 7–11.
834 Baine & Simmons, supra note 340, at 11.
835 Kontorovich, supra note 758.
836 Rothwell, supra note 10.
837 See S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 830, ¶¶ 7–11. This resolution calls for aid to prevent
piracy without mentioning any underlying environmental cause. Id.
838 S.C. Res. 1838, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1838 (Oct. 7, 2008).
839 See id. (mentioning piracy and humanitarian needs, but not environmental concerns).
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hazardous waste dumping, or the plight of the Somali fisherman.”840
Journalist Mohamed Abshir Waldo was even more blunt in his commentary
on the two resolutions under discussion. He wondered whether a number
of member States of the Security Council had “ulterior motives to indirectly
protect their illegal fishing fleets in the Somali Seas,” when they passed
those resolutions, “giving a license to any nation who wants a piece of the
Somali marine cake.”841
It was not just the marine cake but the territorial cake as well that
drew United Nations’ attention when it passed Resolution 1851 on
December 16, 2008.842 Resolution 1851 extended authorization for inter-
national interventions in Somali territorial waters to include Somalia’s
land territory, with the usual caveats concerning observance of interna-
tional humanitarian and human rights laws by all states engaged in
dealing with piracy.843 In fairness to the United Nations, it has to be added
that prior to assuming and sharing these sovereign national powers, the
Security Council secured the permission of the embattled Transitional
Federal Government of Somalia.844 There can be no doubt that these
resolutions on Somalia “represent some of the most extensive maritime
security powers conferred upon States to deal with piracy in the modern
Law of the Sea era.”845
Realistically, however, it would be very risky for any foreign naval
forces to enter Somali territory in pursuit of suspected pirates. For one
thing, memories of the debacles of UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II and the
fate of American soldiers at the hands of Somali mobs are still raw for all
parties.846 Somalis may not yet have acquired sufficient nationalism to
create a viable and effective nation-state, but they are united in disliking
outside incursions on their territory.847 They are also likely to react with
violence against any such interventions and, as the country is awash with
840 Saeed Shabazz, Somalia: Military Action Won’t Resolve Crisis, FINAL CALL, May 6,
2009, http://www.finalcall.com/artman/publish/printer_5980.shtml.
841 Waldo, supra note 803.
842 S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 785.
843 Id. ¶ 6.
844 Rothwell, supra note 10 (noting that only States acting in conjunction with the
Transitional Federal Government of Somalia are authorized by the UN to enter into
Somalian waters and take action against pirates).
845 Id.
846 See Corbett, supra note 523 (“Following the botched US incursion in Somalia in 1993,
it seemed unlikely that the US—or any other foreign power—would advocate getting in-
volved in another intervention in this failed state in the Horn of Africa.”).
847 See id. (noting that Somalis are suspicious of foreign governments).
2010] THE PIRATES OF SOMALIA 475
weapons procured from the whole world,848 the risk of beach landings would
be very serious indeed. On a related issue, that of dispatching yet one more
U.N. force to Somalia, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon was decisive and
quite blunt when he said that the “insertion of international security forces
in Somalia remains a divisive and politicized issue with the potential to
exacerbate the conflict.”849 The Secretary General had also pointed out that
“few countries were willing to send peacekeeping troops to Somalia, as
there was no peace to keep.”850 For the present, the world appears deter-
mined to curb Somali pirates with naval operations.851 Time alone will
tell whether this will deter impoverished young men from taking the risk
of joining pirate gangs, or whether the continuing foreign presence in
their waters, unending toxic dumping and over-fishing will instead impel
Somalis to rally and resist and fight against the external armada. Any
student of Somalia knows that there are surprises and shocks and un-
expected twists and turns at every stage of this tragic nation’s tortuous
progress through history.
In 2009, the nations of the world determined that arresting and
prosecuting as many pirates as possible is one of the most effective ways
to deal with this threat to global commerce. The challenge has been to find
legal means to facilitate that aim. The usual reliance on nationality or
state sovereignty conferring jurisdiction to prosecute is unrealistic given
the anarchy prevailing in Somalia. The Security Council has attempted, via
a series of resolutions, to deal with the jurisdictional issues and facilitate
the capture and prosecution of the pirates.852
These innovative solutions have sought by international consensus
to alleviate the legal and territorial issues that arise in criminal matters
that occur in the ocean. Professor Rothwell provides a clear explanation of
the dilemma facing modern sea captains confronting pirates in the ocean:
[T]here must be a genuine link between the State and the
ship, or between the State and the waters on which the
offences take place. Unless Somali courts are willing and
848 ABDEL FATAU MUSAH & ROBERT CASTLE, EASTERN EUROPE’S ARSENAL ON THE LOOSE:
MANAGING LIGHT WEAPONS FLOWS TO CONFLICT ZONES, INT’L ACTION NETWORK ON SMALL
ARMS (1998), http://www.iansa.org/documents/development/eeurope_arsenal.htm#28.
849 UN Head Against New Somalia Force, BBC NEWS, Apr. 22, 2009, http://news.bbc.co
.uk/2/hi/africa/8013654.stm.
850 Id.
851 See Rothwell, supra note 10 (noting that the U.N. has adopted multiple resolutions
giving maritime powers the ability to enter Somali waters in the name of facilitating the
prosecution of pirates).
852 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 785, ¶ 6.
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able to conduct prosecutions, the responsibility for enforce-
ment will predominantly fall upon those members of the
international community whose ships are currently patrol-
ling off the coast of Somalia. The ability of a State with a
ship in Somali waters to apply and enforce its own laws with
respect to piracy and sea robbery will depend on whether
the pirate ship or the pirates have the nationality of that
State, or the degree to which the national law of the en-
forcing state makes piracy a universal crime which can be
subject to arrest and prosecution anywhere throughout
the world.853
The activities of the pirates are without a doubt criminal by the
national standards of any State,854 and criminal as well, on the basis of
established international law.855 However, international Conventions ana-
lyzed briefly in this article have also clarified the illicit nature of ocean
dumping of toxic and even nuclear waste, and the illegal aspects of foreign
over-fishing when there are no licenses and where dubious and dangerous
methods are used that destroy the habitat of many species.856 What is so
disappointing is the inescapable conclusion of serious imbalance in the
approach taken by the United Nations with respect to the two different
types of criminals and their illicit activities.857 While on the one hand, the
international community is certainly justified in uniting and finding in-
novative ways to protect from hijacking all peaceful commercial vessels to
keep an important trade route open,858 the entire process would have been
enhanced in terms of credibility had it also been conducted to prevent the
devastation of the oceanic environment of a vulnerable state. Had the
armada now patrolling Somalia to protect foreign ships with the blessings
of the United Nations859 also been devoted to protecting Somalia’s oceans,
853 Rothwell, supra note 10.
854 See Hawkins, supra note 55.
855 James Kraska & Brian Wilson, Fighting Piracy: International Coordination is Key to
Countering Modern-Day Freebooters, ARMED FORCES J., http://www.armedforcesjournal
.com/2009/02/3928962 (last visited Feb. 08, 2010) (“The Law of the Sea Convention, the
constitution for the world’s oceans, is the essential framework for peacetime maritime
security cooperation, and it defines piracy as an illegal act of violence or detention com-
mitted for private ends.”).
856 See supra notes 399–402 and accompanying text.
857 For a comparison of the U.N.’s response to piracy and environmental concerns, see
supra notes 825–841 and accompanying text.
858 See Kraska & Wilson, supra note 855.
859 Muuse Yuusuf, The Armada is Not the Solution, WARDHEER NEWS, Apr. 12, 2009,
http://wardheernews.com/Articles_09/April/13_armada_not_solution_muuse.html.
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that would have been evidence of a balanced and honest approach to a seri-
ous political, economic, and environmental crisis. To borrow an apt phrase
from Professor Joseph Nevins, and apply it to the instant tragic situation
to establish a clear case of a double standard: Somalia proves that there
is now “[a]ccountability for ‘mice’ and impunity for ‘lions’.”860
The real problem is determining whether the world community has
either the means or the will to conduct patrols in the Gulf region into the
distant future. This Somali oceanic venture, so encouraged by the West
and endorsed by the United Nations,861 will become incredibly expensive
over time and may well not be all that effective a deterrent, given the vast
size of the area of ocean that is involved.862
The resort to an armada of naval vessels to escort foreign shipping
might have a limited salutary impact on the pirates of Somalia,863 but can
the world’s navies keep up this operation for the long haul? That is what
it is going to take to deal with this piracy problem. It is entirely possible
that the pirates of Somalia could simply wait on land until the interna-
tional enthusiasm and flurry of activity dwindles, and then as contribut-
ing countries order their naval contingents back home, the pirates could
re-emerge to carry on with their attacks. The lure of ransom money has
been so great that absent any consistent and pervasive force that can con-
tinuously patrol vast areas for the next few years, there appears to be no
possibility of permanently eradicating this menace from the Gulf of Aden
trade route.
However, some confidence that piracy was on the decline was ex-
pressed in March 2009 by the members of international shipping associa-
tions in a meeting with Efthimios E. Mitropoulos, Secretary General of the
International Maritime Organization.864 This group attributed the apparent
decrease to “intense international activity . . . successful interventions by
a growing number of warships . . . coordinated industry advice . . . practical
measures adopted by Masters and shipping companies, and, not least,
adverse weather conditions.”865
860 Joseph Nevins, Pirates v. Emperors, NEW AMERICAN MEDIA, May 7, 2009, http://news
.newamericamedia.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=d4e04fae6fabab5e6560f73
aca39eb70.
861 See Yuusuf, supra note 859.
862 See id. (noting the limited success the fleet has enjoyed thus far).
863 See id.
864 IMO and Industry Review Progress on Addressing Seafarer Shortage and the Scourge
of Piracy, INT’L MAR. ORG. Apr. 2, 2009, http://reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/EGUA
-7QVRTZ?OpenDocument.
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It is already apparent that foreign navies have not dedicated suf-
ficient resources to this venture.866 The cost of financing huge anti-piracy
ventures during a global recession has to be considered by all governments
who must weigh the benefits of protecting their commercial fleets against
the need to safeguard dwindling economic resources. Captain Richard
Farrington, Chief of Staff for the naval forces of the European Union,
estimated a need for about sixty warships to patrol the Gulf of Aden and
150 vessels to oversee the Eastern and Southern coastal regions of Soma-
lia.867 However, such an armada may not be able to be assembled or to
effectively deal with a problem in such a vast oceanic environment.868 In
March 2009, NATO dispatched five ships to the Gulf of Aden.869 On
December 8, 2008, the European Union, in response to the crisis of
Somali piracy, launched the one-year Operation Atalanta, its first multina-
tional maritime security mission outside the Mediterranean/North Atlantic
region, with approximately twenty-four warships with 1,500 crew mem-
bers.870 Although a number of countries have sent vessels to protect their
shipping fleets, these activities are self-directed and not sufficiently
harmonized to act as an effective global deterrent to the pirates.871 As
Richard Weitz, Hudson Institute Senior Fellow explains: “While this patch-
work of ad hoc multinational and national initiatives has achieved indi-
vidual successes, defeating several pirate attacks and capturing some
pirates, the efforts of the approximately 50 combat ships and thousands
of military personnel have been limited by insufficient coordination.”872
He continued to explain the reason, stating that the “various formations
have different mandates, tactics and rules of engagement. They also have
become preoccupied with responding to immediate challenges rather than
engaging in long-term local capacity-building.”873
866 See Joshi, supra note 635 (noting that although a multi-national fleet is patrolling the
Gulf of Aden, nineteen ships and two hundred and fifty sailors are still being held hostage
by the Somali pirates).
867 Muhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis, Immoral, Cynical Sheikh Sharif Turns
Somalia to Bloodbath, Serving Only the Somalis’ Worst Enemies, AM. CHRON., May 24,
2009, http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/printFriendly/103635.
868 See Joshi, supra note 635 (noting that the Somali coastline is 1,900 miles long).
869 Richard Weitz, Global Insights: Harmonizing the International Response to Somali
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Long-term success for such vast and expensive multi-national fleets
appears questionable at best.874 Finn Brobersen, senior director in charge
of security for the vast Maersk shipping company, believes that “[w]arships
are not going to solve the root cause of the problem, which is the govern-
ment in Somalia.”875
While there is an articulated determination to crush the piracy
problem, realistically, the world’s resources that can be devoted to this
are not infinite. Pottengal Mukundan, Director of the London-based Inter-
national Maritime Bureau, called for the international community “to take
strong action to capture and board pirate ships at sea, board motherships
and arrest the pirates and hand them over for prosecution.”876 However,
Peter Lehr, piracy expert at the University of St. Andrews, commented
that navy commanders know that it is “impossible to tackle piracy with a
naval mission.”877 The problem must be dealt with on land.878 However, a
land mission can only raise haunting and distinctly horrifying memories of
the fate of United States and United Nations troops in Somalia during the
1990s.879 John Patch, Professor for Strategic Intelligence at the US Army
War College explained that “we don’t have enough will, enough where-
withal and enough information to prosecute a sound land campaign. We’re
pretty busy elsewhere.”880 Patch also concluded that “[p]iracy falls very low
on the scale of important global issues that affect national interests.”881
Of considerable relevance to this discussion is the pertinent view of Peter
Chalk, a Maritime Security Analyst with the RAND Corporation. Chalk
has pointed out that piracy is a form of crime and as such “[i]t’s a law en-
forcement problem and to have a military solution to a law enforcement
problem, in my opinion, is not the way to go.”882
There is considerable contention with respect to the issue of arm-
ing the crews of merchant ships. Currently, some crew members are using
874 See Mark McDonald, Japan Sends Destroyers on Anti-Piracy Patrol, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/14/world/asia/14pirates.html.
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876 Officials, Experts to Tackle Pirate Threat, TAIPEI TIMES, May 18, 2009, at 4, available
at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2009/05/18/2003443872.
877 Knigge, supra note 802.
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water hoses to ward off pirates attempting to climb their ships.883 A former
navy commando from Israel suggested that along with international co-
ordination to protect ships, having armed crews on board with the legal
entitlement to shoot to kill once the “ ‘means and motivation’ of the pirates
[are] established,” would be effective.884 Those in favor of a more aggressive
defense by ship crews argue against that which is deemed the current “mis-
guided policy of restraint against the ever growing threat from pirates,”885
appearing “dangerously close to total surrender.”886
However, the Director of the International Maritime Bureau
(“IMB”), Pottengal Mukundan, feared that arming crews would lead to
escalation of the situation,887 and was also opposed to the idea of placing
armed private security guards on ships.888 Captain Richard Farrington,
Chief of Staff of the European Union’s Operation Atalanta told BBC,
“[i]ndustry thinks it’s a bad thing, we think it’s a dangerous thing and we
would not condone it.”889 Nicolaos Charalambous, Deputy Director of the
IMO, was even more apprehensive about the possibility of turning “the
whole area into a naval battle.”890 There is also the risk of severe explosion
if such a battle erupted on a supertanker under pirate assault.891 Addition-
ally, there are questions about the type of training that ship crews would
require to use weapons effectively.892 Nicole Stracke, researcher in security
and terrorism at the Dubai Gulf Research Centre, is convinced that “[t]he
more aggressive and offensive the counter-measures are going to be, the
more aggressive pirates are going to react.”893 Most sea captains are aware,
883 See Seafarers’ Ban to Somalia-bound Ship Slammed, INQUIRER, Apr. 22, 2009, http://
services.inquirer.net/print/print.php?article_id=20090422-200764.
884 Dan Williams, Interview—Ship Guards, Navy Routes Can Beat Pirates—Expert,
REUTERS.COM, May 18, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/latestcrisis/iduslh648298.
885 David Eshel, Misguided Restraint Against Somali Pirates Will Only Escalate Attacks,
DEFENSE UPDATE, http://www.defense-update.com/analysis/analysis_somali_pirates_080509
.html (last visited Feb. 08, 2010).
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available at http://www.ufs.ph/2009-10/node/325.
889 Frank Gardner, Taking on Somalia’s Pirates, BBC NEWS, Feb. 11, 2009, http://news
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as well, that no matter how well the ship is defended, determined pirates
armed with automatic weapons will be able to get on board.894
Hillary Clinton, United States Secretary of State, says she is
searching for twenty-first century solutions to the centuries old problem
of piracy.895 Ms. Clinton has proposed freezing pirate assets as one way of
dealing with the problem.896 The success of any such venture would depend
on whether or not the pirates utilize the world’s banking system. Given
the proliferation in recent months of bank failures,897 the Somali pirates
may be less inclined to entrust their ill-gotten gains to institutions where
the money is likely to disappear forever. Daniela Kroslak, Deputy Africa
Programme Director of the International Crisis Group, suggested the com-
pilation of a list of individuals who are in charge of the piracy business,
and resort to travel bans, legal proceedings, and other measures against
those persons.898
It has also been suggested that instead of expending costly naval
forces, several nations should combine to provide an effective flotilla of
smaller coast guard vessels to deter the pirate boats from attacking com-
mercial shipping.899 Somali politicians have repeatedly asked the West for
assistance in creating their own coast guard to deter pirates as well as
waste dumpers and unlicenced fishing vessels.900
In the past, some states were reluctant to assume the expensive
and onerous obligations of arrest, detention and trial of these foreign indi-
viduals whose crimes are perpetrated far from the home base of the tar-
geted vessel.901 For this reason, pirates tended to be captured and released
soon after.902 There were also apprehensions that pirates would claim refu-
gee status once they landed in European countries.903 They might even
894 BURNETT, supra note 580, at 87.
895 Michele Kelemen, Morning Edition: Clinton: U.S. to Freeze Pirates’ Assets (NPR radio
broadcast Apr. 16, 2009), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyid
=103158509&ft=1&f=1004.
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claim immigrant status after the conclusion of their prison sentences.904
Accordingly, the jurisdictional issue was continuously articulated as an
excuse by Western nations who did not want a number of former pirates
becoming permanent residents in their countries.905 Monetary consider-
ations aside, apprehensions about jurisdiction are invalid, according to
Eugene Kontorovich.906 Kontorovich emphasizes that pirates have tradi-
tionally been deemed hostis humani generis, or the enemy of all mankind,
thereby conveying sufficient legal and universal jurisdiction over their
capture and disposition.907 Kontorovich suggests that “[a]ny ship patrol-
ling off the Horn of Africa can prosecute any pirates it captures, even if
the pirate has never attacked” that nation’s shipping.908 Recent United
Nations Security Council resolutions have considerably cleared the legal
path for detention of the pirates.909
It has also been suggested that because some countries, particu-
larly in Europe, are not inclined to engage in formal prosecution of Somali
pirates, it might be preferable to establish an international criminal court
to deal with the perpetrators of this particular type of crime.910 Douglas R.
Burgess, Jr., writing in the New York Times suggested that,
[r]ecognizing piracy as an international crime will . . . give
individual states that don’t want to prosecute pirates an
alternative—the international court. If pirates are recog-
nized under their traditional international legal status—as
neither ordinary criminals, nor combatants, but enemies
of the human race—states will have a much freer hand in
capturing them. If piracy falls within the jurisdiction of
the international court, states will not need to shoulder the
burden of prosecution alone.911
Professor Donald R. Rothwell also suggested international mea-
sures of justice, such as an ad hoc ‘International Piracy Tribunal’ operating
under the legal umbrella of UNCLOS, but giving all States the power to
904 See id.
905 See id.
906 See id.
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detain, arrest, and extradite piracy suspects for trial before that Tribunal.912
The Government of the Netherlands proposed the creation of this type of
tribunal to the International Piracy Contact Group.913 Having hosted
the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia and the Permanent Court
of Arbitration, the Netherlands has been called the “legal capital of the
world.”914 The idea has clear merit provided it is taken in tandem with
effective measures to assist Somalia to create a viable and functioning
state apparatus according to the wishes of the Somali people.
Until the international tribunal transpires, Kenya has become a
convenient venue for prosecution and detention of captured pirates.915 The
United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union have
signed agreements with Kenya to accept and prosecute suspected
pirates.916 Such agreements have been controversial, given Kenya’s own
human rights record.917 At the time of this writing, at least one pirate,
arrested by Germany and dispatched to Kenya, has filed a lawsuit
claiming damages against the former for exposing him to unsatisfactory
Kenyan prison conditions.918 Other Somali pirate suspects have also
taken various forms of legal action in Kenya demanding legal costs from
the German Government.919 Human Rights Watch has noted some
significant problems with the justice system practiced in Kenya, including
beating of prisoners, corrupt judges and unfair trials.920 Another problem
relates to the fact that justice in Kenya is slow, with a backlog of 800,000
cases,921 though it appears that the international piracy cases are being
912 Rothwell, supra note 10.
913 Netherlands Proposes International Anti-Piracy Tribunal, EXPACTICA, May 30, 2009,
http://www.expatica.com/nl/news/local_news/Netherlands-proposes-international-anti
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914 Id.
915 See Jacquelyn Porth, Countries Victimized by Pirates Pursue Legal Cases, AMERICA.GOV,
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fast-tracked.922 An international trust fund has been created to pay for
the prosecution of suspected pirates.923
While the arrested pirates may disagree strenuously, Moses
Wetangula, Kenya’s Foreign Minister, has emphasized the important con-
tribution his nation is making.924 It is true that “[p]rosecuting pirates puts
enormous strain on a country’s legal system.”925 However, Wetangula in-
sisted that Kenya would “not become a dumping ground for every Somali
pirate captured on the high seas.”926 Ministers representing the G8 coun-
tries met in Rome in May 2009 and agreed to “help strengthen the criminal
justice system in poor regions affected by piracy, such as East Africa.”927
Kontorovich believes that Kenya, although not involved directly in the
incidents, shares jurisdiction “with all the nations of the world who could
just as readily prosecute if they had the will.”928
CONCLUSION
This study of the Somali tragedy has attempted to analyze the
problem from a variety of perspectives, including the very genuine griev-
ances of the Somali people concerning the predatory abuse by some for-
eigners of their coastline and ocean region, as well as the fear and terror
inspired by their retaliatory vigilante actions against the unarmed sailors
and crewpersons who traverse the Gulf of Aden only because it is their job
to do so. Are there any viable options to curb, and hopefully some day end,
this double tragedy whereby Somalia’s problems have now become the
world’s threat? In the short run, it is possible that the international com-
munity can take immediate steps acting both under the United Nations
umbrella and individually.
The numerous navies patrolling the Somali oceans to protect their
own vessels929 could also be charged to ensure that neither their nations’
ships, nor those of other nations, dump toxic waste into Somali waters.
It is in their best interest to act not merely as policemen over Somali
pirates but over the foreign fleets as well. By having a number of vessels,
ideally under one United Nations command, foreign vessels may be able
922 See id. (discussing the possibility of establishing a special tribunal to handle piracy cases).
923 Press Release, U.S. Dept. of State, supra note 804.
924 Ryu, supra note 713.
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2010] THE PIRATES OF SOMALIA 485
to effectively patrol a pirate alley area—estimated to be 2.5 million square
miles,930 or about four times the size of Texas. If it is too much to expect
that foreign navies will openly hurl accusations of waste dumping, at the
very least, they could be ordered to report all incidents of oceanic dump-
ing to the United Nations, with hopefully, the name of the vessel perpe-
trating the action. This type of naming and shaming, particularly with
open publicity on that amazing instrument of globalization, the Internet,
would go a long way to expose those criminally polluting Somali waters.
This would also enable Somali leaders to convince their skeptical popula-
tion that some degree of decency can still prevail among the outsiders
who traverse their waters. There has to be action of this sort for mutual
confidence to be created.
The research suggests that national governments have probably
not sanctioned either the over-fishing or the oceanic dumping.931 The
actions, by all accounts, appear to be those of individual business interests
who are not averse to engaging in criminal enterprises where the profits
are so lucrative.932 The fact that this predatory looting and polluting of
Somalia has not been governmentally sanctioned by any nation is a
positive sign indicating that governments around the world will have to
act individually, and through the United Nations, to ensure that any of
their ships, named and shamed, are dealt with through their own inter-
nal justice systems, and that criminally-inclined business interests are
not allowed free rein in Somali waters.
There is of course, the problem of flags of convenience, and ships
adopting registration in countries with lax laws. Such nations will have to
be convinced that if they allow shipping sporting their colors to become part
of a criminal enterprise, the community of nations may have to levy sanc-
tions against the entire country. The UNCLOS specifies that it is the duty
of the flag state where a ship is registered to enforce rules concerning the
control of marine pollution, regardless of the location of the infraction.933
As a number of the countries who hand out these expedient flags
of convenience depend quite heavily on foreign investment, foreign aid,
and foreign goodwill, their governments might balk at any overt associa-
tion of their state with plundering and polluting. Once again, world public
930 David H. Shinn, Rise of Piracy and other Maritime Insecurity in Somalia, EAST AFRICA
FORUM, Apr. 7, 2009, http://www.eastafricaforum.net/2009/04/11/rise-of-piracy-and-other
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931 See supra Part II.
932 See supra Part II.
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opinion, now so strong in this age of instant communication, could be
brought to bear on a naming and shaming exercise. If the United Nations
is wary of engaging in this activity, the international community of jour-
nalists, activists, and bloggers will not hesitate to participate. It has also
to be remembered that with the benefits of modern technology at their
command, the developed states, and many developing countries, are in a
position to provide very effective surveillance and monitoring of both dump-
ing and fishing activities in Somalia as part of a humanitarian effort to
protect the oceans until that tragic land can undertake this task.
If Somalia cannot now declare certain areas as no-fishing-zones,
the United Nations has an obligation to do so and ensure that the stocks
do not become extinct. Would it not be preferable to protect Somalia’s
vital food resource instead of providing years-long handouts of food aid
to its starving people? There are some indications of a changing approach.
Leigh Philips, writing for the EU Observer, stated in April 2009 that the
“European Commission has said it is ready to investigate and take action
against any European boats or European-owned fishing companies that
fly flags of convenience that engage in illegal fishing off the coast of
Somalia.”934 However, the European Commissioner for Fisheries put the
onus on the Somali Government—presently fighting for its survival—to
produce the evidence that would trigger an investigation.935 More nega-
tively, Cesar Deben, the European Union’s Maritime Affairs Director for
Policy, told journalists that in 2008 he encountered Somali allegations of
over-fishing and found them to be “facile and stupid rumours.”936
As thousands of commercial vessels traverse this vital sea route,937
the United Nations could also call on these ships to name and report any
waste dumpers and illegal fishing boats that are observed during their
travels through the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden. This makes the pro-
tecting of Somali waters an exercise of the world community and such
actions would go a long way to building better relations.
There has been plenty of commentary about Somalia’s present
situation as a pirate haven, as a failed state, as an area in a perpetual
state of anarchy, and as a region beset with so much violence and inhu-
manity that the outlook for its future must look grim. However, before we
934 Phillips, supra note 328.
935 See id.
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wring our hands and write off Somalia with a sense of resigned despair,
it is also necessary to take a similar analytical microscope and examine
the motivations of the world community. We must particularly look at its
richest and most fortunate nations and the international organization—
the United Nations—that was established in 1945 to ensure peace and
security, the implementation of human rights, and to secure a better,
safer future for all the people on this planet. If the analysis of Somalia
regrettably has to conclude that it is today a representative failed state,
the examination of the United Nations in relation to Somalia equally and
fairly has to lead to the conclusion that in this particular crisis, it has also
failed miserably to fulfill its mandate. At its creation, the United Nations
was envisaged as a hope for all mankind. Again, with full recognition of
the fact that the United Nations, consisting of sovereign Member States,
can only be as decisive as its membership will allow, the blame must shift
to the global community. The nations of the world have to be deemed re-
sponsible for neglecting Somalia’s environment, its economic priorities,
and for passively allowing the violation, by their own business interests,
of fundamental international laws that exist to protect all nations, not
just those that have effective governments.
If foreign navies will undertake the dual roles of curtailing Somali
piracy and curbing over-fishing and ocean dumping, they will be assisting
Somalia by taking over a vital task—ocean policing—until the Somalis
can create and sustain a viable government. Here, the prognosis is still
dim. Somalia has not had an effective government since 1991,938 and the
decades-long internecine warfare of various clan warlords has now been
further complicated by the incursion of Islamic fundamentalists who
appear determined to step into the power vacuum.939 Their most extreme
elements could conceivably turn this strategic area into a terrorist haven.
For the world, having Somalia as the ultimate terrorist base would be
infinitely worse than having it as a pirate hangout.
The research also establishes that while Somalis may reluctantly
tolerate foreign navies protecting their seas, they appear to be unified in
their resistance to any foreign forces appearing on their shores.940 Any
study of Somalia’s recent past including the interventions by the United
States of America and other countries and the various United Nations
expeditions can only lead to one conclusion: the Somalis have to be left to
fight this land battle themselves. Unless they can acquire the necessary
938 See Somalia Needs Stability, supra note 645.
939 See Wadhams, supra note 688.
940 See Somali Anti-Pirate Coastguard Bid, supra note 773.
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will to unify under one national leader, subsume their clan differences, and
create a functioning state and government, there is nothing any foreign
power can do to facilitate this situation from within the country. It would
be the utmost folly to attempt any landed intervention into Somalia, and
there appears to be little desire on the part of any nation to undertake that
daunting task. The democratic nations that could be in the forefront of
any such expeditionary force to Somalia would be extremely reluctant to
have to deal with a country where the local population is both hostile and
well-armed.941
Should the United Nations for once abandon its tendency to feast
on its own rhetoric and instead take meaningful action, those Somali
leaders who appear to have a more solid base of support could be invited
to provide some solutions as to what they consider is necessary for success
in creating a viable government. Naysayers will argue, with some justifi-
cation, that this has been tried and the numbers of fragile governments
that have come and gone is well-known. Somalia’s ninth president since
the fall of Siad Barre in 1991, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, assumed
office in January 2009 to confront a daunting combination of problems.942
The research and analysis of Somalia’s present plight leads to the
conclusion that the world can best assist itself and Somalia by utilizing
naval forces vigorously in the ocean trade route areas, providing protection
both for international shipping and for Somali waters against over-
fishing and toxic waste dumping. The global community should let the
Somalis deal with their problems on land. The provision of humanitarian
aid, where that can be delivered safely, and the readiness to provide exper-
tise and technical advice are productive ways to engage Somalis in working
toward their own reconstruction. By providing Somalis with the capacity
to establish law and order on land, it is very likely that they will be in a
position to curb and control the piracy that is so menacing to world ship-
ping. They might, in the process, avert any possibility of their country
becoming a terrorist base. It would be more cost-effective to subsidize a
Somali police force and coast guard than to keep huge armadas of naval
vessels from so many countries on permanent patrol in the Indian Ocean.
This article also proposes a somewhat innovative approach for the
international community and the United Nations. While it is certainly
laudable that so many countries donate millions to feed starving Somalis
and provide humanitarian relief on a regular basis, the globalizing and
shrinking world also requires that countries act more constructively and
941 See MUSAH & CASTLE, supra note 848.
942 See Somalia Needs Stability, supra note 645.
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assertively when any state is in trouble—suffering anarchy, serious civil
conflict, and the like. The world must act to help failing states at their
moment of crisis, not with unwanted interventions but with clearly pro-
tective intentions. The proposal is that the United Nations, acting through
its Member States, ensures that the suffering country’s external boundaries
and oceanic resources are protected from all predators until the internal
matters are resolved. This would not necessarily involve land interventions
like the tragic UNOSOM campaigns. Rather, it would require that every
country assures the United Nations that its own nationals and its fleets
will observe all the rules already adopted as international law with respect
to the country that is undergoing internal anarchy. It would also ensure
that no advantage is taken of the weakness of the State in crisis by any
parties, and that no attempts are made by land neighbors to extend their
territory. It would certainly prevent the illegal dumping of toxic and
nuclear waste because international law clearly prevents such actions. By
vigorously applying national and international law to their own nationals
who commit crimes against the weakened state, the nations of the world
would be demonstrating a global conscience that is vital in this inter-
connected world. Additionally, if any inhabitants of the anarchic country
engage in international crime, as have the pirates of Somalia, then the
foreign powers would, again, with the sanction of international law, have
the right of arrest, detention, and trial of such individuals. I would also
suggest that where such ventures involve the naval forces of many coun-
tries, that a joint United Nations command structure be adopted to ensure
consistency, and prevent further complications arising from contradictory
rules of engagement.
Wherever there appears to be a viable political structure emerging
in the country in trouble, the representatives of that system should be
included in the United Nations command and control system. Leaders with
some credible base of local support should be utilized for their advice and
acknowledged as partners in the international efforts to protect their
oceans or borders. As we have seen, United Nations interventions have to
have some local support in order to gain credibility and work effectively.943
There is an old African proverb that says: “Until lions write their
own history, the tale of the hunt will always glorify the hunter.”944 The
943 For a discussion of U.N. and U.S. military and diplomatic actions in Somalia during
the 1990’s, see supra Part I.D.1.
944 Anna Marano, Somali: Money and the Civil War, AFRICAN HOLOCAUST, http://www
.africanholocaust.net/articles/Somalia%20Money%20and%20Civil%20War.htm (quoting
an African proverb).
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instant saga of two forms of piracy, one purely monetary, the other environ-
mental as well as ultimately monetary, glorifies none of the perpetrators.
Instead it shows how ultimately we are all the victims when crime of any
type despoils a weak and helpless country.
The tragic saga of piracy in Somalia is not just a story about inter-
national crime. It is also and equally a story about economic deprivation
so severe that its victims have few alternatives and almost no choices. The
tragic reality of this saga is that in seeking to alleviate their own misery,
the pirates of Somalia have involved the entire world and have reinforced
the truism that in this globalized world, “poverty anywhere constitutes
a danger to prosperity everywhere.”945 It is both a moral and a legal obli-
gation on the nations of the world to forego any selfish thoughts of national
aggrandizement or profit from the suffering of a colleague state, and to
seek instead, to assist the weak country, without seeming to encroach or
poach or take advantage of its status as a failing or failed state. If global-
ization is really to succeed, then attitudes must change, both in the United
Nations and in the world community. There is no reason why a globalized
conscience focusing on mutual respect, tolerance, and peaceful interac-
tion should not develop in this new millennium where so much change
appears possible. The goal would then be to integrate solutions that
address Somali concerns about lawlessness, poverty, and environmental
destruction in tandem with measures to curtail piracy. It is simply not
sensible to mount huge military operations to deal with the piracy
problem and do next to nothing about the problems that generate the
piracy. As Professor Mohamed Elmasry commented: “It is up to the
international community to address the causes of piracy, not just react
to its consequences.”946
This research concludes with a truism, that globalization will only
succeed and advance the interests of the world if it does not occur at the
expense of, and to the detriment of, any group or nation. Either we all
pull together and succeed in tandem or we all falter and fail. The Somali
pirates have certainly proven that in the realm of international politics,
power and might are not necessarily the paths to success.
This article titled itself with a question mark that is its ultimate
hypothesis, whether Somalia’s pirates are opportunistic predators or envi-
ronmental prey. The extensive research and analysis of the vast material
945 See Cho Sung-joon, supra note 718 (quoting the Constitution of the International
Labor Organization).
946 Dr. Mohamed Elmasry, In Somalia, Where can You Hide $100 Million?, CANADIAN
CHARGER, June 29, 2009, http://www.thecanadiancharger.com/page.php?id=5&a=48.
2010] THE PIRATES OF SOMALIA 491
on this subject lead to the conclusion that both elements are applicable.
There can be no doubt that the pirates of Somalia pose a very serious
threat to peaceful commercial shipping, a threat with the potential of
catastrophic disruption of the global economic system. However, there
can also be no doubt that the original bands of pirates—the retaliatory
vigilante fishermen—are the victims of environmental degradation on a
significant scale caused by the vessels and crews of several nations. The
tragedy of Somalia today is that, absent a stable government, its people
have had to resort to piracy both as a means of sustenance and to make
a point. That people in any country are driven by economic deprivation to
engage in international crime is a sorry reflection on all of us who enjoy
the benefits of living in the developed world.
Lest we become too complacent and adopt a condescending attitude
about the motivations, justifications and activities of these pirates, we
might pause to consider that they have had incredible success for such
a rag-tag bunch of young men. We should also ponder the reality that
these poverty-stricken young men have managed to climb and seize our
ships and hold the rich world to ransom relatively easily. They have shown
us our own weakness and vulnerability. We cannot, in the so-called First
World, continue to live comfortably and even relatively prosperously, and
ignore the terrible poverty and deprivation that is spreading in other parts
of this planet.
